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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

DANIEL BYMAN argues that criticism of U.S. policy toward Iraq is often overstated and fails to appreciate the accomplishments of the Bush and Clinton administrations. The author discusses which mechanisms have proven particularly effective but also analyzes the room for improvement in U.S. policy.

BRUCE J. DICKSON analyzes the political consequences of economic reform in China by looking at the Chinese Communist party's efforts to recruit technical experts and entrepreneurs into the party. These strategies of cooptation and corporatism are designed to help the party to adapt, but they are also creating tensions with its Leninist nature that may undermine the party's authority rather than rejuvenate it.

MICHAEL JONES-CORREA explores the diffusion of racial restrictive covenants in the early twentieth century. He argues that while critical events like the 1917–1921 race riots ushered in new racial policies, it was interactions among political actors that helped determine which policy alternatives survived and which withered on the vine.

ERIC M. USLANER challenges the accepted wisdom about trust. He argues that group membership and informal socializing do not depend on trust and do not create trust. He establishes categories of trust and discusses the consequences of each type for civic engagement. This author also explores why Americans have become less trusting over time, emphasizing the role of religious fundamentalism, growing pessimism, and rising economic inequality.

RICHARD NED LEBOW asserts there have been three transformations of the international system in the twentieth century. He conducts a counterfactual analysis of World War I—one such transformation—to show there is no necessary relationship between the number and the intensity of underlying causes and the probability of an event. The immediate causes of World War I—the double assassinations at Sarajevo—met a diverse set of political and psychological requirements without which Austrian and German leaders would not have taken the steps that led to war. Sarajevo indicates that there is a class of situations that require complex and highly specialized triggers whose appearance may be infrequent.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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After the Storm: U.S. Policy Toward Iraq Since 1991

DANIEL BYMAN

The end of the Persian Gulf War on 28 February 1991 was supposed to have ended the conflict between Iraq and the U.S.–led coalition. Yet Desert Storm was only the beginning. In the years following the Gulf War, the United States and its allies repeatedly used limited force against Iraq, maintained tight sanctions, conducted intrusive inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs, supported anti-Saddam oppositionists, and otherwise strove to isolate and weaken Baghdad. Ten years after the war ended, a resolution of the conflict seems further away than ever. Since December 1998, the United States and Britain have conducted a sustained, if limited, bombing effort against Iraqi targets.

This massive effort carries a price. Critics claim that the Iraqi people, not the regime, bear the brunt of U.S. efforts to punish Iraq. Contingency operations in the gulf cost roughly $1 billion a year, in addition to the money necessary for overall force posture in the region.[1] The large military presence in the gulf and the need to carry out frequent military strikes have hindered U.S. military preparedness and hurt the morale of U.S. forces.[2] U.S. policy and the associated military presence also anger Islamists and other anti–U.S. radicals, who have at times engaged in terrorist attacks against U.S. soldiers both in and outside the region.

U.S. policy toward Iraq is a regular bone of contention in Washington and abroad. In August 1999, a bipartisan group of members of Congress formally

[1] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops.iraq_orbat.htm [Accessed 3 March 2000].

[2] Paul K. White, *Crises after the Storm: An Appraisal of U.S. Air Operations in Iraq since the Persian Gulf War* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1999), 85.

DANIEL BYMAN is the research director of RAND's Center for Middle East Public Policy. His most recent publications include *Confronting Iraq: U.S. Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War* (co-authored with Matthew Waxman) and *Political Violence and Stability in the States of the Northern Persian Gulf* (co-authored with Jerrold Green).

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noted in a letter to the president their "dismay over the continued drift in U.S. policy toward Iraq."[3] Dissent is even more pronounced abroad. The gulf states and Turkey in general support a hard line against Iraq, but have at times criticized or opposed key elements of U.S. policy, such as sanctions or military strikes. Among the major powers, only Britain is solidly behind the United States. France, Russia, and China have at times harshly criticized U.S. policy, claiming that it is both ineffective and unfair.

This article seeks to provide a comprehensive evaluation of U.S. policy toward Iraq since the end of Desert Storm. What are U.S. objectives? What constraints inhibit U.S. policy? How effective are the means used to achieve these goals? What obstacles may hinder success in the years to come?

I argue that much of the criticism of U.S. policy toward Iraq is overstated and fails to appreciate many of the accomplishments of the Bush and Clinton administrations and their allies.[4] Most of the criticisms focus on one policy instrument, ignoring how that instrument works in combination with other elements. Thus, sanctions, inspections, or other instruments are denounced as failures even though they contribute in a variety of ways to overall U.S. objectives. Moreover, many assessments miss the range of goals the United States has in the region. Pundits regularly describe U.S. policy as a failure due to Saddam Hussein's survival, even though Iraq since 1991 has not successfully menaced its neighbors—a signal achievement. The United States has accomplished the

[3] As quoted in Robin Wright, "U.S. Nearing Key Juncture in Iraq Policy," *Los Angles Times*, 29 August 1999. Other senior lawmakers noted their concern over "signs of a reduced priority in US policy toward Iraq." As quoted in Jonathan S. Landay, "Is Iraq Building Weapons Again?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 30 August 1999.

[4] What works that exist on U.S. policy toward Iraq either fall into the category of punditry or focus only on an aspect of U.S. policy. Tim Trevan provides valuable insights into weapons inspections in *Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons* (London: HarperCollins, 1999). On inspections, see also Scott Ritter, *Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem Once and for All* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999). F. Gregory Gause provides an incisive critique of sanctions policy in "Saddam's Unwatched Arsenal," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (May/June 1999): 54–65; see also John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," in ibid., 45–53. Works on the Iraqi opposition include Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Gideon Rose, "The Rollback Fantasy," *Foreign Affairs* 78 (January/February 1999): 24–41; Daniel Byman, "Proceed with Caution: U.S. Support for the Iraqi Opposition," *The Washington Quarterly* 22 (Summer 1999): 23–37; and David Wurmser, *Tyranny's Ally* (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 1999). An assessment of the use of force to coerce Saddam can be found in Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Matthew Waxman, "Coercing Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the Past," *Survival* 40 (Autumn 1998): 127–152; and Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth Pollack, "The Crisis with Iraq: Reviving the Military Option," *PolicyWatch* (Washington Institute for Near East Policy), no. 295, 22 January 1998. Probably the best work on Iraqi internal politics since Desert Storm is Amatzia Baram, *Building Toward Crises: Saddam Hussein's Strategy for Survival* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998). Regis W. Matlak also provides a superb assessment. "Inside Saddam's Grip," *National Security Studies Quarterly* (Spring 1999), accessed at http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/nssp/nssq/Matlak.pdf (June 1999). A fine journalistic account is Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999). An assessment of policy alternatives can be found in Patrick Clawson, ed., *Iraq Strategy Review* (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998).

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most important task: keeping Saddam's Iraq contained (or "in the box," in Washington parlance). Because of the U.S. military presence, sanctions, and other measures, Saddam has not been able to attack his neighbors or other U.S. allies. Countering Iraq's WMD programs has met with less success, and the most ambitious objective—removing Saddam from power—appears far off today. The United States has made these limited gains without jeopardizing the stability of regional allies, another impressive accomplishment.

Several instruments have proven particularly effective. The use of force and the broader U.S. regional military presence have contributed to containment's success. Sanctions too have proved effective in containing Iraq, though they have not achieved more ambitious goals. The Iraqi opposition and weapons inspections have made more marginal contributions. For all of these instruments, however, their true contributions must be understood in the context of overall U.S. policy rather than in isolation.

Despite the generally positive U.S. record, considerable room for improvement remains. Perhaps most damning, much of the credit for the limited U.S. successes is due to Saddam's missteps rather than to skilled U.S. diplomacy and planning. Washington also wrongly emphasizes weapons inspections and other elements of the original containment regime despite their declining utility. The United States and its regional allies, which are vital to U.S. policy success, are often at odds over various policy instruments and their application, but U.S. domestic politics reduces policy makers' flexibility. Finally, the United States appears to lack a long-term plan for the region.

The remainder of this article has five parts. The first section describes U.S. goals since Desert Storm and notes how they have changed as the decade progressed. The second part examines constraints that have shaped U.S. goals and the means used to pursue them. Part three assesses the means used to meet these goals, noting what has worked and what has not. With this assessment in mind, section four reconsiders the overall question of whether U.S. policy in the gulf succeeded. Part five concludes by identifying several potential problems that could hinder success in the future.

U.S. Objectives

To understand whether U.S. policy toward Iraq has failed or succeeded, the most basic step is recognizing U.S. objectives. These include preventing any Iraqi regional aggression; stopping Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical and missile programs; and removing Saddam from power. A negative objective—preventing the spread of regional instability—has also guided U.S. actions. The relative priority of these goals shifted as the decade wore on, with concerns about Iraq's WMD programs and an emphasis on changing the regime in Baghdad rising in importance relative to the goals of containing Iraq and preserving regional stability. To meet these objectives, the United States relies on sanc-

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tions, weapons inspections, a large military presence, occasional military strikes, and the Iraqi opposition.

Containing Iraqi Aggression

Initial U.S. policy emphasized containing Iraq, preventing any aggression against Kuwait, other gulf states, and U.S. allies more generally.[5] Because Saddam's Iraq remained committed to regional domination despite its defeat in the Gulf War, the United States established a strong military presence in the region to deter, and if necessary defeat, any Iraqi aggression. To demonstrate its commitment, the United States has augmented its forces during crises and at times conducted military strikes. Another key element of containment is keeping Iraq's military forces—both conventional and unconventional—weak. Thus the United States and its allies, working through the United Nations, set limits on Iraqi oil sales and controlled how the money could be spent in order to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its forces.

Preventing a WMD Buildup

Although the conventional military threat Iraq poses remains an important concern, the United States is increasingly focused on Iraq's WMD programs. Before 1990, the world knew little of Baghdad's WMD efforts beyond the fact that Iraq had a proven chemical weapons capability. Moreover, strikes conducted as part of Operation Desert Storm were initially believed to have destroyed much of Iraq's WMD arsenal and capabilities. Information discovered following the Gulf War, however, indicated that Iraq was close to producing a nuclear weapon and had vast chemical weapons stores. After the defection of a key Iraqi regime official in 1995, it became clear that Saddam also had a vast biological weapons program. Military strikes during the war had only destroyed components of these massive programs.

Given Saddam's unrelenting hostility toward the United States and its allies in the region, both in the gulf and Israel, his possession of these weapons, which have the capacity to kill hundreds of thousands if properly delivered, alarmed Washington. Although the focus on WMD weapons began during the months preceding Desert Storm, the United States steadily elevated the WMD problem to near the top of its concerns, with President Bill Clinton declaring in 1998 that their proliferation "constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States."[6] In various

[5] See Zalmay Khalilzad, "The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony," *Survival* 37 (Summer 1995): 95–120.

[6] As cited in Gerald Steinberg, "U.S. Responses to the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 2 (September 1998), electronic version.

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crises after 1997, administration spokespeople emphasized Iraq's WMD programs as their justification for confrontation.

Like containment, preventing a WMD buildup requires several different policy instruments. Robust sanctions and import restrictions ensure that Iraq cannot acquire foreign technology and assistance for its WMD programs. Keeping the inspections and monitoring regime strong, however, requires agreement among the major powers at the United Nations, particularly those with strong defense industrial bases. Washington also has used military force to degrade Iraq's WMD capabilities, which in turn requires regional states to provide basing and access for U.S. forces.

Toppling Saddam's Regime

U.S. policy is focused on Saddam himself as well as the broader threat that a powerful Iraq poses to the region. U.S. leaders see Saddam as reckless, vengeful, and bloody—dangerous traits for a leader pursuing WMD weapons whose country is astride much of the world's oil supplies. At the end of the Gulf War, allied leaders assumed that the combination of military defeat and internal unrest would lead to Saddam's fall. To this end, the United States has used a range of instruments to remove Saddam from power. For many years after the Gulf War, Washington tried to foment a coup in Baghdad. The United States also used military strikes to discredit Saddam and to weaken regime protection forces. Policy makers also hoped that sanctions would foster popular and elite unrest, further destabilizing the regime.

In recent years, the most important instrument for removing Saddam has been the Iraqi opposition. According to its rhetoric at least, the Clinton administration is committed to working with the Iraqi opposition to topple the regime, even as it continues to contain Iraq. In November 1998, President Bill Clinton embraced the opposition, promising to work for "a new government" in Baghdad. Caution at home and opposition from major powers and allies in the region have led Washington to avoid the direct involvement of U.S. ground troops or aid to the Iraqi opposition that would require a major U.S. commitment. A policy more reliant on the Iraqi opposition would depend heavily on regional allies, who would be needed to provide bases, training, and support for opposition fighters.

Preserving Regional Stability

The United States has sought to preserve regional stability even as it pursued ambitious objectives regarding Iraq. Most importantly, the United States feared that the U.S. presence and actions necessary to contain Iraq or overthrow Saddam might decrease stability in regional allies. Sanctions are unpopular, as were many military strikes. In response, regional governments have at times criticized U.S. policy, failed to provide necessary support, or otherwise

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distanced themselves from Washington. Over time, U.S. policy makers have recognized a tension between the use of force and the stability of U.S. allies. Large force increases and the regular use of force against the Iraqi regime have angered many radicals in the region, threatening the stability of U.S. allies and the lives of U.S. personnel. The large and highly visible U.S. regional military presence proved a magnet for critics of gulf regimes, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Terrorist attacks against U.S. servicemen that resulted in the deaths of five Americans in 1995, nineteen in 1996, and seventeen in an attack on a U.S. naval vessel in 2000 highlighted the lethal nature of this threat. In response, Washington often limited the use of force and the scope and visibility of the U.S. presence. For example, the United States has restricted the personal leave of its forces within Saudi Arabia, relocated U.S. forces far from populated areas, and avoided using planes based in Saudi Arabia to conduct direct strikes on Iraq.

The United States has also sought to keep Iraq itself stable. There is little love lost among Iraq's tribal confederations, religious communities, and ethnic groups. Iraqi national identity is weak in comparison to religious or tribal identity, and the collapse of the center could lead to complete disintegration of the state. Moreover, Saddam Hussein has devastated Iraqi civil society, destroying any independent organization and rending ties among citizens. If Saddam falls, as General Anthony Zinni, former commander of the U.S. Central Command, has testified, dozens of opposition groups might compete for power, destabilizing Iraq.[7]

The United States has also tried to prevent radical Shiah from dominating a post-Saddam Iraq. The United States has long worried that a growth in Shiah influence would lead Iraq to tilt toward Iran, support other Shiites abroad, or both. Regional allies are especially concerned about the growth of Shiah influence in Iraq. Saudi Arabia and other gulf states have long feared Iran's revolutionary government, seeing it as seeking to extend its influence over the region, particularly in Shiite-populated areas such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province.

Iran, however, is not likely to dominate a Shiah led Iraq, and there is little reason to think a Shiah regime would be particularly hostile to the United States or its allies. Ethnic divisions between Iraqi Arabs and Persians, and Iran's economic problems, also diminish Iraqi Shiah ardor for Teheran's leadership. Nor have Iraqi Shiites shown a penchant for supporting radicals overseas.

Nevertheless, as a result of these fears, policy makers have hesitated to support efforts that might destabilize Iraq or lead to increased Shiah influence. In general, Washington has avoided policies that might contribute to an Iraqi collapse. It hesitated to support popular resistance to Saddam in the immediate aftermath of Desert Storm. In addition, for most of the 1990s, the United States has preferred a coup as a means of regime change, as this would be more likely to leave a strong government in power than would other methods.

[7] "Commander Opposes White House Strategy to Topple Saddam." *Associated Press*, 28 January 1999.

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Constraints On The United States

The United States does not have a free hand to pursue the above objectives. In particular, three concerns have complicated the application of force or otherwise limited U.S. options: a desire to preserve the anti-Iraq international alliance; public and allied concerns over Iraqi suffering; and domestic pressure opposed to any U.S. concessions with regard to Iraq. These three constraints have shaped both U.S. objectives and the means chosen to pursue them.

The United States seeks to preserve the alliance against Iraq forged during the Gulf War. Several core elements of containment and countering Iraqi WMD, particularly sanctions and UN inspections, depended on international support. Without the support of other major powers, sanctions would have little or no impact. UN inspections also require the backing of the Security Council. Furthermore, Washington believes that international support increases the legitimacy of U.S. policy in general, helping sustain the backing of key regional states such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Maintaining an international alliance, however, places severe limits on U.S. freedom of action. With the exception of Britain, allies have tended to be far more skeptical of the need to use force against Iraq. U.S. allies have also been more critical of the humanitarian impact of sanctions, and several states seek renewed commercial ties. Since 1997, China, France, and particularly Russia have also expressed their opposition to a robust inspections regime. Washington has often softened its policy toward Iraq for fear of jeopardizing the anti-Iraq alliance.

The United States and its allies have taken steps to protect Iraqi Shiites and Kurds from the depredations of Saddam's regime, but these steps are limited and evince a weak commitment to humanitarian objectives. Washington backed UN Security Council Resolution 688, which demanded that Iraq respect the human rights of its communities, and has been enforcing a no-fly zone in northern Iraq (and later in southern Iraq) in part to protect Iraq's communities. Despite these diplomatic efforts, Washington has avoided any formal commitment to either the Kurds or to the Shiites and avoided direct military support. In both cases, Washington waited until an outcry in U.S. and international public opinion before acting.

The United States has also sought to limit the impact of economic sanctions in response to criticism along humanitarian lines. After pressure arose on humanitarian grounds over sanctions, Washington backed UN Security Council Resolution 986, which allowed Iraq to sell oil to buy food, medicine, and other humanitarian items.

U.S. ambivalence stems from both ideological and practical concerns. Washington feels little sympathy towards the Kurds, who have few constituents among the U.S. people and who war with each other as much as with Baghdad. Washington is also concerned that any commitments will be difficult to back up should Saddam make a concerted effort to repress these groups.

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Domestic concerns are a final constraint. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations successfully forged a solid domestic consensus opposed to Saddam Hussein. The price of this success, however, is severe limits on the U.S. ability to make concessions to Iraq. Any tactical retreats are subject to criticism in Congress and in the media as being soft on Iraq. Political leaders must respond to limited Iraqi provocations to sustain domestic support even when the effectiveness of the response is questionable and the U.S. attacks may alienate vital allies.

Policy Instruments

The United States employs five instruments to meet its objectives, subject to the constraints enumerated above, with varying degrees of emphasis: economic sanctions; weapons inspections; a strong regional military presence; limited military strikes; and support for the Iraqi opposition.

The Limited Benefits of Sanctions

Sanctions on Iraq have served a variety of purposes, helping to contain Iraq and limit its WMD arsenal. Sanctions have threatened at times to loosen Saddam's grip on power, but also have inadvertently strengthened his hand. Sanctions' humanitarian impact and popular hostility to sanctions in the region, however, have hindered U.S. relations with allies and regional stability more broadly.

Sanctions were initially imposed as a pressure tactic following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Once the Gulf War ended, the rationale for maintaining sanctions was ostensibly shifted to Iraq's WMD programs, though the common perception at the time was that sanctions would continue as long as Saddam remained in power. Under UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq was to eliminate all its missile systems, WMD, and associated infrastructure in order for sanctions to be lifted.[8] Under restrictions that continue to this day, the United Nations must approve Iraq's purchases, thus reducing Baghdad's ability to obtain arms or technologies related to its WMD programs.[9]

Sanctions have been criticized, often quite severely, on humanitarian grounds. Dennis Halliday, the UN official who coordinated the oil-for-food program in Iraq, has contended that over 500,000 Iraqi children have died as a result of sanctions.[10] Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, F. Gregory Gause acidly argues

[8] UN Security Council Resolutions 661, 665, 666, and 678 set the stage for Resolution 687, approving and elaborating on the use of an economic or trade embargo and UN monitoring until Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait. Resolution 687 is the basis of postwar sanctions.

[9] Mueller and Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," 49.

[10] Gause, "Getting It Backward on Iraq," 58; Mueller and Mueller, "Sanctions of Mass Destruction," 49. Robert A. Pape uses the figure of 567,000 in his critique of sanctions; see "Why Economic Sanctions *Still* Do Not Work," *International Security* 23 (Summer 1998): 76. For an excellent review of sanctions, see Richard Haass, ed., *Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1998).

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that, "American policymakers need to recognize that the only 'box' into which sanctions put Iraqis is coffins."[11]

Critics of sanctions' humanitarian impact, however, often overlook the oil-for-food program, authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 986, and its countervailing humanitarian impact since it was enacted. Iraq is allowed to sell oil to purchase food, medicine, and other necessities. This arrangement offsets, in theory at least, much of the suffering of innocent Iraqis. Moreover, the oil-for-food arrangement suggests that most of the blame for the suffering under sanctions lies with the Iraqi regime. Under the oil-for-food arrangement, 15 percent of the oil revenue goes to fund humanitarian aid in the northern Kurdish region, which is administered by the UN, while the remainder of the country receives food and medicine distributed by the Baath.[12] Saddam long opposed Resolution 986, even though it decreased popular suffering. Moreover, areas in Iraq under UN control have seen an improvement in health statistics. Finally, the Iraqi regime has smuggled humanitarian goods out of Iraq, preferring black market profits to the well-being of the Iraqi people. The regime has often not purchased humanitarian items, despite the urging of UN officials.[13]

Even if the humanitarian impact of sanctions is overstated (or should be blamed on the Baath regime), the political damage stemming from U.S. support for sanctions has hurt the U.S. position in the Arab and Muslim world. Saddam has successfully attributed the collapse in the Iraqi standard of living to sanctions rather than to his regime's policies. By manipulating the access of the media and humanitarian organizations, the Iraqi regime has created a widespread perception throughout the world that thousands of Iraqi children are dying each month as a result of sanctions, ignoring the countervailing impact of the oil-for-food arrangement and the Baath regime's own responsibility. This perception has generated considerable opposition to sanctions, which are seen in the Arab world, including the people of many gulf allies, as cruel and senseless, a tool that starves innocent Iraqi children while doing little to Saddam. It has also contributed to regional, and to a lesser extent U.S. public, disaffection with U.S. policy.

Given this price, how effective are sanctions in their ostensible purpose—stopping Iraq's WMD programs? Clearly, they have not led Saddam to abandon his WMD programs. Citing UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) reports that Iraq still retains a good-sized WMD program, Gause argues that while sanctions do impede Iraq's WMD programs, they only do so to a limited ex-

[11] Gause, "Getting It Backward on Iraq," 56.

[12] Anthony Cordesman and Ahmed Hashim, *Iraq: Sanctions and Beyond* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 148.

[13] "Photos Show Iraq is Smuggling Oil in Violation of UN Sanctions," USIA Information File, 10 December 1999, available at http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/geog/nea&f=99121001.nne&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml [Accessed on 13 December 1999].

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tent.[14] Yet this criticism uses a false baseline that underestimates the benefits of sanctions. The true baseline should be Iraq's probable WMD status if sanctions had never been imposed. Most experts estimate that if sanctions were lifted Iraq would long ago have produced several nuclear weapons and an even more extensive biological weapons program.[15]

Are sanctions effective in weakening the regime? Saddam's regime controls Iraqi food stockpiles and uses them to bolster the regime's control.[16] Saddam has successfully exploited sanctions, using the money he controls through the black market to shore up support among elites, particularly in the military and the secret police. Like other despotic regimes before him, Saddam has shifted the burden of sanctions from his regime to the Iraqi people in general.[17]

Sanctions have, however, hurt the regime's standing somewhat at home, including with Saddam's core of supporters. The per capita income of Iraqis has plummeted, falling to less than one-fifth of the level Iraq achieved in the 1980s.[18] The Iraqi leader has not increased salaries sufficiently in response to inflation and otherwise let a range of possible supporters suffer. The impoverishment of Iraq has decreased support for the regime in general. Saddam has not been able to shift the entire burden of sanctions on his foes or on the powerless. His power base sees Iraqi prosperity as one measure of Saddam's rule. Thus, Saddam has had to take short-term measures, including accepting the oil-for-food deal, which he otherwise would have refused, in order to keep the economy afloat.[19] Sanctions have had a strong impact on the stability of Saddam's regime, but not enough to topple him.

Sanctions and import restrictions have had a considerable impact on Iraq's conventional readiness, thus augmenting containment. As with other uses of sanctions, they are often effective as a form of "brute force": rendering a target less capable of effective military action or other forms of resistance.[20] Sanctions proved quite devastating in Iraq, in part because of Iraq's dependence on oil, which must be sold on external markets to have value and can be easily monitored, and because it came on the heels of the Gulf War, which had devastated

[14] Gause, "Getting it Backward," 57.

[15] Michael Eisenstadt, *Like a Phoenix from the Ashes? The Future of Iraqi Military Power* (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), 39.

[16] Cordesman and Hashim, *Iraq*, 143.

[17] Gause, "Getting it Backward," 57. This problem of shifting the impact of sanctions from elites to the people in general is common. See Robert A Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22 (Fall 1997): 93.

[18] Cordesman and Hashim, *Iraq*, 150.

[19] Baram, *Building Toward Crises*, 61–78.

[20] Kimberly Ann Elliott, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" *International Security* 23 (Summer 1998): 53. The "brute force" vs. coercion distinction was first made by Thomas Schelling, who noted the importance of distinguishing between efforts relying on the threat of force to change behavior (coercion) and those that simply force an adversary to do what the coercer seeks (brute force). See *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 3.

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some of Iraq's infrastructure. Iraq's economic strength, the foundation of its military power, suffered dramatically because of sanctions.[21]

This impact is best observed by looking at changes in Iraq's military capacity since the end of Desert Storm. During the 1980s, including after the Iran-Iraq war, Baghdad made massive purchases of a range of weapons systems and was among the world's top arms importers. After the imposition of sanctions, this flood slowed to a trickle. As Iraq depended on imports for logistical and supply assistance, as well as for complete systems, its military readiness and effectiveness has plummeted.[22] Efforts to meet shortfalls through smuggling and by increasing domestic production have largely failed.[23] Iraqi forces have not been able to conduct routine maintenance, let alone modernization. Iraq's military capacity is less than 20 percent of what it was in 1990.[24] Information on the progress of Iraq's WMD programs is limited, but an intuitive argument can be made that a regime under tight international scrutiny, with its dual-use exports being controlled, has made at best limited progress on these programs, particularly when compared to their rapid development in the 1980s.

Sanctions, however, also have had a negative effective on allied stability, particularly with regard to relations with Washington. In part because of the perceived devastating effects of sanctions but also because of a vestige of pan-Arab sentiment and hostility toward the West, many Arab governments are increasingly critical of the U.S.–led containment effort. Among U.S. allies, Egypt has led the effort to end containment. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) also have questioned sanctions, and when fearing a loss of popular support, they objected to certain U.S. military strikes against Iraq.

This overall finding on the impact of sanctions on Iraq offsets somewhat the generally negative impact of sanctions in general noted by most academic studies.[25] As Elizabeth Rogers has argued, setting up the removal of a regime's leadership as the measurement of success is too demanding a test.[26] Lesser, but still vital objectives have in part been met by sanctions. Moreover, sanctions' impact is best understood by examining their contribution to U.S. objectives in combination with other instruments. Sanctions' ostensible purpose is tied to putting pressure on Iraq because of its WMD programs and is linked to the removal of the Iraqi regime—two goals that have met with limited or no suc-

[21] Immediately after sanctions were imposed, Iraqi GNP fell by more than 50 percent and Iraq's currency plummeted. Elizabeth S. Rogers, "Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts," *Security Studies* (Summer 1996): 60.

[22] Cordesman and Hashim, *Iraq*, 225.

[23] Ibid., 227–231.

[24] Anthony Cordesman, "Hearings on the Current Situation in Iraq" Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, September 1996.

[25] See T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (Spring 1997): 27–50.

[26] Rogers, "Using Economic Sanctions," 61.

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cess, respectively. Pressure from sanctions, however, led Saddam to accept weapons inspections in the first place. If weapons inspectors enjoyed any successes (and clearly they did), then sanctions deserve at least some of the credit.[27] Sanctions also serve a brute-force purpose. They augmented containment, hindering Iraq's ability to acquire weapons and technology that can help it build up both its conventional and unconventional forces.

WMD Inspections

On 4 April 1991, the United Nations adopted Resolution 687, which required the destruction of Iraq's WMD programs as a condition for ending sanctions. Iraq was to declare its illegal weapons immediately and to destroy them within a year. The UNSCOM on Iraq was created to catalog Iraq's WMD arsenal and supervise its destruction. In the years that followed, inspections have helped reduce Iraq's WMD arsenal by uncovering and destroying a range of weapons systems, stockpiles, and production equipment. Inspections, however, did little to solve the long-term problem of Iraqi WMD and at times hindered the effective use of force against Iraq.[28]

UNSCOM's task proved to be enormously difficult. Saddam refused to take UNSCOM seriously and neither declared his WMD arsenal nor cooperated in its destruction. He reportedly told his advisers, "The Special Commission is a temporary measure. We will fool them and we will bribe them and the matter will be over in a few months."[29] From the start, Saddam blocked the inspectors' access, lied to them about the extent or even existence of various WMD programs, and otherwise made a mockery of the process.

As the inspections dragged on, Saddam successfully forced concessions to the inspections regime that greatly hindered its effectiveness. In 1997, Iraq declared several sites to be "presidential" sites and thus off limits to inspectors, even though these sites included over 1,000 buildings and storage sites. In a fuzzily-worded Memorandum of Understanding between UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz signed on 23 February 1998, the United Nations agreed to respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity and legitimate concerns related to dignity, making particular reference to presidential sites. By implication, Annan agreed that the inspectors would limit their activities.[30]

In addition to gaining the complicity of officials at the United Nations, Iraq has also gained the tacit and at times overt support of several major powers. France, Russia, and China all became highly critical of both inspections and

[27] Ibid.," 60.

[28] For a review, see Daniel Byman, "'A Farewell to Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000).

[29] Cockburn and Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein*, 96.

[30] See "Interview: Richard Butler," *Talk* (September 1999), electronic version, accessed October 1999.

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sanctions. After UNSCOM issued reports citing Iraqi noncompliance, these powers called for the end of sanctions and criticized UNSCOM rather than demand that Iraq respect the Security Council's previous resolutions. In 1997 and much of 1998, the United States did not conduct military strikes to back up UNSCOM, for fear of losing the international consensus behind its actions.[31]

Rather implausibly, Iraq insists that its WMD programs are terminated and demands an end to sanctions as a result. In reality, Iraq's WMD programs may have continued even as inspections went on, and Iraq's efforts probably increased once inspectors' wings were clipped, though information is extremely scarce. A White House report to Congress notes that, "Saddam Hussein has shown no hesitation in developing WMD in the past, and it is prudent to assume that he is still intent on such development."[32] Press reporting indicates that Iraq may also be investigating new types of chemical agents and pursuing components for nuclear weapons.[33]

Despite these formidable challenges, UNSCOM made some progress on identifying and then destroying elements of Iraq's WMD and missile arsenal. UNSCOM (along with the International Atomic Energy Association [IAEA]) has overseen the destruction of dozens of long-range missiles and missile warheads; tens of thousands of chemical munitions and 690 tonnes of chemical weapons agent; a biological weapons production facility; and nuclear weapons production facilities.[34]

Equally important, when the inspectors had relatively free access throughout Iraq, their presence and vigilance made it more difficult for Iraq to continue work on its WMD programs. Although such judgments are difficult counterfactuals, it is plausible that if left to its own devices Iraq could have developed several operable nuclear weapons as well as a more extensive biological and missile program.[35] Thus, as with sanctions, the baseline for success should be comparing what Iraq's WMD programs would have been without inspections rather than simply judging it by the amount of material destroyed or the continued existence of Iraq's programs.

Even when the inspections regime was going full bore, however, its effectiveness was limited. Finding hidden weapons in a vast area is exceptionally difficult, particularly for biological weapons, which require a relatively limited infrastructure and can be easily concealed as legitimate medical or research facilities. The defection of Wafiq al-Samarrai, the former chief of Iraqi military intelligence, led to revelations that Iraq had manufactured and loaded the le-

[31] Ibid.

[32] Landay, "Is Iraq Building Weapons Again?"

[33] Richard Z. Chesnoff, "Bad Chemistry," *U.S. News and World Report*, 25 October 1999 (electronic version); Gary Milhollin, "Saddam's Nuclear Shopping Spree," *The New Yorker*, 13 December 1999, 44.

[34] From UNSCOM web-site, http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm [Accessed 2 March 1999].

[35] Eisenstadt, *Like a Phoenix*, 39.

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thal chemical agent VX—a surprise to UNSCOM.[36] Similarly, despite four years of intrusive inspections, the remarkable extent of Iraq's biological weapons program only became clear after the defection in 1995 of Hussein Kamel al-Majid, who headed Iraq's WMD programs. Only after this defection did Iraq admit that it had a large biological weapons program and, even more frightening, that it had weaponized some agents.

Military Presence

The U.S. military presence—as opposed to the actual use of military force—has helped in the containment of Iraq but carries a price in allied stability. After the end of the Gulf War, Washington signed a series of access agreements, sold large quantities of arms to its gulf allies, and arranged for the presence of substantial U.S. forces in the region. Since the end of the Gulf War, the total number of U.S. military personnel present both on the ground and at sea at any one time has fluctuated between 5,000 and 38,000, depending on the regional security environment and on rotation schedules. Troops in the region regularly include about 2,500 soldiers, 8,000 sailors and Marines, and another 1,000 staff from joint headquarters and joint units. In addition, about 200 combatant and direct support aircraft are deployed to the region to conduct Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch—the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq—along with their crews and support staff. Saudi Arabia and Turkey are key states for air bases, but Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates also play an important role.[37]

The most significant augmentation of U.S. forces in response to Iraqi defiance was in October 1994, when intelligence analysts discovered that Iraq was deploying two Republican Guard armored divisions near the Iraq-Kuwait border. Iraq made bellicose statements regarding Kuwait and also threatened to expel UNSCOM inspectors. The United States responded by rapidly deploying troops to the theater (Operation Vigilant Warrior) and threatening large-scale strikes if Iraq did not withdraw. Both the United States and Britain subsequently warned Iraq that they would use force to stop any Iraqi buildup south of the 32nd parallel. In response, Iraq drew back its forces, recognized Kuwait's independent status, and accepted the revised Iraq-Kuwait border. The United Nations Security Council also passed resolution 949, which limited the Iraqi troop presence near the Kuwaiti border—the so-called no-drive zone.

The United States also augmented its regional presence in 1997–1998 in order to make the threat of retaliation plausible after continued Iraqi defiance over weapons inspections. As 1997 drew to a close, Baghdad refused to allow the inspectors access and otherwise hindered the inspection process. In November 1997, the United States deployed the *U.S.S. George Washington*, which

[36] Cockburn and Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, 111.

[37] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops.iraq_orbat.htm [Accessed 21 February 1999].

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joined the *Nimitz*, sent B-52s to Diego Garcia, and deployed fighters and bombers to Kuwait and Bahrain. Washington also deployed additional troops as negotiations continued, leading to a total presence of 30,000 troops by December 1997.[38]

Tension continued to escalate in the weeks that followed. Iraq again obstructed inspections, leading the United States to deploy the *U.S.S. Independence* in January 1998 to join the other two carriers. In February, the United States deployed a Marine expeditionary force and additional aircraft. The Pentagon announced that the United States was ready to conduct military strikes on Iraq if defiance continued. In response to negotiations by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, which led to restrictions on the inspectors as well as to an Iraqi agreement to readmit them, Baghdad allowed the inspectors to return. Despite its favorable terms, Baghdad's agreement was only temporary, and Saddam soon refused all cooperation.[39]

The above review suggests that the military presence, like other instruments, had mixed benefits. The military presence contributed to the goal of keeping Iraq contained by diminishing any hope of territorial aggrandizement. High-level defector reporting indicated that Saddam was considering another cross-border attack in 1994 if there was no U.S. response to his buildup.[40] Not only was an Iraqi invasion deterred, but Resolution 949 laid the groundwork for red lines that have since made a surprise attack far less likely. Iraq's subsequent recognition of the Iraq-Kuwait border and of Kuwait's independence both were important U.S. demands, suggesting that Saddam recognized that facts on the ground would not change as long as U.S. forces were in the region.

The impact of the U.S. presence on Iraq's WMD programs, however, was far more limited. Although Saddam did comply briefly with inspections in response to the late 1997 and early 1998 U.S. buildup, this compliance was both half-hearted and short-lived. Saddam also wrung important concessions out of Annan, reducing UNSCOM's ability to conduct intrusive inspections. Thus, while the buildup and the threat of force it conveyed led to token concessions on Iraq's part, it did not contribute substantially to long-term success.

The military presence is costly. These continuing operations and the regular surges required to deploy to the region in response to Iraqi provocations have challenged military rotation and leave schedules. Sustaining the no-fly zones over Iraq has proved draining. The inhospitable welcome often given to West-

[38] White, *Crises After the Storm*, 50–51.

[39] Ibid., 51–52.

[40] "Hussein Kamil on Army Strength, Saddam Fedayeen." *Al-Watan al-Arabi*, 24 November 1995, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia, (FBIS-NES-95-227), 27 November, 1995, 33. Saddam may, however, have simply decided to call attention to the region, trying to bully Kuwait to have sanctions removed. The Iraqi dictator may also have been trying to prove to core supporters at home that he could defy the United States. The timing of the provocations suggests the importance of domestic motives: the Iraqi dinar was plummeting, forcing Saddam to increase food prices and otherwise making his regime unpopular. See Baram, *Building Toward Crises*, 79.

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ern forces further strains the military. Morale, retention, and overall readiness have fallen as a result.

The U.S. military presence carries a political price as well. In Saudi Arabia in particular, both radical and mainstream dissident groups have focused much of their protest on the large U.S. military presence in the Kingdom. Saudis are particularly upset about the cost of maintaining the U.S. presence and the related arms purchases, arguing that the money could be better spent on services and infrastructure. Much of the business community, many of whom do not strongly oppose the U.S. presence on ideological grounds, criticize U.S. policy in the region because they believe the cost of the U.S. presence has led to a decline in government largesse and is generally bad for business.[41]

Military Strikes

The United States has repeatedly used limited force to achieve its goals. Since the end of the Gulf War, the United States conducted air and cruise missile strikes to compel Iraqi compliance with a range of goals regarding containment and WMD and also tried to use the strikes to foster discontent with the Baath regime. The four major instances are described below.

January 1993 confrontation. In December 1992, Iraq initiated a crisis with coalition forces, making limited incursions in the southern no-fly zone and threatening to shoot down U.S. monitoring aircraft by moving additional surface-to-air missiles to the southern no-fly zone. At roughly the same time, Iraq blocked the inspection of suspected WMD sites. Two-hundred Iraqi troops also made several crossings over the newly-demarcated Iraq-Kuwait border, seizing items that they claimed belonged to Iraq.[42]

To coerce Baghdad to stop these provocations, U.S., British, and French forces conducted air strikes against several military sites. On 13 January, allied warplanes bombed, among other things, command and control facilities and air-defense sites in the southern no-fly zone. Several days later, the United States struck the Zaa'faraniyah nuclear complex outside of Baghdad with forty-five cruise missiles. The following day, allied aircraft again attacked Iraqi military facilities in the no-fly zones.[43]

In the end, Iraq backed down and did not violate no-fly zones or actively challenge UNSCOM inspections for several years. Diplomatic support, however, was uneven. Saudi Arabia allowed strike aircraft to fly from its territory—the last time it authorized such strike missions. Turkey, however, did not sup-

[41] Abdullah al-Shayeji, "Gulf Views of U.S. Policy in the Region," *Middle East Policy* 5 (September 1997); Andrew Rathmell, "Terror comes to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 3 (1 January 1996): 6.

[42] White, *Crises after the Storm*, 20–23.

[43] Ibid., 22–25.

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port the attacks, as concurrent attacks on Muslims in the Balkans had made Ankara reluctant to support perceived anti-Muslim operations elsewhere.[44]

Operation Desert Strike (September 1996). In 1996, after months of growing strife, open warfare erupted between the two leading Kurdish factions—the Kurdish Democratic party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)—in northern Iraq, a zone under an ambiguous level of protection by the United States. The PUK, with help from Iran, appeared to gain the upper hand. To avoid defeat, the KDP called on Baghdad to help repel the PUK. On 29 August, Saddam moved into northern Iraq, the area his government had earlier assumed was under U.S. protection, with 30,000-40,000 troops and thousands more police and intelligence personnel, along with several hundred tanks and artillery pieces. Iraqi troops took much of the north, including the Kurdish-held city of Irbil. In addition, Iraqi security forces rounded up hundreds of opposition members and supporters, executing and imprisoning them. Thousands more were evacuated to the United States.[45]

In response to Saddam's attack, the United States launched forty-four cruise missiles at fixed, above-ground targets in southern Iraq, primarily SAM sites, radar installations, and command and control facilities (Operation Desert Strike). In addition to the cruise missile attacks, the United States extended the no-fly zone in the south, which before had ended at the 32nd parallel, to the 33rd parallel. The zone's extension was intended to further limit Iraq's ability to move its forces and to improve the U.S.–led coalition's ability to monitor the regime.[46] By necessity, the U.S. response was limited, as both Saudi Arabia and Turkey refused to allow the United States to attack Iraq with planes based in their territories.[47] Both countries had little sympathy for the Kurds and did not see Saddam's incursion as meriting a large military response. Thus, the cruise missiles were launched from naval assets or from B-52s staging out of Guam.[48]

Saddam responded quickly to the limited U.S. attack. Iraq had concentrated forces near Chamchamal, a Kurdish-held city en route to the PUK's base at Sulaymaniyah. After the strikes, Saddam dispersed the Republican Guard and pulled his forces back to the cease-fire line.

Operation Desert Fox (December 1998). In December 1998, Ekeus's replacement as head of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the Security Council that Iraq was not complying with its obligations regarding WMD disarmament. This report came after over a year of Iraqi obstruction, backsliding, and outright defiance. In response, the United States and Britain conducted a

[44] Ibid., 22–27.

[45] Bruce Reidel, "U.S. Policy Toward Iraq: Balance, Dismember, or Contain?" Testimony before the National Security Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, 26 September 1996.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Cockburn and Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, 243.

[48] http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/desert_strike.htm [Accessed on 18 December 1999].

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large-scale, four-day air and cruise missile campaign against Iraqi military targets. The United States and Britain launched roughly 600 aircraft sorties and 400 cruise missile strikes against approximately 100 targets, including Iraqi intelligence and security forces facilities, presidential palaces, air defense systems, WMD sites, and economic targets.

Though far more massive than any previous strike against Iraq since Desert Storm, Desert Fox remained a limited operation. Even though one ultimate aim was to destroy WMD capability, the allied strikes avoided some Iraqi chemical plants, fearing that a strike could unleash poisonous plumes and kill Iraqi civilians. The campaign was ended after only four days to avoid adverse political and diplomatic consequences expected to arise if strikes continued during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Nevertheless, France, Russia, China, and Egypt all protested the Desert Fox bombings, and demonstrations were held in much of the Arab world.[49]

Saddam remained defiant of UNSCOM, but his reaction to the strikes indicates that he feared that military strikes might decrease support among his power base. In response to the bombing and overall crisis, Saddam divided Iraq administratively in a manner that would further increase the control of regime loyalists. He also reinforced areas such as Basra that might be prone to unrest and executed several officers who might have been considering a coup. In the following months, he also cracked down on any potential dissent among the Shiites, executing religious leaders.[50]

Tit-for-tat strikes in 1999 and 2000. Following Operation Desert Fox, Saddam repeatedly made limited challenges to the no-fly zone and continued to refuse access to weapons inspectors. In 1999, Iraqi forces made over 400 separate attacks on coalition aircraft, and over 140 violations of the no-fly zones; the figures for 2000 are similar.[51] In response, coalition forces have engaged in limited strikes, primarily against Iraqi air defense sites but also against communications nodes and other targets. As with the response to Operation Desert Fox, Saddam has stepped up efforts to prevent internal unrest.

Taken together, the various military strikes since the end of the Gulf War have helped the United States make marginal progress in keeping Iraq contained. The no-drive zone, enforced by the threat of strikes on any forces that deploy, has made it far harder for Saddam to concentrate his troops, which is necessary for large and sustained attacks across Iraq's borders. The strikes against Iraqi forces have hindered, if only in a limited manner, Iraq's efforts to rebuild its military power, forcing Saddam to rebuild scarce assets. Saddam has also displayed a remarkable sensitivity to military strikes, halting aggression in 1996 despite the pinprick nature of the attacks.

[49] Cockburn and Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, 284.

[50] See Matlak, *Inside Saddam's Grip*.

[51] http://www.centcom.mil/releases/news_rel [Accessed on 11 December 1999].

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Determining the true impact of military strikes is difficult, however, as their greatest impact may have been unseen, enhancing the credibility of U.S. deterrence. Given Saddam's sensitivity to limited strikes, it is reasonable to assume that he fears more massive attacks, which would be likely in response to more serious Iraqi aggression. The repeated strikes on Iraq, however, demonstrate both the limits of U.S. resolve and its depths. On the one hand, the United States has demonstrated that it will attack Iraqi regime assets for relatively minor provocations (interfering with a no-fly zone), suggesting that more considerable Iraqi aggression would result in more severe attacks. On the other hand, the United States appears unwilling to go beyond brief, if rather intense, bombing campaigns such as Desert Fox when seeking to punish or compel Baghdad. This hesitation may undermine many of the credibility benefits gained from the overall willingness to use force.

Destruction of Iraq's WMD programs through air strikes, however, has proved near impossible. Much of Iraq's WMD programs, particularly its biological programs, are difficult to detect even with on-the-ground monitors. Given that UNSCOM inspected and at times oversaw the destruction of the most obvious sites, the additional damage wrought by air strikes was probably limited. Thus, air strikes—including massive efforts such as Desert Fox—may have degraded known sites somewhat, but almost certainly did not represent a major setback for Saddam. Indeed, the WMD destruction effort at times hindered containment. The military posturing and strikes of 1997-1998 increased disgruntlement with containment in general, both in the region and among the major powers. These high profile confrontations and strikes eroded the consensus around inspections and sanctions, thus threatening the core of the anti-WMD efforts.

Military strikes, however, appear to have weakened Saddam at home—though they hardly led to the collapse of his regime. Saddam is intensely sensitive both to internal security and to any perceived loss of face as a leader.[52] The repeated military strikes, which he could do little to counter, undermined his stature among Iraqis. Moreover, when strikes threatened key regime forces, such as the Republican Guard, they directly threatened Saddam's key supporters.

As the years progressed, allies grew less supportive of military strikes on Iraq. Saudi Arabia began curtailing the types of missions that could be flown from its territory, and Turkey at times refused the United States permission to conduct strikes on Iraq. Despite Saddam's defiance over UNSCOM in 1997 and 1998, the United States refrained from attacks until December 1998, in large part because of a lack of allied support. Only Saddam's refusal to offer even a hint of compromise or compliance led to allied support for Desert Fox. The tit-for-tat bombings after Desert Fox, however, represent a reversal of this trend.

[52] See Matlak, *Inside Saddam's Grip*; and Baram, *Building Toward Crises*.

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Because of their regular and low-level nature, they are off the front pages, thus reducing the pressure on regional allies.

Repeated limits to access suggest a tension, but a manageable one, between the U.S. goals of preserving allied stability and containing Iraq. For lesser U.S. objectives, such as efforts to protect the Kurds or protect the no-fly zones, allies have limited U.S. access and missions to preserve domestic stability. Yet their stability has not been threatened to the point that they refused to cooperate with Washington.

Backing the Iraqi Opposition

A final instrument, one increasingly prominent in recent years, is encouraging the Iraqi opposition to overthrow Saddam. Since the end of the Gulf War, the United States made limited efforts to unite Iraqis opposed to Saddam, helping form the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as an umbrella group and otherwise encouraging anti-Saddam forces. Washington, however, has refrained from providing substantial aid to the Iraqi opposition or direct military support for opposition military activities.

The opposition has met with at best limited success since the end of the Gulf War. Despite widespread hatred of the regime, the INC was not able to forge the opposition into a coherent, anti-Saddam front. The INC and its allies did not provoke significant defections from the regime.[53] Saddam's incursion into northern Iraqi in 1996 wiped out the INC's local cadres or forced them into exile. Today, the opposition in the country appears divided by region, religion, and ethnicity and does not act in concert with foes of the regime abroad.

The opposition received far more attention in the United States once it no longer had a presence in Iraq. In 1998, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, which authorized the transfer of $97 million in military equipment to opposition groups as well as other forms of modest aid. In response, the Clinton administration embraced the Iraqi opposition, at least rhetorically. In 1999, Congress supplemented this aid with several million dollars of direct assistance.

The opposition has done little to remove the Baath regime, and its existence may have actually strengthened it. Although the regime has at most limited support even among Iraq's Sunni community, this community fears greater Shiah or Kurdish influence in the country. This fear is particularly strong among Saddam's core supporters, who would pose the greatest threat to his rule if they turned against the regime. Not surprisingly, Saddam has played up fears of Iraq's dismemberment and the shadow of Shiah domination in order to maintain their loyalty.

Efforts on behalf of the opposition also may hurt ties to allies. Saudi Arabia is concerned that any opposition success might increase Shiah influence in Iraq and further destabilize the region. Turkey, for its part, is suspicious of any plan

[53] Cockburn and Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, 187–190.

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that might augment the military capabilities and increase the political aspirations of the region's Kurds. This skepticism is particularly acute outside the region. European allies oppose a strong commitment to the opposition, and Russia and China are highly sensitive to any U.S. efforts to foster internal unrest. Both states fear the precedent of recognizing insurgents, as they have their own restive minorities who oppose the central government.[54]

The opposition, however, does serve a useful role in the service of containment as long as its activities remain limited. A viable opposition forces the Iraqi regime to use its assets for internal security rather than external aggression. Saddam has also demonstrated a surprising caution when confronting instability, suggesting he is less likely to take risks if an opposition is strong. Washington can thus strike a balance, strengthening opposition forces to some degree without greatly angering U.S. allies. So far, U.S. efforts to back the opposition have not led the gulf states and Turkey to do more than criticize; basing and access remain unaffected.

An Overall Assessment: A Qualified Success

On its own terms, U.S. policy in Iraq is generally successful, though hardly perfect. Most obviously, Iraq has been contained. A robust U.S. regional presence, a rapid surge capacity, and a willingness to use limited force probably have convinced Saddam that regional aggression will not succeed. Moreover, as a result of sanctions and the devastation of the Gulf War, Saddam's Iraq is far weaker than it was in 1990, both in relative and in absolute terms. Baghdad's few friends during Desert Storm, such as Jordan and the Palestinians, have largely abandoned it. Iraq's regional influence, while increased from 1991, remains limited. In Richard Haass's words, Iraq today is "better understood as constituting a dangerous nuisance than an actual strategic threat."[55]

The United States has considerable capabilities to prevent cross-border aggression, and, if anything, the balance has tilted in favor of the United States and its allies since the end of Desert Storm. The United States now has large air forces in the gulf and is prepared to project additional force rapidly to the region. Access agreements have been completed with several gulf states, and prepositioned equipment would help ground troops gain their full strength far more quickly than they did in 1990. Advances in munitions and systems integration enable U.S. air assets to more effectively halt heavy Iraqi forces, which would have to advance through relatively open terrain.[56]

[54] Byman, "Proceed with Caution," 26-27. Even Britain has voiced its skepticism over the U.S. embrace of the opposition. See "Fatchett Reply to INC," 16 March letter circulated publicly by "Iraq News," 19 March 1999 (Electronic version).

[55] Richard N. Haass, "U.S. Policy Toward Iraq: Balance, Dismember, or Contain?" Testimony before the National Security Subcommittee, U.S. House of Representatives, 26 September 1996.

[56] See David A. Ochmanek et al., *To Find and Not To Yield: How Advances in Information and Firepower Can Transform Theater Warfare* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).

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Stopping Iraq's WMD programs has proved far more difficult. Iraq probably has not attained a nuclear weapon; and progress on its biological and chemical programs has probably halted (though data remain scarce)—a clear success when we recognize that without UNSCOM inspections, sanctions, and other measures Iraq would probably have a nuclear weapon and a range of biological weapons. Nevertheless, the broader U.S. goals of discovering the extent of Iraq's programs, destroying them, and preventing Iraq from reconstituting them in the future have not been met. Inspectors never discovered the true scope of Iraq's programs, much less destroyed them. Effective inspections ended in late 1997, and even the pretense of effective arms control has now been abandoned. Saddam is probably trying to continue some programs and certainly will do so in the future if sanctions end.

The long-term prognosis is even bleaker. U.S. actions have not substantially induced a change in Saddam's long-term policies toward acquiring such an arsenal. Given Iraq's long-time rivalry with Iran and current conventional weakness, it is probable that any successor to Saddam would also seek WMD. Although the current level of WMD infrastructure in Iraq may be limited, the country's scientific and engineering base remains robust and has the capability to rapidly restore WMD programs to past levels and beyond should international efforts to prevent this continue to decline.

Maximal U.S. goals were not met. Efforts to change the regime—by inducing Iraqi elites to support a coup or encouraging the Iraqi populace to overthrow Saddam—probably are farther from success than at any time this decade. Saddam Hussein has foiled several coup attempts since the Gulf War, as well as at least two tribal revolts. Iraqi intelligence rolled up the U.S. network in Iraq in 1996.[57] The Iraqi opposition is fragmented. Several Kurdish and Shiah groups maintain some, but very limited, capacity to operate against Saddam; but the regime vigilantly stamps out any sign of unrest.

When trying to overthrow Saddam, whether through a coup or an insurgency, the United States is pitting itself against the Iraqi dictator's strength. In effect, Saddam has "coup-proofed" his regime.[58] Not surprisingly for a man who has made many enemies, Saddam keeps a close watch on any access to his person. Members of his bodyguard are drawn almost exclusively from Saddam's home area. Other key regime protection assets, such as the Special Security Organization and the Special Republican Guard, also recruit largely from Saddam's al-Bu Nasir tribe and other nearby tribes that have good relations with the al-Bu Nasir. A key task of security forces is defending against a military coup.[59]

The United States has largely met its negative objective: preventing regional instability. Instability from Iraq has not spread to Turkey or other U.S.

[57] Baram, *Building Toward Crises*, 27, 48–49; Cockburn and Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes*, 229.

[58] For more on this, see James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security* 24 (Fall 1999): 131–165; see also Matlak, *Inside Saddam's Grip*.

[59] Baram, *Building Toward Crises*, 25.

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allies. Nor have the U.S. presence and strikes caused massive internal instability or led regional governments to turn against Washington. Although Islamists and other anti-U.S. oppositionists regularly criticize the United States for its military presence in the gulf region, the anti-Iraq campaign is only a limited source of their anger, and various strikes on Iraq have only marginally increased their resentment.[60]

Potential Future Problems

The successes that the United States and its allies have attained should not obscure potential weaknesses in regional policy. Four weaknesses are particularly acute: a reliance on Saddam Hussein's missteps; an overemphasis on keeping the forms of containment intact even when their utility has declined; a neglect of U.S. allies for the sake of domestic politics; and a lack of a long-term solution to the Iraq problem. These weaknesses could derail containment or otherwise gravely harm U.S. policy in the region.

Dependence on Saddam. The maintenance of sanctions and of allied support for military strikes depends in part on Saddam's mistakes. His utter refusal to make even token concessions regarding inspections, for example, has made it difficult for Russian and French apologists to press his cause. Similarly, his blistering rhetorical attacks alienated potential sympathizers among his neighbors, leading them to support U.S. military basing and strikes. A pretense of cooperation and repentance, while perhaps harming Saddam at home, would make it more difficult for the United States to maintain sanctions or attack Iraq. Thus, if Saddam becomes more temperate, sustaining containment will become more difficult.

Overcommitment to the forms of containment. The United States has also committed itself to several policies that no longer serve their original purposes yet are draining, both politically and operationally. For example, inspections are overvalued. Given the concessions made by Ekeus and particularly Annan regarding where the inspectors could go and how much notice was required, the inspectors cannot be expected to make major new discoveries or otherwise hinder Iraq's programs. The renewal of inspections under current conditions might actually hasten the end of sanctions and thus assist Iraq's WMD programs.

The United States nevertheless clings to the pretense of inspections, because retreat might be seen at home as well as in Iraq as backing down to Saddam. Washington, however, has weathered far more painful defeats, such as Saddam's invasion of the north in 1996, without suffering a fatal blow to its

[60] Daniel Byman and Jerrold Green, *Political Violence in the States of the Northern Persian Gulf* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).

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regional position. The United States has put its credibility on the line unnecessarily, making the continuation of inspections an end in and of itself. Changing course, however, requires the political courage to withstand criticism at home about being soft on Iraq, regardless of its validity.

Neglecting regional allies. The United States runs the risk of letting domestic pressures hinder vital relations with regional allies. Maintaining the no-fly zones requires constant basing and support from regional allies. Although policy makers have gone to great lengths to minimize resentment, particularly from Saudi Arabia, regional allies may also turn against U.S. policy if American backing of the Iraqi opposition is not handled carefully.

Focusing on the short-term. The long-term resolution of the Iraq problem will not come even if the United States meets its most ambitious objective with Saddam's death. Rather, stability (and perhaps better governance) will only come to the region when Iraq is integrated into a regional structure that provides security. Baghdad's desire for WMD, mistreatment of national minorities, and irredentist ambitions are likely to live beyond Saddam Hussein. Although a long-term solution remains far off today, the United States needs a blueprint for the region that goes beyond the removal of a particular leader. Only then, can its current short-term strategy serve long-term objectives.

Although U.S. policy toward Iraq is far from perfect, most critical assessments are a clear case of moving the goalposts. Based on initial U.S. goals, the Bush and Clinton administrations have scored an impressive success: Iraq has not invaded its neighbors and remains militarily weak. Although containment is a frustrating policy, the persistent problems Saddam's Iraq poses should not drive us to despair. The post-Gulf War containment of Iraq demonstrates that the threat posed by aggressive regional powers can be managed, if the United States and its allies can continue demanding and at times unpopular policies to limit adversaries' powers and restrict their freedom of action.*

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Cooptation and Corporatism in China: The Logic of Party Adaptation

BRUCE J. DICKSON

The political implications of China's economic reforms center on the adaptability of the Chinese Communist party (CCP). Can it successfully adapt to the new economic and social environment that its reforms are creating? Or is its ability to cope being undermined by these changes? In the midst of rapid economic change, scholars have identified trends that may be evidence of potential political transformation. Entrepreneurs and skilled expertise are being recruited into the party. Cooptation facilitates adaptation by bringing in new elites who may invigorate the party with new ideas and new goals. In addition, local party and government officials are developing corporatist arrangements to promote economic change. These trends give hope to some that economic reform will eventually lead to gradual political change, allowing China's transition from communism to be more like Hungary or Poland (or even Taiwan) and thereby avoid the turmoil that accompanied political change in the rest of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Along with these promising signs of rejuvenation are contrary signs of disintegration. Large numbers of party members are abandoning their party responsibilities to pursue economic opportunities. The nonstate sector of the economy is growing so fast that most enterprises do not have party organizations within them, and few new members are being recruited from their workforce. In some rural areas, party organizations are paralyzed, recruitment of new members is difficult, and lineage-based clans are competing with the party for influence. These are warning signs of disintegration, of a party unable to manage its members, to have direct institutional links with the most dynamic sectors of the economy, or to control its society.

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Although we cannot predict the ultimate fate of the CCP, comparing the experiences of other Leninist parties can at least clarify the kinds of questions we need to be asking. The challenges faced by the CCP are not unique—how to liberalize its economy without destabilizing the political system, how to change its organization and attract new members in order to carry out new tasks, how to balance the need to adapt with the need to uphold party traditions—nor are the strategies it has adopted to meet these challenges. Whether it will be successful, however, will depend largely on the peculiarities of the Chinese context: the legacies of the Maoist era, past decisions by party leaders regarding the scope and pace of economic and political reform, the continued influence of orthodox voices at the apex of the political system, and the evolving relationship between state and society.

Much of the recent scholarship on China has focused on the political system as a whole, and in particular the extent of central state power relative to local governments and society.[1] The impact of economic reform on the CCP itself, as opposed to the state as a whole, has received less extensive attention.[2] This article will consider the implications of ongoing economic reforms for the CCP by focusing on the two key elements of organizational adaptation: the cooptation of new members and the creation of new links with outside organizations. It will compare the kinds of elites being coopted into the CCP with those coopted into the ruling parties of Hungary and Taiwan, the best examples of successful transformation of Leninist parties, and consider whether a similar transformation is possible in China. It will then consider the utility of the growing literature on corporatism in China for understanding its changing political economy and its consequent impact on the political system. Both cooptation and corporatism are having positive impacts on China's economy and the CCP. But I will argue, neither is likely to lead to the transformation of China's political system. The evolutionary forces now at work are likely to be incompatible with the Leninist political system in China and will serve to undermine the foundations of that system, rather than prop it up. The expectation of incremental change, while reassuring in its depiction of political change without turmoil and instability, may therefore be misplaced.

The Onset of Adaptation and The Logic of Inclusion

The CCP's decision at the Third Plenum in December 1978 to abandon class struggle and to pursue economic modernization announced the beginning of

[1] See, for instance, Andrew G. Walder, ed., *The Waning of the Communist State: Economic Origins of Political Decline in China and Hungary* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Susan Shirk, *The Political Logic of Reform in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Joseph Fewsmith, "Institutions, Informal Politics, and Political Transition in China," *Asian Survey* 36 (March 1996): 230–245; Murray Scot Tanner, *The Politics of Law Making in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and Democratic Prospects* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[2] Some scholars have looked at different facets of this issue: Minxin Pei, *From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Jie Chen, "The Impact of Reform on the Party and Ideology in China," *The Journal of Contem-*

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the post-Mao reform era and the onset of the CCP's adaptation. These reforms led to profound changes in China's economy and society and consequently its politics. But it also set up a debate within the CCP between those who sought to protect party traditions and preserve their own positions, on the one hand, and those who sought the party's adaptation to facilitate economic change, on the other.

Organizations have two main strategies for coping with environmental change: cooptation of new personnel and creation of new links with other organizations. These strategies allow the organization to be better integrated with its environment and better informed of changes occurring therein. Cooptation allows the organization to add new skills, experiences, and resources (such as political support) that may enhance its performance and increase its chance of survival. But cooptation can also threaten the organization if these coopted actors do not share its goals. The organization may receive needed support but as a consequence be diverted from its original mission.[3] Therefore, the cooptation decision may be contested within the organization. Other organizational goals, such as self-preservation and self-replication, can become paramount, limiting the organization's ability to adapt successfully to new challenges. Opponents of adaptation may point to party traditions and established norms as more legitimate grounds for resisting change than sheer self-interest.[4]

The experience of authoritarian parties, and Leninist parties in particular, is consistent with this dilemma posed by cooptation. As they abandon class struggle for the sake of economic modernization, these parties typically switch from an exclusionary to an inclusionary, or cooptive, recruitment policy.[5] Organizations coopt those they depend on, who possess resources they require or who pose a threat to the organization. In the post-Mao period, the switch from class struggle to economic modernization as the key task of the party has made the party dependent on the technocrats and entrepreneurs who make the economy grow. Former class enemies and counter-revolutionaries are now brought into the party because they have the skills desired by party leaders to accomplish their new policy agenda. This may lead to the rejuvenation of the party, but may also lead to long-term degradation if the interests of these new members conflict with party traditions. As the party tries to adapt by coopting new members, supporters of party traditions resist "assimilating new actors whose

porary China 9 (Summer 1995): 22–32; Yanqi Tong, *Transitions from State Socialism: Economic and Political Change in Hungary and China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

[3] Philip P. Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949); Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald B. Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), 164–65.

[4] Michael T. Hannan and John Freeman, *Organizational Ecology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 67–68; Pfeffer and Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations*, 82.

[5] Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems" in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970); Ken Jowitt, "Inclusion" in *New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

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loyalty to the organization (as opposed to its ostensible goals) is in doubt."[6] This is precisely the dilemma posed by admitting technocrats and entrepreneurs into the CCP: they are committed to economic growth, but more orthodox leaders question their support of communism and loyalty to the CCP. Those who are more concerned with self-preservation than adaptation resist the arrival of former enemies into their midst.

But the concerns of defenders of party traditions about the potential threat posed by entrepreneurs are not totally self-interested. The main threat to an authoritarian regime is the "diversification of the elite resulting from the rise of new groups controlling autonomous sources of economic power, that is, from the development of an independently wealthy business and industrial middle class."[7] The creation of autonomous sources of wealth weakens one of the key institutional pillars of a communist system: state control over the economy, resulting in organized dependence, that is, the dependence of society on the state for economic security (jobs, housing, food, etc.) as well as political protection.[8] As economic reform creates alternative paths toward career mobility and acquisition of wealth (through education and entrepreneurship), dependence on the state is reduced, and the power of the state and its ruling party is similarly diminished. Thus, the fears of party conservatives are not totally self-serving or illusory.

The second key strategy for an organization to cope with environmental change is to create links with other organizations in its environment. These links allow information (and potentially influence) to flow between the organizations, elicit support for the organization, and may enhance its legitimacy.[9] Similarly, as a Leninist party enters the period of adaptation (or what Ken Jowitt calls "inclusion"), it substitutes the manipulation of symbols with the manipulation of organizations.[10] In other words, the party relies less on coercion and propaganda to control society and develops links with other organizations, either new ones that it sanctions or old ones it revives, such as united front organizations, labor unions, or professional associations. These corporate groups allow the party to organize interests emerging in the course of reform. Links between the party and the organizations allow both the articulation of those interests and the preservation of the party's role as the arbiter of competing interests.[11] In China, the state has created a dense web of economic and social organizations in order to channel interest articulation, regularize the flow of information between the state and key groups in society, replace direct state

[6] Patrick H. O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary," *World Politics* 48 (July 1996): 579–603, quote from 585.

[7] Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics," 20.

[8] Andrew G. Walder, "The Quiet Revolution from Within: Economic Reform as a Source of Political Decline" in Walder, ed., *The Waning of the Communist State.*

[9] Pfeffer and Salancik, *The External Control of Organizations*, 143–47.

[10] Jowitt, "Inclusion," 101–102.

[11] Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics," 34–36.

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controls over the economy and society with at least partial social regulation, and screen out unwanted groups. Thus, official recognition of social organizations serves the dual purpose of incorporating interests and viewpoints the state finds acceptable and repressing those it finds unacceptable or threatening.[12]

As with cooptation, however, the manipulation of organizations carries potential risks. An organization that previously enjoyed extreme autonomy (as is the case for most Leninist parties prior to inclusion) may be "unable to cope with a world in which it does not have arbitrary control."[13] Creating links with other organizations may strengthen those organizations at the expense of the party. These organizations may develop an identity separate from the party and eventually seek to represent the interests of their members and resist acting as agents of the party. What begins with the party's manipulation of organizations may lead to those organizations' manipulation of the party. Such an arrangement is incompatible with a Leninist political system. Cooptation and organizational links with nonparty organizations are key elements of inclusion, but they both come with risks attached. While they are necessary for the party's adaptation, they are not guarantors of the party's survival and may in fact contribute to its demise.

For one-party authoritarian regimes and complex organizations, the period of adaptation may be open-ended as the regime or organization makes repeated adjustments to its ever-changing environment. For Leninist parties, however, there is a tension between policies of inclusion and the party's mobilizational needs. Jowitt's original model of inclusion for Leninist parties implied it was a long-term and presumably open-ended strategy of survival, but later suggested it was simply the phase preceding the "Leninist extinction," because the liberalization that accompanied inclusion weakened the foundations of Leninist parties in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[14] China's leaders have been wary of making a similar mistake and have tried to limit the extent of inclusion in order to achieve "reform without liberalization."[15] But they have had a difficult time balancing the two elements of this dichotomy. As the CCP adopted economic modernization as its key task, it confronted precisely the same mobilizational challenges that are inherent to the period of inclusion for Leninist parties identified by Jowitt: increased social heterogeneity as the working classes developed a clearer identity independent of the state;[16] increased occupational and geographic mobility, which challenged the party's ability to

[12] See Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan, *In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[13] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis for Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 47.

[14] Jowitt, "The Leninist Extinction" in *New World Disorder.*

[15] Kevin O'Brien, *Reform without Liberalization: China's National People's Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp. 6–8, 174–78.

[16] Andrew G. Walder, "Industrial Workers: Some Observations on the 1980s" in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum, ed., *State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992).

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monitor and control society;[17] the displacement of the traditional "revolutionary" classes by new elites with professional and technical skills;[18] the cynicism of youth, in particular the changing attitudes toward the party.[19] But the biggest challenge concerns the party's own identity. How can it reconcile its cooptation of wealthy businessmen and the promotion of entrepreneurial skills with its traditional status as a vanguard party representing the interests of workers, peasants, and soldiers? How can the party balance its desire to integrate with society to promote economic modernization with its desire to maintain its monopoly on legitimate political organization and its ability to mobilize society on behalf of political and social goals? To examine these key questions, the following sections will focus on the two key dimensions of inclusion.

Cooptation

Since its arrival as the ruling party of China in 1949, a key and divisive issue confronting the CCP has been the appropriate skills and political backgrounds of potential party members. As the party alternated between periods of radicalist upsurges designed to transform the economy and society and periods of restoration designed to resume economic production and social order, criteria for recruitment also changed.[20] During periods of radicalism, when the party pursued utopian goals in its economic and social policies and promoted class struggle in its relations with society, the party rewarded political reliability and ideological fervor, while downgrading—and in some cases persecuting—technical expertise and intellectual freedom. In contrast, when the party emphasized economic development during periods of recovery from radical policies, the party targeted for advancement those with the experience and skills needed to manage the economy and impose order.

Rather than evolving in a linear fashion, therefore, the CCP remained stuck in recurring cycles of transformation and consolidation, largely because Mao

[17] Dorothy Solinger, "China's Urban Transients in the Transition from Socialism and the Collapse of the Communist 'Urban Public Goods Regime,'" *Comparative Politics* 27 (January 1995): 127–46.

[18] Li Cheng and Lynn White, "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan: Empirical Data and the Theory of Technocracy," *China Quarterly* 121 (March 1990): 1–35; Hans Hendrischke, "Expertocracy and Professionalism" in David S. G. Goodman and Beverly Hooper, eds., *China's Quiet Revolution: New Interactions Between State and Society* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).

[19] Stanley Rosen, "The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Society: Popular Attitudes toward Party Membership and the Party's Image," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 24 (July 1990): 51–92.

[20] Zhao Shenghui, ed., *Zhongguo Gongchandang zuzhi shi gangyao* [History of the CCP's Organization] (Anhui: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1987), chaps. 5–7; Chen Zhili, ed., *Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe shi* [A History of the CCP's Party Building] (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1991), chaps. 5–7. Variations in criteria for party recruitment fit the general pattern of policy cycles described in G. William Skinner and Edwin A. Winckler, "Compliance Succession in Rural China: A Cyclical Theory" in Amitai Etzioni, ed., *A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1969).

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Zedong resisted the institutionalization of the party required by consolidation. As a result, the debate over the proper qualities of party members and cadres was never decisively resolved in favor of either "redness" or expertise. The alleged presence of class enemies and the consequent ongoing need for class struggle meant that some people were excluded from the political system and from the CCP in particular. This is the essence of an exclusionary recruitment policy, appropriate for both periods of transformation and consolidation.

The transition to economic modernization in the post-Mao period necessitated changes in the definition of the party's work and also in the state-society relationship. Victims of previous political campaigns were released from prison and exonerated; former "class enemies" had their political labels removed and were welcomed into the definition of the "people." In China as in Hungary, reconciliation policies included the end of persecution of alleged class enemies, the release of political enemies from prison camps, expanded exposure to foreign media, greater travel and education opportunities, and enhanced artistic creativity and labor mobility.[21] The party also changed its recruitment policies. It first targeted the people with the types of technical skills needed for economic modernization and then began to coopt new social and economic elites in recognition of their prestige and accomplishments. The cooptation of experts and entrepreneurs prompted a debate within the CCP between those who argued the party had to adapt to survive and those who felt this particular form of adaptation undermined party traditions and thereby reduced its long-term survivability rather than enhanced it.

The Renewed Emphasis on Expertise

As the CCP abandoned class struggle as its core task and shifted to economic modernization, it first weeded out those whose radical tendencies made them unlikely supporters of reform and also rehabilitated the victims of past political campaigns, especially the antirightist movement of 1956–1957 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966–1976. These victims were generally too old and poorly educated to guarantee the success of reform, so the CCP also recruited those who were "more revolutionary, younger, better educated, and more professionally competent." By the time of the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, the percentage of party members with a senior high school or better education was 43.4 percent, up from 12.8 percent in 1978, and 92 percent of central committee members now have at least some college education. The CCP was less successful recruiting youth and therefore in the mid-1980s adopted the standard that two-thirds of new recruits had to be less than 35 years old. However, the party

[21] Yanqi Tong, "State, Society, and Political Change in China and Hungary," *Comparative Politics* 26 (April 1994): 333–53.

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as a whole continued to age, and the percentage of all party members under 35 actually fell from 27.3 percent in 1987 to 22.4 percent in 1997.[22]

Renewed efforts to recruit front-line workers revealed the tension between inclusion and mobilization. By the late 1980s, more orthodox leaders began to argue that the exclusive reliance on expertise had pushed aside political reliability as a criterion for recruitment and promotion.[23] From their perspective, the proletariat was being squeezed out by economic and technical elites: "progressive" forces (workers and peasants) were declining in numbers and influence, while those who until recently had been persecuted as "reactionary" forces (intellectuals and entrepreneurs) were on the rise. Although these latter groups had contributed immeasurably to the success of the post-Mao economic reforms, they also threatened the traditional base of the party. The emphasis on workers did not replace the need for expertise, but simply restored the proletariat to its previous position of status in the party.

Concerns about emphasizing expertise over political reliability became especially prominent after the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989, in which large numbers of party members and cadres openly participated, demonstrating that the party was losing not only its external support but more importantly its internal cohesion. In a December 1989 speech at the central party school, CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin said, "We must make sure that the leading authority of all party and state organs is in the hands of loyal Marxists."[24] A commentator's article in *People's Daily*, the CCP's official paper, criticized two errors in recruiting cadres: first, focusing on education and professional competence at the expense of being more revolutionary; and, second, giving exclusive priority to intellectuals and ignoring workers, peasants, and others at the grass-roots level.[25]

After the imposition of martial law in June 1989, the CCP changed its recruitment policies to match its orthodox rhetoric. The CCP paid new interest to recruiting "workers at the forefront of production." Age and education remained key criteria for new recruits, but now the party also sought out those directly involved in agricultural and industrial production and deemphasized those engaged in administrative or intellectual pursuits. For instance, although 69.2 percent of the 1.87 million new party members recruited in 1994 reportedly were under 35 years old and 70.8 percent had a senior high school education

[22] *Xinhua*, 22 June 1988, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Daily Report—China* (hereafter FBIS) 24 June 1988, 19; *Xinhua*, 6 October 1992, in FBIS, 6 October 1992, 29; *Xinhua*, 7 July 1997, in FBIS (online service), 7 July 1997.

[23] For instance, see Li Yanxi, "*Shelun dangyuan duiwu de shuliang kongzhi*" [Limit the Number of CCP Members], *Xuexi yu shixian* (local CCP journal in Wuchang), January 1989, 49–51, in *Fuyin baokan ziliao, D2: Zhongguo Gongchandang* [Reprinted Reports D2: The Chinese Communist Party] (hereafter FBZ), February 1989, 136-38; Zhou Peng, "*Shinian lai fazhan dangyuan gongzuo de huigu*" [Review of the Past Ten Years of Party Recruitment], *Dangzheng wenhui*, January 1989, 12, in FBZ, March 1989, 133; Dong Wanmin, "*Yange anzhao biaozhun fazhan dangyuan*" [Recruit Party Members Strictly According to Standards], *Henan ribao*, 7 January 1991, in FBZ, January 1991, 127–28.

[24] *Xinhua*, 29 December 1989, in FBIS, 10 January 1990, 17–19.

[25] *Renmin ribao*, 11 March 1990, 1, in FBIS, 5 April 1990, 29.

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or better, 854,000 (45.7 percent) were "forefront" farmers and workers, and only 328,000 (17.6 percent) were technical experts.[26] The emphasis on recruiting from the "forefront of production" was meant to reduce the influence of "nonproductive" trades, especially intellectuals and teachers, who were blamed for contributing to the 1989 demonstrations. This did not end the CCP's efforts to coopt expertise, but reflected its desire to mobilize its traditional supporters to balance the new elites in the organization. Beginning in the mid-1990s, as the pace of economic reform began to accelerate again, the CCP reemphasized the value of entrepreneurial skills, especially for cadres.

The Debate over Coopting Entrepreneurs

Beginning in the mid-1980s, entrepreneurs were coopted into the party in large numbers. The State Industrial and Commercial Administrative and Management Bureau reported that 15 percent of owners of private firms were party members.[27] A 1989 survey of private (*siying*) entrepreneurs in Wenzhou found that 31.7 percent were party members, of whom two-thirds had at least a senior high school education and 17 percent were former state cadres. In addition, one-quarter of members in Wenzhou's people-run business associations (*minying gonghui*) were party members.[28] At the end of 1991, over 200,000 party members reportedly registered as private entrepreneurs, representing 4 percent of party members and 8 percent of entrepreneurs.[29] A nationwide survey in 1995 found that 17.1 percent of private entrepreneurs were party members.[30]

The presence of newly wealthy entrepreneurs in the party irritated some party veterans, who felt their contributions to the revolution were being betrayed by the party's new commitment to economic growth. Fearing that bourgeois influences were spreading into the party, the CCP banned the new recruitment of private entrepreneurs into the party after the imposition of martial law in 1989; entrepreneurs already in the party could no longer hold official positions.[31] In September 1995, the organization department repeated that the party would not admit private entrepreneurs, "because they are capitalists bent on exploiting the labor force."[32]

Criticism of this trend has been especially prominent in the journals representing the party's orthodox positions, such as *Zhenli de zhuiqiu* (The Pursuit

[26] *Xinhua*, 29 June 1995, in FBIS, 30 June 1995, 12–13.

[27] Reported in *Jingji Cankao*, 4 November 1988, in FBIS, 7 December 1988, 36.

[28] Kristen Parris, "Local Initiative and National Reform: The Wenzhou Model of Development," *China Quarterly* 134 (June 1993): 259, 261.

[29] From a *Xinwen wenzhai* report cited in *Ming Pao*, 4 August 1992, in FBIS, 14 August 1992, 20.

[30] *Zhongguo siying jingji nianjian, 1996* [China's Private Economy Yearbook, 1996] (Beijing: Zhongguo gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996), 162.

[31] This was first reported in *South China Morning Post*, 29 August 1989, in FBIS, 29 August 1989, and later confirmed in *Zhenli de zhuiqiu*, 11 November 1994, in FBIS, 12 January 1995.

[32] Press Digest of the central organization department, as reported in *China News Digest*, 17 September 1995.

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of Truth). These journals publish exposé-style articles that criticize the practice of recruiting entrepreneurs into the party and appointing them to official positions (which violates official party policy) and the policy of encouraging party members to take the lead in getting rich (*daitou zhifu*). These articles argue that the presence of wealthy people in the CCP contradicts the allegedly proletarian nature of the party, creating confusion regarding the party's identity and policies.[33] From this perspective, the trend of coopting entrepreneurs undermines the party, which is why the official ban remains in place.

Despite the consistency of central policy on this issue in recent years, local party committees have circumvented these restrictions. Some classify private enterprises as collective or joint stock enterprises, thereby allowing them to recruit their leaders while remaining in technical compliance with the central ban.[34] The head of the organization department in an unspecified city in Shandong defended the practice of recruiting entrepreneurs who have proven their innovativeness, administrative skills, and ability to produce wealth, which he claimed are the main criteria for party membership. "While maintaining party member standards, active recruitment into the party of outstanding people from among the owners of private enterprises can highlight the timeliness of the socialist market economy, and can make full use of the role of party members as vanguards and models in leading the masses along the path of common prosperity."[35] These trends are repeatedly criticized by the center. Orthodox leaders contend that the ability to innovate, manage, and create wealth cannot substitute for the political standards also required of party members. In September 1995, Yu Yunyao, deputy director of the CCP's organization department, said that even debating the advantages and disadvantages of recruiting entrepreneurs was irresponsible.[36]

Why has the ban on private entrepreneurs been so ineffective? For one thing, there is no indication it has been enforced in recent years. More importantly, recruiting entrepreneurs into the party is advantageous for both local officials and entrepreneurs. For officials, it allows them to coopt potential opposition, to establish links with the private sector and promote growth, and to create personal ties to wealthy and successful entrepreneurs. Why do entrepreneurs want to get into the CCP? Party membership gives them easier access to loans, official discretion, and protection from competition and unfair policy implementation. Moreover, the desire to be within the system is stronger than

[33] See, for instance, "Lun dangyuan daitou zhifu yu dailing qunzhong gongtong zhifu," *Zhenli de zhuiqiu* (July 1998), 13–20.

[34] Interviews in Zhejiang, summer 1997. Classifying private enterprises as collectives known as "red hat" enterprises is not done solely, or even primarily, to allow party recruitment; rather it is done for the mutual benefit of entrepreneurs and local officials. See Kristen Parris, "Private Entrepreneurs as Citizens: From Leninism to Corporatism," *China Information* 10 (Winter 1995/Spring 1996): 1–28.

[35] Quoted in *Zhenli de zhuiqiu*, 11 November 1994, in FBIS, 12 January 1995, 24–25; the article went on to criticize this viewpoint.

[36] *Zhongguo xinwenshe*, 6 September 1995, in FBIS, 8 September 1995, 16.

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the desire for autonomy in China, where autonomy from the state has major disadvantages. As elsewhere in Asia, entrepreneurs are partners with the state, not adversaries of it. Finally, there is a strong belief that CCP members have advantages in business. The result is a symbiotic relationship that benefits both sides. Local and individual interests outweigh the negligible risk of punishment for violating the formal ban, which shows no sign of being either enforced or rescinded. The state constitution was revised in spring 1999 to protect the rights of the private sector. In this context, because it is the CCP that approves all constitutional and policy changes, cooperation between local officials and private entrepreneurs is sure to grow.

Political Implications

What are the political consequences of these policies of cooptation? Will they lead to rejuvenation of the party by drawing in new elites, or will they undermine the foundations of the Leninist system in China? Scholars have generally seen the inclusion of new elites into the party as a positive development. According to Hong Yung Lee, the presence of technocrats in the party and government bureaucracies better balances "the political needs of the Leninist party and the structural prerequisites of economic development."[37] Similarly, Kristen Parris sees entrepreneurs as a "force for change within the party rank and file."[38] While cooptive parties tend to be more adaptable than those with exclusive recruitment policies, who is being coopted has important implications for how the party adapts. To show why this is so, it is best to distinguish different types of elites.

Yanqi Tong makes a useful distinction between a civil society organized to regulate the supply of goods and services (a "noncritical realm" that does not pose a direct challenge to the regime, and may even be welcomed by it) and a political society designed to "influence state decisions or to obtain a share of state power" (a "critical realm" that does threaten the regime's monopoly on power and therefore becomes the target of repression). The success of the critical realm depends on the existence and support of the noncritical realm. They are complementary though not equal, and "the development of noncritical and critical realms often represent different stages in the emergence of an autonomous civil society and, in the process, of political change."[39]

In a Leninist system, the presence of this noncritical realm is the result of political liberalization, not its cause. Party leaders, who need allies in their in-

[37] Hong Yung Lee, *From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 2. Lee believes that markets and Leninism are incompatible, leading eventually to an authoritarian developmental state in China.

[38] Parris, "Local Initiative and National Reform," 261.

[39] Tong, "State, Society, and Political Change," 334. Gordon White and his collaborators make a similar point regarding the separate but potentially reinforcing market and political dynamics of China's emerging civil society; see White, Howell, and Shang, *In Search of Civil Society*, esp. 7–10.

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ner-party battles and who need social organizations to take over social and economic self-regulatory functions as the state liberalizes its control over society, support the emergence of this realm of civil society. The rise of a critical realm, in contrast, is the product of its own leaders, and is rarely welcomed by the regime, even by party reformers. The noncritical realm of civil society reinforces the regime's decision to liberalize (reduced state interference in the economy and the daily lives of the citizenry) but it is the critical realm of political society that pressures the regime to democratize (public involvement in the selection of state leaders and accountability over their actions).

The implications of this distinction between critical and noncritical realms are best seen by comparing the experience of Leninist parties in Hungary, Taiwan, and China. In Hungary, the policy of cooptation focused on the critical intelligentsia. Leaders of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' party decided in the early 1960s to coopt nonmanual workers into the party, including not only clerical and managerial staff but also young intelligentsia. Other Eastern European communist parties responded to demands for political reform by purging party ranks of intellectuals and thereby creating an external social opposition. The Hungarian party instead eliminated the potential threat of external dissent by drawing critical intelligentsia into the party. In so doing, "the party [in Hungary] both perpetuated its rule and created the means of its eventual downfall."[40] At the central level, intellectuals were channeled into government positions, leaving party loyalists in control of all key party posts. In rural areas, however, conservative party secretaries with extensive patronage networks shut intellectuals out of influential positions.

Frustrated by the lack of upward mobility and by their exclusion from decision-making arenas, local intellectuals organized informal networks, which in the 1980s became the basis for the party reform circles. These took shape as political circles outside the party were growing and as the reformist coalition in the party elite, which had forced hard-liner Janos Kadar's resignation as party chief in 1988, was itself splitting, creating more space for political activity.[41] In May 1989, the party reform circles held their first national conference, attended by 440 delegates representing over 10,000 members of 110 reform circles.[42] In alliance with central party reformers, the reform circles achieved the dissolution of the Socialist Workers' party and its reformation as the Hungarian Socialist party in October 1989. Originally formed as an anti-establishment movement against the official party structure, however, the circles refused to institutionalize themselves and quickly lost the initiative to older party leaders. The circles themselves broke up shortly after the creation of the Socialist party. Although they contributed immeasurably to the transformation of the Hungarian party and the democratization of the Hungarian political system, reform circle members were unable to benefit from the changes they brought about.

[40] O'Neil, "Revolution from Within," 587.
[41] Tong, "State, Society, and Political Change," 346–7.
[42] O'Neil, "Revolution from Within," 594.

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Cooptation was also a major factor of the transformation of the Kuomintang (KMT), the ruling party in Taiwan.[43] In the early 1970s, the central leaders of the KMT, principally Chiang Ching-kuo and Li Huan, sponsored the Taiwanization policy, which brought large numbers of youth with political ambitions into the party. The policy had two main goals. First, Taiwanization was designed to change the reputation of the KMT. Before Taiwanization, all key positions were held by émigrés from the mainland; beginning in the early 1970s, the KMT gradually shed its mainlander reputation and came to represent a broader spectrum of Taiwan's society. Second, Taiwanization was intended to improve the effectiveness of the ruling party by attracting young people of talent rather than simply those with political connections. Most new members were recruited when they were still in college, and some were given scholarships for foreign graduate study, mostly in the United States, where they were exposed to the workings of a democratic political system. The KMT coopted these educated youth in order to channel their political ambitions into the KMT and preempt their joining the opposition. The KMT also used the promise of elected office to attract these young elites. With opposition parties banned, an official nomination by the KMT virtually guaranteed electoral victory. At the same time that it coopted some youth, it continued to repress the political opposition that was excluded from the party and made it difficult for them to compete in elections.

Many of those who played key roles in the transformation of the KMT and the gradual democratization of Taiwan's political system during the 1980s were recruited under the Taiwanization program of the 1970s. The centrally sponsored policy of cooptation known as Taiwanization led to the adaptation of the political system in several ways. First, young elites with political ambitions created pressure within the KMT for democratization. They sought more open, competitive elections to advance their careers. Second, their experience in the United States and other foreign countries exposed them to more liberal political systems, further fueling their desire for democratization. These internal pressures in combination with the growing support for democratization outside the party eventually led to the democratic breakthrough of 1986–1987. Third, Taiwanization also led to a basic change in the key task of the KMT: from achieving reunification with the mainland to the economic and political development of Taiwan itself.[44]

In Hungary and Taiwan, the ruling parties reduced the potential threat of external dissent by coopting into the party critical intelligentsia and politically ambitious youth, that is, those from the critical realm of political society. In contrast, the CCP continues to exclude critical intelligentsia from the political system in general and the party in particular. Instead, it targets experts and en-

[43] Bruce J. Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1997), 122–130.

[44] Ibid., 204–216.

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trepreneurs from the noncritical realm of civil society, but even the entrepreneurs are excluded from holding official posts. The ultimate consequences of the CCP's policy of inclusion are not yet clear; in Hungary and Taiwan there were lengthy gaps between the initial cooptation and the subsequent political effects. But there is little reason to assume that technocrats and entrepreneurs will make similar demands on the CCP that critical intelligentsia did in Hungary and Taiwan. Technocrats and entrepreneurs may prove to be a force for change within the CCP, but more time—and more research—is needed to determine what types of change they will promote.

As members of the noncritical sphere, technocrats and entrepreneurs could play a supporting role in the course of political change. Some have argued that technocrats are more likely to favor democratization than the revolutionaries they replaced; others have argued that technocracy will only lead to a more efficient form of authoritarianism.[45] For my purposes, the key point is that technocrats belong to the noncritical realm. They are primarily concerned with promoting economic growth and to that end limiting the influence of ideology in policy making. But technocrats may also be essential allies of democrats. A key element of Hungary's democratization was the informal alliance of technocrats who desired less party interference in the economy, party reformers who wanted to be rid of conservatives, and democrats outside the party.[46] But in China, "bureaucratic technocrats are not enthusiastic about political democratization."[47] Moreover, most technocrats were trained in China, the former Soviet Union, or Eastern Europe. Unlike KMT elites, many of whom received college degrees in the United States and other Western countries, CCP technocrats lack exposure to alternative political values and institutional arrangements.[48] However, younger technocrats have been acquiring more exposure to the West and in the future may be more open to adaptation.

Could entrepreneurs be allies of democrats in China? The evidence so far has been mixed. Margaret Pearson argues that they are not likely to initiate demands for systemic change but could be "available to lend support if others take the lead in pressuring for economic and political change."[49] During the 1989 demonstrations, the Beijing Stone Group provided ample and visible support for student demonstrators, but elsewhere in China entrepreneurs withheld their support. In Xiamen, one of the special economic zones in southern China, entrepreneurs disapproved of students' demands for rapid reform, preferring

[45] Li and White, "Elite Transformation and Modern Change in Mainland China and Taiwan"; Hendrischke, "Expertocracy and Professionalism."

[46] Tong, "State, Society, and Political Change," 347.

[47] Hong Yung Lee, "China's New Bureaucracy" in Rosenbaum, ed., *State and Society in China*, 71.

[48] Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan*, 134–35.

[49] Margaret M. Pearson, "The Janus Face of Business Associations in China: Socialist Corporatism in Foreign Enterprises," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 31 (January 1994): 25–46; and "China's Emerging Business Class: Democracy's Harbinger?" *Current History* 97 (September 1998): 268–72.

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state-sponsored reform to bottom-up pressures that could result in instability.[50] Entrepreneurs may favor liberalization in order to promote economic growth, but there is little evidence that these same people favor democratization. The growing alignment between local political and economic elites may in fact reinforce the status quo, because both sets of actors benefit from its preservation. The party retains its monopoly over political participation and takes credit for the economic growth created by the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs may be unwilling to risk the certain benefits of the existing system, despite its many irrationalities, for the uncertainties of an alternative arrangement. Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan note that entrepreneurs and even intellectuals who belong to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress "support further economic and political reforms—but they are usually *not* pro-democracy."[51]

The reforms in Hungary and Taiwan also had an element of indigenization that is wholly lacking in China. In Hungary, the Communist party was seen as the creation of the Soviet Union, especially after the repression of the 1956 uprising, and therefore lacked domestic legitimacy. The party used its policy of cooptation and tolerance of pluralism within the party to soften its image as an alien force and to legitimize its rule.[52] In Taiwan, the policy of cooptation was motivated by a desire to change the KMT's image as an unwanted occupying force. The very name of the program, Taiwanization (in Chinese, *bentuhua*, literally indigenization) announces its goal. In so doing, the KMT tried to sink roots in local society, not just to control it, but also to appear more responsive to it. The CCP lacks these motivations for adaptation. One of its primary bases of legitimacy is its victory in the Chinese civil war. It is not motivated by the search for domestic sources of legitimacy nor by the type of ethnic conflict that prompted Taiwanization.

Technocrats and entrepreneurs have had an important impact on the progress of reform and the performance of the CCP. They have been strong supporters of liberalization and have contributed to the rapid pace of economic growth. But their overt support for liberalization must be distinguished from their muted support for democratization. As the comparison with Hungary and Taiwan show, cooptation enhances the adaptability of Leninist parties, but not all coopted elites favor the same types of adaptation. China's technocrats and entrepreneurs, drawn from the noncritical realm of civil society, are unlikely to initiate democratizing reforms, although they may prove to be indispensable allies of those who do favor such reforms.

[50] David L. Wank, "Private Business, Bureaucracy, and Political Alliance in a Chinese City," *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 33 (January 1995): 63–65.

[51] Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, "Corporatism in China: A Developmental State in an East Asian Context" in Barrett L. McCormick and Jonathan Unger, eds., *China after Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia?* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 111. (Emphasis in original.)

[52] John Ishiyama, "Communist Parties in Transition: Structures, Leaders, and Processes of Democratization in Eastern Europe," *Comparative Politics* 27 (January 1995): 158–9.

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Organizational Links Between The CCP and Society: A Corporatist Solution?

The second element of party adaptation concerns organizational arrangements. The party may rejuvenate united front groups or create new organizations to incorporate new groups into the political system. Recent scholarship on China has found extensive evidence of this type of inclusion and has defined it as corporatism.[53] The concept of corporatism is a familiar one in comparative politics and describes a system of interest representation in which interests are vertically organized into peak associations to limit and institutionalize the participation of key groups in the policy process.[54] Corporatist arrangements may be dominated by the state in an authoritarian political system, a variant known as state corporatism, or they may provide greater autonomy and influence for the groups themselves in a more pluralist setting, a variant known as societal corporatism.

The emerging corporatist elements in China's political system provide a rationale for the more harmonious relations between state and society characteristic of inclusion. The corporatist model points out that the state and society relationship is based on achieving consensus and common goals, not a zero-sum struggle for power. As Douglas Chalmers notes, "Corporatism has much in common with socialism's understanding of society after the end of class conflict." A harmony of interests is possible without the total transformation of society.[55] Similarly, Alfred Stepan identified the universal appeal of corporatism to elites facing "a perceived threat of fragmentation." They reject both the liberal ideals of individualism and checks and balances and the Marxist ideals of class conflict, "because they are seen as legitimizing conflict."[56]

Corporatist structures are consequently emerging in China as a substitute for coercion, propaganda, and central planning to maintain party hegemony. As Unger and Chan argue, corporatism is "a mechanism through which the state's grip could be lessened" but not released altogether. "The more the economy decentralizes, the more corporatist associations get established as substitute control mechanisms."[57] This is a perfect illustration of the logic of inclusion: because the CCP is no longer able to manipulate the nation with symbols and

[53] Pearson, "Janus Face of Business Associations"; Unger and Chan, "Corporatism in China"; Chan, "Revolution or Corporatism?"; White, et al., *In Search of Civil Society*; Jonathan Unger, "'Bridges': Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New Associations," *China Quarterly* 147 (September 1996): 795–819; Christopher Earle Nevitt, "Private Business Associations in China: Evidence of Civil Society or Local State Power," *China Journal* 36 (July 1997): 25–43.

[54] Philippe C. Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" in Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends towards Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).

[55] Douglas A. Chalmers, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics" in Howard J. Wiarda, ed., *New Directions in Comparative Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 62.

[56] Alfred C. Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 58.

[57] Unger and Chan, "Corporatism in China," 105, 107.

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propaganda, it tries to manipulate the organizations through which society interacts with the state.

While drawing attention to the evolving corporatist structures, some scholars also allude to another consequence of economic reform. For instance, Unger and Chan assert that, "Yet at the very same time that these new corporatist structures get erected and firmed up by the Chinese state, forces are simultaneously at work that undermine and weaken the central state's power over them."[58] They believe that at least some of China's groups operating in the current state corporatist mold are "shifting gradually but perceptibly in a 'societal-corporatist' direction," in which organized groups will assert the interests of the people they nominally represent.[59] Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan also repeatedly allude to the potential of civic associations evolving from a corporatist logic to constitute a civil society, with a dense mix of organizations largely autonomous from constraints imposed by local officials, but still embedded in the state.[60]

This points to a more provocative question: Are corporatist arrangements compatible with a Leninist system? Or will the emergence and evolution of corporatism lead to the decay of Leninist institutions? To answer these questions, it is necessary to explore the implications of the corporatist model.

How useful is corporatism for understanding Chinese politics? In his critique of the interest group model of Soviet politics, William Odom lists three criteria for evaluating a model: it must capture the core elements of the political system; it must be comparative in nature; and it must account for change.[61] According to Odom, the interest group model failed on two accounts: first, it focused most of its attention on peripheral elements of the system (institutional pluralism) and second, it therefore misinterpreted signs of political decay for political development. The advocates of the corporatist model in China are not so ambitious in their claims for political change, but generally limit themselves to analysis of the evolving institutional arrangements that govern China's political economy. Still, they do include allusions of political transformation that deserve greater scrutiny. Like the proponents of the Soviet interest group

[58] Ibid., 107.

[59] Ibid., 129. Unger and Chan make the same point in their separate writings. See for instance, Unger, "'Bridges': Private Business, the Chinese Government and the Rise of New Associations"; and Chan, "Revolution or Corporatism? Workers In Search of a Solution" in Goodman and Hooper, eds., *China's Quiet Revolution.* Not all advocates of corporatism are so optimistic. Pearson notes "the absence of a compulsion to resolve the tension between autonomy and state dominance" in "Janus Face of Business Associations," 446.

[60] White, et al., *In Search of Civil Society.* This is the mirror image of Peter Evans's notion of "embedded autonomy": here it is the civil associations who seek connections with the state in order to be effective.

[61] William G. Odom, "Soviet Politics and After: Old and New Concepts," *World Politics* 45 (October 1992): 66–98. Odom borrowed these criteria from Samuel Huntington's "Paradigms of American Politics: Beyond the One, the Two, and the Many," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (March 1974): 7.

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model, advocates of Chinese corporatism may be misleading us in terms of the expected future course of Chinese politics.

Is China a corporatist system? Most scholars do not argue that China has a full-blown corporatist system, only that there are corporatist elements emerging in the course of economic reform. Corporatism is an ideal type; it does not define a political system, but corporatist elements are present in a variety of contexts. Democratic countries such as Britain and the Netherlands, bureaucratic authoritarian countries such as Brazil and Argentina, military regimes such as Peru and South Korea, one-party regimes such as Mexico and Taiwan, and communist countries such as Poland, the Soviet Union, and most recently China have been described as corporatist. The corporatist model does capture core elements of China's political system, especially its political economy. The state has created or licensed associations for independent entrepreneurs, owners of private enterprises, enterprises with foreign investment, organized labor, Catholic and Protestant churches, writers, scientists, and other functional interests. These associations are noncompetitive, and when two or more exist the state forces them to merge or one or more to disband. Membership is compulsory, and members in business associations are often enrolled when they receive their business license. The leaders of these associations are often officials from the party or government offices responsible for regulating or managing them, and association offices are often in government compounds.

These corporatist elements have very much in common with the key aspects of a Leninist system, which is based on the ruling party's monopoly on legitimate political organization. The state may create mass organizations to link state and society, and these organizations are typically staffed and budgeted in large part by the state. A Leninist party also prevents the spontaneous formation of new organizations, especially where an official one already exists; and the presence of organizations outside of its control is a challenge to its authority. During periods of transformation and consolidation, the state uses these organizations as "transmission belts" to send authoritative decisions to lower levels of the organizations. The state grants leaders of these organizations a degree of leeway to manage their organizations and the people they nominally represent, but prevents interests and preferences from working their way back up through the organization to influence state policy. During the period of inclusion, these same organizations become channels for interest representation so that these interests can be incorporated into the state. As the party loses its ability to monitor the activities of these organizations and to sanction the behavior of its members and society more generally one of the institutional pillars of a Leninist system is weakened.[62] This points up the contradictions in the competing goals of inclusion and mobilization for a Leninist party.

To portray the potential evolution of corporatism, advocates of the corporatist model in China highlight examples of leaders who change from being

[62] Walder makes a similar point in "The Quiet Revolution from Within."

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agents of the state to become advocates for their associations. But the corporatist model considers the state as a "'naturally' divided entity" with different interests derived from its relations with economic and professional groups. According to Chalmers, "One cannot talk of state interests as opposed to those of society when the state is in fact made up of ties with interests in society."[63] Interest representation is not the defining difference between state and societal corporatism. Rather, the power relationship between the state and corporate groups distinguishes the two subtypes, and that relationship is dependent on whether the political system is authoritarian or pluralistic in nature. Unger found that the federation for large-scale business "is still too tightly bound to the party-state in its structure and staffing" to be described as societal corporatist although it was "gravitating" in that direction due to "a growing desire even on the part of some of its minders for it to play such a societal corporatist role."[64] The desire for increased autonomy for organized interests undoubtedly continues to exist in China, but those wishes are not compatible with the CCP's desire to preserve its power.

Despite its policies of inclusion, the central fact of China's political system remains that it is ruled by a Leninist party. The party enjoys and protects its monopoly of political organization. In his case study of Xiaoshan city, Gordon White found that only the most politically inconsequential of social organizations (sports, arts and culture, retired teachers, and female factory managers) were autonomous, in that there was no overlapping of personnel with the sponsoring government bureau and no financial subsidies.[65] At the same time, bottom-up demands for new and autonomous social organizations (labor, entrepreneurs, students, etc.) were rejected and repressed. Unger and Chan argue that some of the key demands during the 1989 protests involved gaining state approval for autonomous unions for students and workers in Beijing. "To the extent that they were demanding a *structural* change in the political system, it was to effect a shift to a societal corporatism in which they could choose their own leadership and set their own agendas."[66] But the CCP's rejection of this demand and its violent repression of protestors show that Leninism, not corporatism, still defines China's political system. Beginning in 1998, the CCP has repeatedly suppressed efforts to create an opposition party, showing that a Leninist logic still prevails in China. If the party's monopoly is undermined, we will witness not simply an incremental and gradual evolution from state to societal corporatism, but increased political decay of the communist system itself.

Corporatist trends are nevertheless affecting several key factors of China's political system. An important variation on corporatism as practiced in China is that corporatist groups are usually sanctioned and controlled by local party and government authorities and not always vertically organized into peak asso-

[63] Chalmers, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics," 67–68.

[64] Unger, "'Bridges,'" 818.

[65] White, "Prospects for Civil Society."

[66] Unger and Chan, "Corporatism in China," 112. (Emphasis in original.)

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ciations whose primary interaction is with the central state. This has exacerbated the decentralization of political and economic authority. Just as corporate associations no longer act as transmission belts, local governments no longer act as loyal agents of the center.[67] This is a potential sign of disintegration, not just for the CCP but the political system as a whole. As a result of these newly created institutional links, the party's traditional concern with party building as a means of linking state and society and monitoring compliance with party policy has atrophied.

The creation of a market economy has created new opportunities for pursuing personal goals that do not require joining the party. Indeed, party membership is now seen by many as detrimental to fulfilling individual interests. The new collectively and privately owned and foreign funded enterprises are being created so fast that the party cannot create party organizations within most of them, and many do not even have party members. Party organizations in the countryside have weakened, and recruiting new members has become increasingly difficult. Moreover, many party members in rural areas have joined the "floating population" of migrant workers seeking jobs in coastal cities, further reducing the party's presence in the countryside. In more prosperous areas, up to 10 percent of the floating population are party members. Most floating party members are young and middle-aged and either business oriented or "backbone workers," precisely the kinds of people the party would like to utilize. Once they join the floating population, these party members lose touch with their original party unit and do not register with the party committee in their new location. Consequently, they no longer fulfill their responsibilities to the party or fulfill their "vanguard role."[68]

The second criterion for a model is that it allow comparisons to be drawn with other countries, and the corporatist model is clearly comparative in nature. But because corporatism is present in so many contexts, it is important to clearly identify the subtypes of the concept so that comparisons are drawn with the right countries. Both state and societal corporatism are monopolistic forms of group politics and therefore are structurally similar. Yet their origins and dynamics are fundamentally different. State corporatism is generally associated with authoritarian regimes, whereas societal corporatism is "more an evolution—perhaps a corruption—of liberalism."[69] It is not compatible with a Lenin-

[67] See Wang Shaoguang, "The Rise of the Regions: Fiscal Reform and the Decline of Central State Capacity in China" in Walder, ed., *Waning of the Communist State*; and Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin, eds., *Changing Central-Local Relations in China* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994): For a contrary view, see Huang Yasheng, *Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[68] Liang Yanjia and Li Kaisheng, "Jiguan qishiye danwei dangyuan liudong de diaocha he sikao" [Investigation and Reflection on Floating Party Members in Administrative and Enterprise Units], *Lingnan xuekan* (Guangzhou), January 1994, 3-56, in FBZ, February 1994, 144–47; *Hong Kong Standard*, 29 December 1994, in FBIS, 29 December 1994, 33–34; *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), 3 February 1995, in FBIS, 6 February 1995, 24.

[69] Chalmers, "Corporatism and Comparative Politics," 60; see also Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" 22–25.

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ist system, because the former requires the types of autonomous and politically active groups that the latter refuses to tolerate. The notion of state corporatism is less threatening to the regime: instead of autonomy, corporate groups are embedded in the state, where they can be manipulated, their leaders replaced, and their finances controlled. Leninist parties seek to prevent autonomous groups, for good reason. The Eastern European experience shows that the rise of civil society has a significant—and in some cases decisive—impact on the collapse of communism.[70]

The third criterion of a model's utility is its ability to account for change, and this is where the corporatist model as applied to China most falls short. The depiction of a gradual and incremental evolution from state to societal corporatism is not consistent with the wider literature. According to Philippe Schmitter, state corporatism is unlikely to transform itself continuously toward societal corporatism; instead, it must "degenerate into openly conflictual, multifaceted, uncontrolled interest politics—pluralism in other words."[71] This is exactly what Leninism is designed to prevent. We should not expect that the transition from state to societal corporatism will occur amid regime continuity.

The incremental transformation depicted by the advocates of the corporatist model is based not only on faulty logic but also problematic analogies. Unger and Chan suggest that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all made smooth transitions from state to societal corporatism and conclude that a similar transformation in China is possible. But in all three cases, the transition was epiphenomenal to changes taking place in the larger political system. In each case, societal corporatism was the consequence of democratization, but the modes of democratization were fundamentally different in each country. Despite the near ubiquity of corporatism in all sorts of political systems, we should be wary of drawing comparisons across different types of political systems. Unger and Chan further suggest that as political liberalization continues in China, "it is far more likely to involve such incremental shifts into societal corporatism rather than the introduction of any form of political democracy."[72] But societal corporatism and democracy are not independent of one another. The emergence of societal corporatism was the consequence of democratization elsewhere in East Asia, not an alternative to it. In other countries, societal corporatism developed in an already pluralist setting. The combination of societal corporatism and rule by a Leninist party would therefore not likely be a stable one.

Corporatism may survive the transition from communism in China, but communism is unlikely to survive the transition to corporatism. Chan cites the

[70] Marcia A. Wiegle and Jim Butterfield, "Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The Logic of Emergence," *Comparative Politics* 25 (October 1992): 1–24; Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

[71] Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporatism?" 41.

[72] Unger and Chan, "Corporatism in China," 129.

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relegalization of Solidarity in Poland in spring 1989 as a possible model for increased autonomy of China's labor organizations.[73] But within a few months of this step, the communist government in Poland negotiated its way out of existence. This example of "socialist societal corporatism" existed only for the short period of time between the relegalization of Solidarity in April 1989 and the appointment of the first noncommunist prime minister, Solidarity adviser Tadeusz Mazowiecki, in September 1989.[74] This is a poor precedent, either for theory building or for party policy.

A more promising approach may be to apply Stepan's typology of exclusionary and inclusionary poles within state corporatism.[75] A regime can shift between exclusionary and inclusionary policies over time and even practice them simultaneously. For instance, the CCP has allowed the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in recent years to advocate strongly the interest of labor in the policy and legislative process, but it has also imprisoned those who advocate the formation of independent trade unions. Stepan's typology may account for trends that scholars are finding without stretching the concept of societal corporatism beyond recognition.

Corporatist features are clearly emerging in China as a substitute for the CCP's more totalitarian impulse to control state and society in the Maoist years. But the ultimate political implications of this trend are still uncertain. Some scholars see the promise of societal corporatism coming into view; others see signs of disintegration. The creation of corporatist organizations to link state and society was part of the CCP's strategy of inclusion, and it remains dedicated to preventing the rise of autonomous organizations. Before societal corporatism replaces Leninism as the defining feature of China's political system, the party would have to abandon its monopoly on political organization. This is a fundamental change that the CCP has steadfastly opposed. If the party's control over key organizations erodes to such an extent that state corporatism begins to transform into societal corporatism, the real story will not be about the rise of corporatism but about more fundamental political change in China.

Conclusion

The logic of inclusion offers a useful framework for analyzing the CCP's policies of coopting new elites and forging links with nonparty organizations, as well as understanding the problems that have arisen as a consequence. Although inclusion seems to be a natural phase in the evolution of Leninist parties, the tension between inclusion and mobilization also indicates why adapta-

[73] Chan, "Revolution or Corporatism?" 83.
[74] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 192–94.
[75] Stepan, *State and Society*, 73–81.

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tion is so difficult and why the transformation of Leninist parties is so rare. While cooptation and the creation of organizational links seem necessary to promote economic modernization, neither is sufficient to guarantee the party's survival. Instead of leading to rejuvenation, inclusion may contribute to a Leninist party's disintegration.

The cooptation of new elites is a classic strategy of adaptation for Leninist parties and for organizations in general, but it is a risky strategy. As the case of the CCP shows, coopted elites may not support or even sympathize with party traditions. The technocrats and entrepreneurs who are now being courted were previously targeted as class enemies. Even though the newly coopted technocrats and entrepreneurs are unlikely to initiate pressures for democratizing reforms, they may be powerful allies if others inside and outside the party do so. The attention given to coopting new elites and promoting economic reforms has also led to deterioration of traditional party building, leaving the party less able to mobilize and control society and its own members at a time of increasing political, economic, and social change.

Proponents of corporatism in China may be doing a disservice. They are uncovering important changes in China's political economy that may have profound implications for its political system. But in their quest for a comparative concept to analyze changes in China, they have latched onto a concept that does not give sufficient emphasis to the central fact of China's political system—the continued rule of a Leninist party. The corporatist approach also does not give adequate attention to the experience of other Leninist parties for whom political change was tumultuous, not gradual. Hungary and Taiwan are exceptions to this general rule, but the CCP lacks the key features that prompted their transformation, and corporatism was not a key factor in their democratization. By implying a possible path of incremental political change that is not consistent with either the general literature or the political experience of other countries, advocates of the corporatist approach may mislead us.

The CCP is pursuing policies of inclusion, both by coopting new elites and creating links with nonparty organizations, while at the same time lamenting the loss of mobilizational capacity. Some local party officials and many scholars argue that the solution to this dilemma is to deemphasize mobilizational goals for the sake of greater economic growth. From this perspective, party organs should not be present in the nonstate sectors of the economy, specifically because they tend to retard growth and frighten off potential investors. Cooptation and new organizational links offer alternatives to traditional party building as a means to link the party with society. From the perspective of the party, however, its organizational interests are being challenged by these policies of inclusion. As its capacity to monitor compliance with its policies, enforce norms of behavior, and mobilize society on behalf of regime goals deteriorates, the Leninist attributes of the CCP and its viability as the ruling party are also un-

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dermined. As Samuel Huntington noted, the strength of an authoritarian regime depends in large part on the strength of its party; as the party weakens, so too does the regime it governs.[76] While noting the positive trends of cooptation and corporatism, we should not lose sight of the negative consequences for the CCP and the implications for the political system as a whole.*

[76] Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics," 9.

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The Origins and Diffusion of Racial Restrictive Covenants

MICHAEL JONES-CORREA

Racial restrictive covenants—private agreements barring non-Caucasians from occupying or owning property—were a key element of the segregationist policies in the early twentieth-century United States. Yet though we know a great deal about racial restrictive covenants at the moment of their demise in the 1940s,[1] we know relatively little about their origins or spread. The practice disseminated rapidly among the states, yet the mechanisms of its diffusion are unclear. Why did restrictive covenants nationalize rapidly in the early 1920s? Why were they successfully implemented while other alternatives in race relations failed to materialize? What were the avenues for their diffusion?

Much of the existing literature on policy diffusion,[2] stemming from Jack

[1] Robert C. Weaver, *The Negro Ghetto* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1948); Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, *People vs. Property: Race Restrictive Covenants in Housing* (Nashville, TN: Fisk University Press, 1947); and Charles Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbors: A Study of Prejudice in Housing* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955).

[2] Michael Mintrom, "Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (July 1997): 738–770; Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry, "State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 84 (June 1990): 395–415; Susan Welch and Kay Thompson, "The Impact of Federal Incentives on State Policy Innovation," *American Journal of Political Science* 24 (November 1980): 715–729; Robert Savage, "Policy Innovativeness as a Trait of American States," *Journal of Politics* 40 (February 1978): 212–224; Robert Eyestone, "Confusion, Diffusion, and Innovation," *American Political Science Review* 71 (June 1977): 441–447; Virginia Gray, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study," *American Political Science Review* 67 (December 1973): 1174–1185. For reviews of the literature see: Virginia Gray, "Competition, Emulation and Policy Innovation" in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., *New Perspectives in American Politics* (Washington DC: CQ Press 1994); Frances Berry, "Sizing Up the State Policy Innovation Research," *Policy Studies Journal* 22 (Autumn 1994): 442–56; and Robert Savage, "Diffusion Research Traditions and the Spread of Policy Innovations in a Federal System," *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* 15 (Fall 1985): 1–27.

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Walker's 1969 article "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States,"[3] is of limited help here. This approach to policy diffusion has given a great deal of attention to the dynamics of diffusion—why states may adopt policies when they do and in particular why there may be differences in the speed and rate of adoption among states. But much less attention has been given to the mechanics of policy diffusion—how exactly diffusion works and why some policy alternatives are picked up while others languish.[4]

Recent historical institutionalist approaches to political development, however, may provide more leverage on this question. Aspects of this literature, for instance, point to links between "critical junctures" and "developmental pathways." Crucial founding moments (critical junctures) send institutions down developmental paths; once on these paths, institutional development is constrained by past trajectories.[5] In this view, history consists of sequences of order, breakdown of order, and reestablishment of order strung along like pearls on a temporal string. In the periods between crises, institutions are largely self-perpetuating, and self-reinforcing. Once they are in place, their very existence creates the conditions for their continued stability. Institutions generate commitments and create interests that profit from the perpetuation of these institutions. If these institutions are threatened, these interests mobilize in their defense. Given the sunk costs in a given institution, switching to an alternative set of institutions is usually prohibitively costly in the short run, even if other possibilities offer a better return in the longer run.[6] In part this is because new institutions may have large start-up costs, and these costs are likely to outweigh any inefficiencies of the prevailing institutions.[7] Together these factors ensure that institutions tend to be "path dependent," that is, initial choices of institutional design have long-term implications. Following Paul Pierson, if policies can be thought of as institutions,[8] then this model of institutional continuity and change seems directly relevant to inquiries into policy diffusion in general and the case of racial restrictive covenants in particular.

Central to the notion of path dependency is that there are mechanisms that lock institutions into paths of development from their very earliest stages.[9]

[3] Jack Walker, "The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States," *American Political Science Review* 63 (September 1969): 880–899.

[4] Mintrom, "Policy Entrepreneurs," 739.

[5] Kathleen Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism and Comparative Politics" (paper presented at the American Political Science Association, Boston, 1998), 29.

[6] Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 42–45.

[7] Douglass North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 92–104; Brian W. Arthur, "Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-In by Historical Events," *Economic Journal* 99 (March 1989) 116–131.

[8] Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State.*

[9] See, for instance, James Mahoney, "Uses of Path Dependence in Historical Sociology, *Theory and Society*, forthcoming.

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However, an emphasis on "lock-in" effects[10] may result in overly deterministic readings of institutional outcomes. Other scholars working in an historical institutionalist vein argue contrarily that critical junctures take place in contexts shaping options, that multiple alternatives may result from any single juncture, and that discarded alternatives remain as challengers to institutions.[11] Taken together, these critiques suggest that while path-reinforcing mechanisms matter, institutional outcomes may not be quite as automatic as those posited by a strict understanding of path dependency.

With this in mind, this article begins by arguing that the diffusion of racial restrictive covenants across the nation was spurred by a critical historical moment: the urbanization of black Americans and the consequent race riots from 1917–1921. The reaction to these events reinforced a number of policy alternatives, among them racial restrictive covenants. The diffusion of racial restrictive covenants was ensured by the National Association of Real Estate Boards, which was eager to foster segregated neighborhoods and actively propagated the use of covenants toward that end. However, in the case of racial restrictive covenants, not only were there collective action problems in getting these restrictions in place, but once in place they were quickly challenged by their opponents. Their success where other policies failed and their continued diffusion across the states depended on the reinforcement of initial policy outcomes by the intervention of other actors, notably the federal government and its entrance into housing policy after 1933.

The study of the diffusion of racial restrictive covenants suggests that the critical juncture/path dependency model is insufficient to explain the success or failure of policy alternatives over time. Though critical junctures may generate new policy alternatives, their success is not inevitable. Interactions among actors occupying different institutional layers help determine which policy alternatives survive and which will wither on the vine. This serves to confirm one of the central insights of the historical institutionalist approach: that institutional change should be seen in relational terms, with processes in one arena intersecting with ongoing processes in other areas. Kathleen Thelen's observation, which is certainly borne out in this case, is that policy processes cannot be understood in isolation; different processes interact with each other in ways that influence crucial institutional outcomes.[12]

[10] Arthur, "Competing Technologies."

[11] Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, The Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Kathleen Thelen, "How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical Analysis" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 31 August 2–September 2000); Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a 'New' Institutionalism" in Lawrence Dodd and Calvin Jillson, eds., *The Dynamics of American Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 311–330.

[12] Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism," 31–32.

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Racial Restrictive Covenants

Racial restrictive covenants, which appeared in the late nineteenth century and spread rapidly in the early twentieth century, were agreements between buyers and sellers of property, which took the form of an appendix or article in the deed not to sell, rent, or lease property to minority groups, usually blacks, but also, depending on the part of the country, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, or any non-Caucasians. (See Table 1.)

The typical wording of the covenant appeared as follows:

> In consideration of the premises and the sum of five dollars ($5.00) each to the other in hand paid, the parties hereto do hereby mutually covenant, promise, and agree each to the other, and for their respective heirs and assigns, that no part of the land now owned by the parties hereto, a more detailed description of said property, being given after the respective signatures hereto, shall ever be used or occupied by, or sold, conveyed, leased, rented, or given to, Negroes, or any person or persons of the Negro race or blood. This covenant shall run with the land and bind the respective heirs and assigns of the parties hereto for the period of twenty-one (21) years from and after the date of these presents.[13]

As a form of private contract, these covenants were legally enforceable in court. In the 1926 *Corrigan v. Buckley* decision, which was upheld by the Supreme Court, the judges stated:

> The constitutional right of a Negro to acquire, own, and occupy property does not carry with it the constitutional power to compel sale and conveyance to him of any particular private property. The individual citizen, whether he be black or white, may refuse to sell or lease his property to any particular individual or class of individuals. The state alone possesses the power to compel a sale or taking of private property, and that only for public use. The power of these property owners to exclude one class of citizens implies the power of the other class to exercise the same prerogative over property which they may own. What is denied one class may be denied the other. There is, therefore, no discrimination within the civil rights clauses of the Constitution. Such a covenant is enforceable, not only against a member of the excluded race, but between the parties to the agreement.[14]

The Court's ruling sanctioned racial restrictive covenants until the practice was reversed by the Supreme Court in 1948.[15]

The Diffusion of Restrictive Covenants

The usual story explaining the spread of restrictive covenants is that they were a response to the Supreme Court's ban on racial zoning.[16] Beginning in 1911,

[13] *Corrigan v. Buckley* 299 F. 899; U.S. App. (1924); 55 App. D.C. 30.

[14] *Corrigan v. Buckley* 271 U.S. 323 (1926).

[15] *Shelley v. Kraemer* 334 US 1 (1948).

[16] Allan Spear, *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto 1890–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Clement Vose, *Caucasians Only: The Supreme Court, The NAACP and the Restrictive Covenant Cases* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 5,9; and Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 231.

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TABLE 1

Racial Restrictive Covenant Cases Appearing in State Appeals Courts

Case	*Date of Covenant*	*Date of Ruling*	*Outcome of Covenant*
California			
Gandolfo v. Hartman (California) 49 F. 181, *182; 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1182	1886	1892	Struck Down
Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary 42 Cal. App. 152; 183 P. 470; 1919 Cal. App. LEXIS 717	1910	1919	Upheld
Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary 42 Cal. App. 152; 183 P. 470; 1919 Cal. App. LEXIS 712	1910	1919	Upheld
Janss Investment Company v. James J. Henry Walden, Appellant 196 Cal. 753; 239 P. 34; 1925 Cal. LEXIS 358	?	1925	Upheld
W.B. Wayt et al., Appellants, v. George Paytee et al., Respondents 205 Cal. 46; 269 P. 660; 1928 Cal. LEXIS 483	1910?	1928	Upheld
Thomas S. Littlejohns et al., Appellants, v. Francis Henderson et al. 111 Cal. App. 115; 295 P. 95; 1931 Cal. App. LEXIS 1248	1923	1931	Upheld
George H. Letteau et al., Appellants, v. Pauline Ellis et al., Respondents 122 Cal. App. 584; 10 P.2d 496; 1932 Cal. App. LEXIS 1050	1905–7	1932	Struck Down
Joseph Oberwise, Appellant, v. Joe Poulos et al., Respondents 124 Cal. App. 247; 12 P.2d 156; 1932 Cal. App. LEXIS 791	1925	1932	Struck Down
Frank A. Foster et al., Appellants, v. Lesley J. Stewart et al., Respondents 134 Cal. App. 482; 25 P.2d 497; 1933 Cal. App. LEXIS 206	?	1933	Struck Down
South			
People's Pleasure Park Company (Inc.) and Others v. Rohleder 109 Va. 439; 61 S.E. 794; 1908 Va. LEXIS 119	1904	1908	Struck Down
Queensborough Land Company v. Cazeaux et al. 136 La. 729; 67 So. 641; L.R.A. 1916B LEXIS 2057	1907	1915	Upheld
Charles R. Bailey v. Jackson-Campbell Company and L. B. Jackson 191 N.C. 61; 131 S.E. 567; 1926 N.C. LEXIS 8	1916	1926	Struck Down

(*continued*)

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TABLE 1

Continued

Case	*Date of Covenant*	*Date of Ruling*	*Outcome of Covenant*
L. F. Eason and wife, Alma Eason, v. W. E. Buffaloe et al. 198 N.C. 520; 152 S.E. 496; 1930 N.C. LEXIS 396	?	1930	Struck Down
Gulf Oil Corporation Of Pennsylvania v. Suburban Realty Company 183 Ga. 847; 190 S.E. 179; 1937 Ga. LEXIS 436	1912	1937	Upheld
Border States			
Elizabeth Koehler and August Koehler, Appellants v. Leo N. Rowland et al. 275 Mo. 573; 205 S.W. 217; 1918 Mo. LEXIS 93; 9 A.L.R. 107	1905	1918	Upheld
Corrigan et al. v. Buckley 299 F. 899; 1924 U.S. App. LEXIS 3488; 55 App. D.C. 30	1921	1924	Upheld
Torrey et al. v. Wolfes et al. 6 F.2d 702; 1925 U.S. App. LEXIS 2103; 56 App. D.C. 4	?	1925	Upheld
Marie C. Toothaker and Luther Perkins v. Jeffry Pleasant, Appellant 315 Mo. 1239; 288 S.W. 38; 1926 Mo. LEXIS 786	1915	1926	Struck Down
Corrigan et al. v. Buckley 271 U.S. 323; 46 S. Ct. 521; 1926 U.S. LEXIS 884; 70 L. Ed. 969	—	1926	Upheld
Cornish et al. v. O'Donoghue et al. 30 F.2d 983; 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2577; 58 App. D.C. 359	1905	1929	Upheld
Russell et al. v. Wallace et al. 30 F.2d 981; 1929 U.S. App. LEXIS 2576; 58 App. D.C. 357	?	1929	Upheld
Edwards v. West Woodridge Theater Co., Inc. 55 F.2d 524; 1932 U.S. App. LEXIS 3755; 60 App. D.C. 362	?	1932	Upheld
Grady v. Garland et al. (Washington D.C.) 89 F.2d 817; 1937 U.S. App. LEXIS 3597; 67 App. D.C. 73	1905	1937	Upheld
Herb et al. v. Gerstein et al. (Washington D.C.) 41 F. Supp. 634; 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2490	1930	1941	Upheld

(*continued*)

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TABLE 1

Continued

Case	*Date of Covenant*	*Date of Ruling*	*Outcome of Covenant*
North and Midwest			
Parmalee v. Morris 218 Mich. 625; 188 N.W. 330; 1922 Mich. LEXIS 634	?	1922	Upheld
Bulen v. Rice 1931 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1386; 11 Ohio l. abs. 175	1922	1931	Struck Down
Williams, et al. v Commercial Land Co. 1931 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 1403; 10 Ohio l. abs. 314	1925?	1931	Struck Down
Stanton et al. v. Schmidt et al. 45 Ohio App. 203; 186 N.E. 851; 1931 Ohio App. LEXIS 360; 11 Ohio L. Abs. 281	1927	1931	Struck Down
Olive Ida Burke, Appellee, v. Isaac Kleiman et al., Appellants 277 Ill. App. 519; 1934 Ill. App. LEXIS 148	1927	1934	Upheld
Marion A. Ridgway, Plaintiff, v. Pauline Teresa Cockburn, Defendent 163 Misc. 511; 296 N.Y.S. 936; 1937 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1343	1928	1937	Upheld
Dury et al. v. Neely et ux. 69 N.Y.S. 2d 677; 1942 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1254	1940?	1942	Upheld

Source: Lexis-Nexis and the *American Legal Review*

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several southern cities had used municipal zoning ordinances to prescribe separate residential areas for blacks and whites; by 1915 city councils in Baltimore (1911), Richmond (1911), Winston-Salem (1912), Atlanta (1913), and Louisville (1914) had enacted segregation ordinances. (See Table 2.)

In 1916 St. Louis held a popular referendum in which ordinances proposing the segregation of blacks was overwhelmingly approved by a two-to-one majority,[17] and Dallas followed with its own segregatory zoning ordinance in 1917.[18] That same year Chicago's Real Estate Board began proposing explicit residential segregation by race.[19]

At the time, it might have seemed that legislated racial zoning had the potential to spread throughout the country, but as it turned out, the issue was the NAACP's first major legal victory. The National Association of Colored Persons (NAACP) and its allies took the issue to the Supreme Court, where zoning of this sort was overruled in 1917 in *Buchanan v. Warely*. Though the Court was finding elsewhere that the state could not interfere with private racism, neither could it tolerate the state's enforcement of racial zoning. These ordinances, the Court found, interfered with individuals' property rights.[20] This didn't stop New Orleans from passing a similar ordinance in 1924, and Indianapolis following suit in 1926. These ordinances were again held unconstitutional by the Court's decision in *Harmon v Tyler* in 1927.[21]

Commentators have noted that restrictive covenants began to be more widely used just around the time that the Supreme Court ruled against racial municipal zoning in *Buchanan v. Warely*. William Tuttle goes so far as to assert that "as a result of this ruling, restrictive covenants came into being."[22] So it might seem, as several savvy observers have assumed, that covenants were a response to the Court's decision.

There are three reasons, however, why this explanation is unsatisfactory. The first is that the timing is off. Covenants did not appear after *Buchanan v. Warely*; in fact, by 1917 they had been around in some form for more than two decades. The earliest racial restrictive covenant cases appeared in California, where the covenants were directed against Chinese immigrants. In *Gandolfo v. Hartman*, a California case decided in 1892, for instance, the judges highlight the disputed passage in a deed which reads:

> It is also understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto, their heirs and assigns, that the party of the first part shall never, without the consent of the party of the second part, his heirs or assigns, rent any of the buildings or ground owned

[17] "Segregation in St. Louis: Ordinances Restricting Negroes Carried by Heavy Majority," *New York Times*, 1 March 1916.

[18] Vose, *Caucasians Only*, 51.

[19] William M. Tuttle, "Contested Neighborhoods and Racial Violence: Prelude to the Chicago Riot of 1919," *Journal of Negro History* 55 (October 1970): 276.

[20] *Buchanan v. Warley* 245 U.S. 60 (1917).

[21] *Harmon v. Tyler* 273 U.S. 668 (1927).

[22] Tuttle, "Contested Neighborhoods," 277.

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TABLE 2

Municipal Segregation Ordinances and Cases, 1911–1927

Case	*Date of Ordinance*	*Date of Ruling*	*Outcome of Ruling*
State v. Gurry (Baltimore) 121 Md. 534; 88 A. 546; 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1087	1911	1914	Struck Down
State v. Darnell (Winston-Salem) 166 N.C. 300; 81 S.E. 338; 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332	1912	1914	Struck Down
Carey et al. v. City Of Atlanta et al. 143 Ga. 192; 84 S.E. 456; 1915 Ga. LEXIS 348	1913	1915	Struck Down
Harris v. City of Louisville Ky. 177 S. W. 472	1914	1915	Upheld
Hopkins and Others v. City of Richmond, and Coleman v. Town of Ashland 117 Va. 692; 86 S.E. 139; 1915 Va. LEXIS 86	1911	1915	Upheld
St. Louis; municipal segregation ordinance passed	1916		
Dallas; municipal segregation ordinance passed	1917		
Buchanan v. Warely (Louisville) 245 US 60 1917	—	1917	Struck Down
Tyler v. Harmon (New Orleans) 104 So. 200 March 1925	1924	1925	Upheld
Indianapolis, municipal segregation ordinance passed	1926		
Harmon v. Tyler 273 U.S. 668	—	1927	Struck Down

Source: Litigation data in this table from Lexis-Nexis; for St. Louis, *New York Times* 1 March 1916 3:8; for Dallas, Vose 1959; 51; for Indianapolis, Thornbrough 1961: 598–599. Exact data for one additional city, Birmingham, Alabama, which passed a similar municipal ordinance during this period, is unavailable.

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TABLE 3

Racial Restrictive Covenant Cases by State

State	Covenant Cases	Earliest Mention of Covenant
West		
California	yes	1892
South		
Alabama	?	
Florida	?	
Georgia	yes	1912
Louisiana	yes	1915
Mississippi	no	—
North Carolina	yes	1916
Oklahoma	no	—
South Carolina	no	—
Texas	no	—
Virginia	yes	1904
Border States		
District of Columbia	yes	1905
Kansas	no	—
Kentucky	no	—
Maryland	?	
Missouri	yes	1905
Tennessee	no	—
North/Midwest		
Illinois	yes	1927
Indiana	no	—
Michigan	yes	1922
New Jersey	no	—
New York	yes	1928
Ohio	yes	1922
Pennsylvania	no	

Note: '?' indicates incomplete data available
Source: Lexis-Nexis and the *American Legal Review*

> by said party of the first, and fronting on said East Main Street, to a Chinaman or Chinamen. This agreement shall only apply to that part of lot 2, block 47, aforesaid, lying north of the alley-way hereinbefore described, and fronting on said East Main Street. And said party of the second part agrees for himself and heirs that he will never rent any of the property hereby conveyed to a Chinaman or Chinamen.[23]

Judging from race restrictive covenant cases that made it to state appeals courts, these covenants first appeared in the South around 1904 and in the border states, including the District of Columbia, by around 1905. (See Table 3.) The earliest appearance of these types of covenants in northern or midwestern states' courts of appeals was not until 1922.

[23] *Gandolfo v. Hartman et al.* 49 F. 181; 1892 U.S. App. See also Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 231.

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Second, racial restrictive covenants did not replace zoning, per se, as the main tool to restrict black residential choices.[24] If covenants were simply substituting for zoning, then covenants should have appeared first in cities that already had experience with zoning—Atlanta, Baltimore, and the other cities listed earlier. This is not the case; in the South, racial restrictive covenants predated zoning and when zoning appeared, ran concurrently with them. Third, in the North, where the spread of restrictive covenants gained force in the early 1920s, covenants did not replace zoning, since municipal zoning was almost entirely a southern phenomenon. The diffusion of restrictive covenants in the North and Middle West in the 1920s was a novel occurrence.

Ascribing the rise of restrictive covenants as a simple response to the 1917 *Buchanan v. Warely* decision is misleading. At the very least, there seemed to have been regional differences in patterns of diffusion, with California, the border states, and the South adopting restrictive covenants well in anticipation of the North and Middle West. In their spread through California and the South in the early 1900s, it appears restrictive covenants were transmitted largely through the courts: lawyers arguing restrictive covenant cases were aware of precedents in other states and used these precedents to bolster their arguments. State appeals cases in Louisiana (1915), Missouri (1918), and California (1918) were key precedent-setting judgments, cited by many of the decisions upholding restrictive covenants in the years that followed.[25] Notice of these decisions was disseminated via legal reviews, which summarized key cases in other states and allowed these decisions to be used as ammunition in on-going court battles.

What changed in the early 1920s was that restrictive covenants became nationalized, with the North and Middle West picking up and extending the practice of racial restrictive covenants. Some of this may be attributed to the impact of *Buchanan v. Warely*, but the decision is not enough in itself to explain the process of diffusion or its timing. For a more complete explanation, we need an understanding of the interplay of changing demographics of cities at the time and critical events like the riots of 1917–1921.

Black Migration and the Riots of 1917–1921

Racial restrictive covenants appeared primarily in cities, and cities at this time were going through dramatic transformations, largely in response to the rapid urbanization of immigrants and migrants of color, whether from the rural South

[24] Note that nonracial exclusionary zoning also spread rapidly during this time period, creating barriers based on class rather than race. This kind of exclusionary zoning is still widely implemented in the United States.

[25] *Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary* 42 Cal. App. 152, 183 P. 470, 1919 Cal. App. LEXIS 712; *Queensborough Land Company v. Cazeaux et al* 136 La. 729, 67 So. 641, L.R.A. 1916B LEXIS 2057; *Elizabeth Koehler and August Koehler, Appellants v. Leo N. Rowland et al.* 275 Mo. 573; 205 S.W. 217; 1918 Mo. LEXIS 93; 9 A.L.R. 107. Before these precedents were established, earlier cases in California and Virginia had overturned judgments on racial restrictive covenants. See *Gandolfo v. Hartman (California)* 49 F. 181, *182; 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1182; *People's Pleasure Park Company (Inc.) and Others v. Rohleder* 109 Va. 439; 61 S.E. 794; 1908 Va. LEXIS 119.

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or from abroad. As late as 1910 it was not certain that black migrants, particularly in the North, were going to be treated as a class distinct and apart from immigrants. Blacks were less segregated in midwestern and northern cities than some contemporary immigrant groups, notably Italians, Russians, and Romanians.[26] This began changing between 1910 and 1920, as immigrant groups became less residentially distinct; and the black population, increasing in numbers, was channeled into neighborhoods with existing African-American populations.[27]

Black migration from the South to the North and West—part of the broader phenomenon of black urbanization—had been increasing steadily since the 1880s, but the Great Migration really began after 1910. The migration figures tend to be a little sketchy, but between 1910 and 1920 about 500,000 or more blacks moved out of the South, with most of the migration occurring after 1916 (thirteen southern states had an absolute loss of black population).[28] The reasons for the migration are various: the devastation of the cotton crop in the South and resulting tensions within the sharecropping system certainly contributed, as did the increase in black lynchings. The outbreak of war in Europe, combined to the effects of anti-immigrant legislation, meant that the regular northern labor supply was cut off.[29] After the United States entered World War I, an additional one million men were taken out of the labor force.[30] A wartime economy meant a tremendous demand for labor, and for blacks, a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.

> The black migrant was motivated primarily by the desire to escape the caste-like social system of the South with all of its economic and social manifestations. Until the war, the problem was there was no place for him to go that would substantially change his situation, and if there had been, no realistic way for him to get there. But this situation was changed with the sudden reversal of the supply and demand

[26] Stanley Lieberson, *A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants Since 1880* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago: Aldine, 1965), 235–238; and Kenneth Kusmer, *A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black Cleveland, 1870–1930* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 43, 164.

[27] Joe William Trotter, "Blacks in the Urban North: The 'Underclass' Question in Historical Perspective" in Michael B. Katz, ed., *The Underclass Debate: Views From History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 74–75.

[28] For estimates, see Florette Henri, *Black Migration: Movement North 1900–1920* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975), 51; Marcus E. Jones, *Black Migration in the United States with Emphasis on Selected Central Cities* (Saratoga, FL: Century 21 Publishing, 1980), 35; Ira Katznelson, *Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics and Migration in the United States 1900–1930 and Britain 1948–1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 31; Trotter, *Blacks in the Urban North*, 68; and Daniel M. Johnson and Rex R. Campbell *Black Migration in America: A Social Demographic History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981), 74. On white migration from the South, see Jones, *Black Migration*, 35.

[29] Chicago Commission on Human Relations, *The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and the Race Riot in 1919* (New York: Arno Press, 1968; originally published by the University of Chicago Press, 1922), 79.

[30] Johnson and Campbell, *Black Migration*, 71.

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> for labor in the North, which created a place to go as well as a way to get there. The demand for labor, together with the railroad companies working jointly with industry to provide transportation, offered black southerners a way to achieve their desire of freedom and social advancement.[31]

Employers who never would have considered blacks for semiskilled manufacturing jobs before then began not only hiring but also actively recruiting black migrants. Within a very short period of time African-American populations in northern and midwestern cities doubled, tripled, and quadrupled.[32]

With the movement of African Americans into urban areas, labor competition between blacks and whites increased, since blacks were moving increasingly into both skilled and unskilled positions previously occupied only by whites. This period was characterized by increasingly bitter accusations that blacks were being recruited by northern employers as strikebreakers. In East St. Louis, after strikes in 1916 at meatpacking plants and in 1917 at the Aluminum Ore Company, there was considerable resentment on the part of white workers about the hiring of nonunionized blacks.[33] In the Chicago Stockyards strike of 1904 and the teamsters strike of 1905, employers used nonunion black workers as strikebreakers.[34] The fact that white immigrants also occasionally played the role of scabs and that blacks were discouraged from joining predominantly white unions was conveniently overlooked.[35] Susan Olzak uses time-series and event-history analysis in her study of ethnic competition and conflict between 1877 and 1914 to reach similar conclusions. Collecting information on interethnic conflict across seventy-seven cities, she found that as occupational segregation decreased and union formation accelerated, interethnic conflict increased. Increasing contact and competition in the workplace, she argued, led to overt conflict.[36]

In addition, as blacks moved into cities there was competition over housing and public space. Residents of middle- and upper-class neighborhoods, who had the resources to move further out to the city's edge or beyond, tended to give way in the face of black middle class incursions; while working class whites, who were irrevocably tied to their investments in their homes, were more likely to stay and resist, if at all possible. In Cleveland, for example, historian Kenneth Kusmer describes how the areas of black settlement were bounded in some areas by native-born settlements, in other areas by neighborhoods of Russian

[31] Ibid., 86.

[32] Jones, *Black Migration.*

[33] Elliot M. Rudwick, *Race Riot at East St. Louis, July 2, 1917* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964), 18, 27; Chicago Commission, *Negro in Chicago*, 74.

[34] Trotter, "Blacks in the Urban North," 63; Allan Spear, *Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto 1890–1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 36. For a contrary view, see U.S. Department of Labor Division of Negro Economics, *Negro Migration in 1916–1917* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), 135.

[35] Chicago Commission, *Negro in Chicago*, 419–420; Kusmer, *Ghetto Takes Shape*, 67.

[36] Susan Olzak, *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992).

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Jews, and elsewhere by other Central European immigrants. As African Americans sought housing, native-born whites in adjacent neighborhoods moved readily to outlying areas. Russian Jews, who were largely renters, moved relatively quickly as well. The second-generation immigrant neighborhoods, with fewer resources than the native-born but higher rates of home ownership than Russian Jews, held fast and at times violently resisted black migration into their neighborhoods.[37] Immigrants in these neighborhoods, "[h]aving raised themselves above poverty, acquired a small home (with perhaps a large mortgage as well) and attained a modest level of income . . . were fearful of association with any group bearing the stigma of low status"[38] There were similar processes at work in other cities: in Chicago's 1919 race riot, historian Dominic Pacyga points out that more blacks were killed in Irish neighborhoods to the east of the "black belt," where middle-class African Americans were competing for housing, than to the west, where blacks crossed Polish and Italian neighborhoods on the way to work in the meat-packing district.[39] As black neighbors moved in, threatening to devalue the real-estate investments of the Irish lower-middle class, the goal became the removal of African Americans from the neighborhood.[40]

Population change, labor competition, and housing pressures meant that as African Americans began increasing in numbers in urban areas, tensions with whites in northern cities increased. (See Figure 1.) These tensions came to a head between 1917 and 1921, when there were fourteen major race disturbances across the United States, punctuating the background hum of more localized events—lynchings, firebombings, and assaults—which were the basic vocabulary of interracial violence at the time. (See Table 4.)[41]

These riots were a turning point in interracial relations, particularly for blacks and whites in cities in the North and Middle West. Just as demographic and economic competition contributed to riots, the riots themselves contributed to the rise of institutional practices that addressed and contained these conflicts. The Chicago riots, in particular, were critical. Unlike the rioting in other cities, the outbreak of violence coincided with the presence of institutions capable of organizing a concerted policy response. Although riots occurred in

[37] Kusmer, *Ghetto Takes Shape*, 170–171.

[38] Ibid., 171.

[39] Dominic Pacyga,"Chicago's 1919 Race Riot: Ethnicity, Class and Urban Violence" in Raymond Mohl, ed., *The Making of Urban America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), 187–207.

[40] Ibid. 205; see also James Grossman, *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners and the Great Migration* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 175.

[41] A subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary found instances of thirty-eight riots around the country in 1919, and DuBois gives a count of twenty-six communities experiencing riots. But I was unable to verify these in a search of the *New York Times* index. See "Increase of Mob Violence Set Out in Senate Brief for Federal Inquiry," *New York Times*, 5 October 1919; and W.E.B Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn* (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1940). For a more detailed discussion of the riots of this period and their causes, see Michael Jones-Correa, "American Riots: Structures, Institutions and History" (Russell Sage Foundation Working Paper #148, 1999).

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FIGURE 1
Probability of Riot by Change in Black Population, 1910–1920



Source: Jones-Correa, Michael (1999) "American Riots: Structures, Institutions and History" Russell Sage Foundation, Working Paper #148.

cities all over the country, Chicago's led to the nationalization of the particular segregatory enforcing mechanism of racial restrictive covenants.

Responses to the Riots

In the aftermath of the Chicago riots there were a number of alternative responses, some of which were less successful in the long run than others. These can be grouped into three clusters—accommodationist, segregationist, and exclusionary responses.

Accommodationist

The liberal, or accommodationist, responses to the riots took the form of proposals for better relations among the races. The Chicago Commission on Race

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TABLE 4

List of Race Riots, 1917–1921

East St. Louis, Illinois	2 July 1917
Chester, Pennsylvania	26 July 1917
Houston, Texas	23 August 1917
New York City, New York	13 October 1918
Winston-Salem, North Carolina	18 November 1918
Millen, Georgia	15 April 1919
Charleston, South Carolina	10 May 1919
Washington, DC	19 July 1919
Chicago, Illinois	27 July 1919
Knoxville, Tennessee	30 August 1919
Omaha, Nebraska	28 September 1919
Elaine, Arkansas	1 October 1919
Tulsa, Oklahoma	30 May 1921
Augusta, Georgia	17 August 1921

Relations, established after the 1919 riots, published its report in 1922, which rejected "separatist" alternatives proposed by both whites (segregation) and blacks (Garveyite "black nationalism").[42] It criticized the behavior of the police for their one-sidedness during the riots, of the white teen-age "athletic clubs" that had perpetrated much of the worst violence, and of bankers who exacerbated the housing situation for blacks.[43] It suggested that a solution for the housing crisis would be for the public sector to become more involved in providing housing for new black migrants and to encourage the dispersal of African Americans through the city.[44]

Senator Joseph McCormick of Illinois called for "the two races . . . candidly to take steps to accommodate their differences and their interests."[45] George Haynes, the director of the Division of Negro Economics in the Department of Labor, urged that riots be forestalled by calling together local and national biracial committees to work out issues of controversy. White and black leaders did in fact try to institutionalize this approach of accommodation and formed the Commission on Interracial Violence.[46]

Very little came of these accommodationist suggestions. The Chicago Commission, Arthur Waskow notes, never confronted the question of how its recommendations were to come into effect.[47] "Even the commission's one institutional recommendation—that permanent commission like itself be created—

[42] Arthur Waskow, *From Race-Riot to Sit-In, 1919 and the 1960s: A Study in the Connections Between Conflict and Violence* (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 95.

[43] Ibid., 97–98.

[44] Chicago Commission, *Negro in Chicago*, 645.

[45] Quoted in Waskow, *From Race Riot to Sit-In*, 197.

[46] Ibid., 197–8.

[47] Ibid., 97.

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was not accomplished till the 1940s . . . ."[48] In Washington DC, questions raised by the *Washington Post* about the administration of the District and the behavior of the police simply faded away.[49] The national Commission on Interracial Cooperation met for twenty-five years until 1944, but did not significantly change the tenor of the debate on race.

Major black organizations like the NAACP and their allies in the press, like the *Chicago Defender*, continued their steadfast opposition to segregation.[50] The *Defender* in particular exhorted its readers almost weekly to resist the encroachment of de facto segregation. These liberal responses were not ridiculous or unrealistic: just a few years prior to when racial covenants first began appearing in Chicago, for instance, there were a number of bills passed at the state level strengthening the state's civil rights laws.[51] While the NAACP and the black press held the moral high ground, they had no institutional leverage to change the behavior of their white antagonists.

Segregationist

The segregationist response took the form of encouraging the separation of the races as the solution to racial tensions. Segregatory impulses were not exactly new to the North. By 1910 African Americans had to put up with increasing de facto segregation in theaters, restaurants, and other public places. Homeowners' organizations, which began appearing in Chicago around 1908 ostensibly as neighborhood improvement associations, increasingly turned to advocating the separation of the races. In 1909 the Hyde Park Improvement Club issued a manifesto: "blacks had to confine themselves to the 'so-called Districts,' real estate agents must refuse to sell property in white blocks to blacks [or be blacklisted], and landlords must hire only white janitors. To implement this policy, the club appointed a committee to purchase property owned by blacks in white blocks and to offer bonuses to black renters who would surrender their leases . . . ."[52] The associations had meetings and rallies against wavering realtors, who might have been tempted to sell property to African Americans. Eight years later, the Chicago Real Estate Board was urging property owners' associations to shore up the solidarity of their neighborhoods to assure that no more defectors would sell out to blacks. It then called on black leaders to meet to discuss the practicability of block-by-block segregation. At this meeting, the Chicago Real Estate Board tried to persuade black realtors to "desist" from selling abodes to their people in black neighborhoods. Black representatives refused to consider the request.[53] About the same time, the Kenwood and Hyde Park

[48] Ibid., 103.
[49] Ibid., 36.
[50] Ibid., 176–182.
[51] Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*.
[52] Spear, *Black Chicago*, 22.
[53] Tuttle, *Contested Neighborhoods*, 276.

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FIGURE 2

Increase in Number of Racial Restrictive Covenants, Chicago and St. Louis, 1910–1945



Source: Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson *People vs. Property: Race Restrictive Covenants in Housing* (Nashville, TN: Fisk University Press 1947).

Property Owners' Association, largely led by realtors, was making similar demands. At one meeting in 1919, the organization's minutes reported that "any real estate agent who did not refuse to rent or sell to blacks would be blacklisted; that block captains had been selected to report any attempts by blacks to move into the district; and finally, that three hotels in the neighborhood had agreed to cooperate in a plan whereby black employees who did not consent to vacate their residences in the district would be discharged."[54]

One effect of the riots was to accelerate the turn to racial restrictive covenants. The timing of the implementation of these covenants seems to support this interpretation of events. (See Figure 2.) Herman Long and Charles Johnson's data on the formation of race restrictive covenants in Chicago and St. Louis indicate that race-specific deed restrictions in St. Louis sharply increased in number between 1915 and 1919, around the time of the East St. Louis distur-

[54] Ibid., 281.

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bances occurring in 1917 just across the Mississippi River. Chicago's covenant campaigns didn't begin until the 1920s, in the aftermath of that city's riots in 1919. In both cities, once introduced, covenants spread quickly.[55] The difference in the timing of the appearance of racial covenants and the coincidence of this timing with the race riots in each city provide evidence of the independent effect of the riots on the introduction of restrictive covenants.

By the late 1920s, race restrictive covenants had spread both within and among cities, particularly across the North and Middle West, where they had only a few years earlier been practically unknown. By 1928, restrictive covenants in Chicago were, as one judge and a member of the Chicago Real Estate Board told the Hyde Park Kiwanis Club, "like a marvelous delicately-woven chain armour . . . [excluding] any member of a race not Caucasian."[56] In theory, blacks in northern cities continued to have free access to housing, but in practice their choices were increasingly limited by both formal and informal barriers. The usual pattern was to have concentrations of these restrictive agreements in areas around black neighborhoods, relatively sparse coverage elsewhere in the city, and much more widespread application in newer suburban developments. This is explained by the different costs entailed in establishing covenants in urban versus suburban areas, and older cities versus newer ones: covenant agreements in older neighborhoods were established only with the agreement of all the property owners in a given area, which could be a time-consuming and expensive process; while in the suburbs, developers often wrote covenants into deeds before new owners moved in.[57] Chicago, for instance, followed this pattern; by 1947 covenants covered about half of the city's residential sections. (See Figure 3.)[58] With black neighborhoods hemmed on all sides, either by industrial zones, covenanted neighborhoods, or Lake Michigan, the area occupied by blacks in Chicago remained substantially the same from the 1920s to the 1940s, when covenants were finally ruled unconstitutional. But by then restrictive covenants had served their purpose: racial barriers had been "successfully defended for a generation."[59]

Exclusionary

Exclusionary impulses had manifested themselves well before the riot in 1919. In 1917, the Chicago Real Estate Board petitioned the city council to pass an ordinance prohibiting further migration of blacks to Chicago until such a time as the city could work out "such reasonable restriction of leasing or selling [to] be enforced as to prevent lawlessness, destruction of values and property, and

[55] Long and Johnson, *People vs. Property*.

[56] *Hyde Park Herald*, 20 March 1928, quoted in Tuttle, "Contested Neighborhoods," 278.

[57] Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 212; Long and Johnson, *People vs. Property*, 23–25.

[58] Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 246.

[59] Arnold Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 5.

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FIGURE 3
Distribution of Race Restrictive Covenants in Chicago, 1947



Source: adapted from a map prepared by the Chicago Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and based on a survey by Loring B. Moore.

loss of life."[60] The proposal never merited serious consideration and was dismissed as obviously unconstitutional by the *Chicago Tribune*. But the Real Estate Board's proposals were only the most innocuous of the antiblack responses.

[60] Tuttle, "Contested Neighborhoods," 276; Grossman, *Land of Hope*, 174; Rose Helper, *Racial Policies and Practices of Real Estate Brokers* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), 226.

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Between 1917 and 1921 there were fifty-eight bombings in Chicago, most of them targeting new African-American homeowners, but also the real estate agents who purportedly sold houses to blacks.[61] These bombings tapered off in the early 1920s. It is not coincidental that this same period in the late 1910s and early 1920s also saw the rise of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) as a national movement, making its appearance for the first time in the North and Middle West. Klan mobilization was closely linked to the increasing visibility of blacks in northern cities. In Chicago, for instance, membership in the Ku Klux Klan maps closely onto areas bordering African-American neighborhoods. (See Figure 4.) However, the KKK's mobilization peaked after only a few years in the face of immigrant and black hostility to the movement and the failure of the Klan's candidates at the ballot box.[62]

The implementation of these three types of responses all encountered practical obstacles. Collective action problems—the difficulty of providing incentives for individuals with distinct interests to keep working toward common ends—defeated many of these proposals. Accommodationist responses, for example, could not provide incentives for people to live together in integrated neighborhoods. They had some institutional support from some of the white liberal elite and from African-American organizations like the NAACP and the black press, but this elite support was both narrow and shallow. Exclusionary responses for their part were costly and difficult to sustain. The illegal bombing campaigns in cities like Chicago and Detroit had no official support. While many whites may have been sympathetic to the goals of the bombers, few were openly supportive. Similarly, organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, while initially mobilizing a large following, were unable to make the transition into more conventional avenues of politics. Segregationist responses were the default option: they had supporters among both whites, some of whom wanted nothing to do with blacks, and even among some blacks, who wanted control of their own institutions.

Restrictive covenants and their cousins—racial steering, block busting, and redlining—succeeded in part because they were in step with the segregationist notions of the time; but their implementation and diffusion were by no means preordained. Like other responses to the riots, racially restrictive covenants ran into challenges from very early on. The NAACP began contesting covenants as soon as they were established, though racial restrictive covenants survived a Supreme Court decision in 1926 and were not overturned until 1948.[63] If racial restrictions on residential housing had relied solely on local efforts, it is likely that residential desegregation would have begun to take place sooner than it did. Some scholars have argued that even at their height racially restrictive covenants were not always effective, particularly as demographic pressures simply

[61] Grossman, *Land of Hope*, 174. See also Chicago Commission, *Negro in Chicago*.

[62] Kenneth Jackson, *The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915–1930* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 1992 [1967]), 126, 142.

[63] See Vose, *Caucasians Only*, 17–18; Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 243.

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FIGURE 4
Distribution of Klan Strength in Chicago, 1923



Source: Jackson 1992 [1963].

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became irresistible in the 1940s.[64] These racialized institutions would not have been able to sustain themselves if not for the backing of local institutions like real estate boards, and later the federal institutions that played an increasingly important role in the housing market after 1933. The institutional success of racial restrictive covenants was crucially dependent on their interaction with other institutional actors.

The Institutionalization of Residential Segregation

In the 1910s and 1920s, responses to tensions between blacks and whites were primarily local and private. The federal government was largely absent from the picture. While the federal judiciary upheld local racial restrictions, the federal government simply did not have the capacity to meddle in any kind of detail in municipal affairs. (See Figure 5.) This is reflected in the figures for federal transfers to the states, which before 1921 were minimal. The passage of the Federal Highway Act that year saw the first significant flow of funds to localities—which was opposed by urban representatives, who saw it primarily as a boondoggle benefiting rural counties.[65] Metropolitan governments often had neither the inclination nor the resources to address the structural issues underlying civil disturbances.

As a result, racial restrictive covenants and the like were initially sponsored not by the public sector but rather by private institutions. Among these, local real estate boards played a central role. Real estate boards and their allies, particularly neighborhood and homeowners' associations, endorsed restrictive covenants and mobilized campaigns to collect the necessary signatures for their creation.[66] In Chicago, for instance, the Chicago Real Estate Board resolved to "start a propaganda through its individual members to recommend owners' societies in every white block for the purpose of mutual defense."[67] Often local realtors and members of the real estate board served as officers of these associations.[68]

That Chicago was home to the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) was instrumental not only in the local realtors' enthusiastic support for covenants, but in the propagation of covenants elsewhere. With its formation in 1908 the national association, according to its own commissioned publications, "proved to be a clearing house for the best thought and best ideas de-

[64] Hirsch, *Second Ghetto*, 16, 30; Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 212, 234.

[65] Austin MacDonald, *Federal Aid: A Study of the American Subsidy System* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1928), 239–240.

[66] Thomas Philpott, *The Slum and the Ghetto: Neighborhood Deterioration and Middle Class Reform, Chicago, 1880–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 193–196; Long and Johnson, *People vs. Property*, 38.

[67] *Chicago Real Estate Bulletin*, 21 November 1917, cited in Tuttle, "Contested Neighborhoods," 278.

[68] Tuttle, "Contested Neighborhoods," 281.

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FIGURE 5
Federal Aid Payment to the States, 1912–1927



Source: Austin F. McDonald *Federal Aid: A Study of the American Subsidy System* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company), 6.

veloped everywhere in the business. . . . It has been an instrument for the development of public policy in matters affecting real property."[69] As part of its role in developing public policy in 1924, NAREB adopted an amendment to its "code of ethics" or charter, which read: "A Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood."[70] Individual realtors usually found it in their interests to follow the national guidelines. Real estate boards could and did expel or ostracize members who did not keep to the code.[71] Expulsion had very real costs: it meant the loss of the network of contacts and information critical to the practice of the real estate broker. Most member realtors kept to the rules of the national organization. In 1927 NAREB drafted a standard restrictive covenant document, which was then shared with

[69] Richard T. Ely, *The Administration of Real Estate Boards* (New York: MacMillan, 1925), 1.
[70] Ibid., 207.
[71] Helper, *Racial Policies*, 23, 190, 228, 230; Ely, *Administration*, 168.

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local real estate boards around the country.[72] It also encouraged local boards to form home owner's associations to sign onto covenant agreements.[73] Together these loose confederations of national and local associations did much of the work of enforcing patterns of racial residential segregation that kept African-American residents confined to deteriorating urban neighborhoods.

Even with the support of a national organization like the National Association of Real Estate Boards, segregatory responses like racial restrictive covenants were inherently vulnerable to challenge and could often be difficult and expensive to enforce.[74] While they originated in the absence of a strong federal presence, they persisted because of that presence. With the Depression, the federal government began to increase its involvement in local affairs, not least in the area of housing. This involvement began with the establishment of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) in 1933, which was designed to reduce mortgage foreclosures. Between July 1933 and June 1935, HOLC supplied $3 billion in loans, covering more than one in ten owner-occupied nonfarm residences in the United States.[75] HOLC single-handedly established the pattern for long-term mortgage loans. In doing so, it had to make predictions about how housing covered would fare over the lifetime of the loan. Housing appraisals became increasingly systematized, rating not only the structural integrity of the homes themselves but also the neighborhoods surrounding them. Areas were rated, privileging homogeneous native-born white-collar neighborhoods and downgrading older, mixed-use, ethnic or black neighborhoods.[76] As a result, African-American neighborhoods were systematically deprived of mortgages and other lending. The patterns established under HOLC persisted after it was folded into the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). "The FHA started its career by accepting prevalent real estate doctrine that nonwhites should be kept out of white neighborhoods in order to protect property values."[77] The FHA's 1938 *Underwriting Manual* instructed appraisers that "if a neighborhood is to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes." Appraisers were to predict

[72] Wendy Plotkin, "Neighbors and Boundaries: Racial Restrictive Covenants in Chicago, 1900–1948" (presented at the Chicago Historical Society, Urban History Seminar; 19 March 1998); Helper, *Racial Politics*, 229–230.

[73] On the role of neighborhood associations and homeowner's groups in the spread of restrictive covenants, see Vose, *Caucasians Only*, 8; and Long and Johnson, *People v. Property*, 38. On the link between developers and homeowner's associations in keeping the "character" of neighborhoods, see Charles N. Glaab and A. Theodore Brown, *A History of Urban America* (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1967), 294; and Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 254.

[74] Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 233.

[75] Kenneth Jackson, "Race, Ethnicity and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration," *Journal of Urban History* 6 (August 1980): 421; Glaab and Brown, *History of Urban America*, 300.

[76] Jackson, "Race, Ethnicity and Real Estate," 423.

[77] Davis McEntire, *Residence and Race: Final and Comprehensive Report to the Commission on Race and Housing* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), 301.

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"the probability of the location being invaded by . . . incompatible racial and social groups."[78] To "preserve" neighborhood character, FHA officials were enjoined to uphold racial restrictive covenants. The *Manual* openly recommended "subdivision regulations and suitable restrictive covenants" that would be "superior to any mortgage."[79] Explicit racial references were deleted from the FHA underwriting manual only in 1947.[80] Federal intervention encouraged segregated housing by reinforcing local discriminatory practices, among them race restrictive covenants.

The story of the federal government's role in promoting segregated housing has been told extensively elsewhere.[81] The point I want to emphasize here is the link between local and federal institutions. As the federal government played a greater role in local affairs during the Depression, it did not step in and invent entirely new institutional structures and practices. More often it melded its new role with existing practices. In the case of housing, this meant adopting the standard practices of local real estate boards and banks, particularly in respecting and upholding local racially restrictive covenants and racial steering. As HOLC and then the FHA got underway, they were staffed at the federal and local levels by former real estate professionals who operated under and accepted the profession's racial strictures, and who then transferred these norms into federal practices.[82] For example, Frederick Babcock, a prominent figure in real estate appraisal, who wrote a widely used appraising text *The Valuation of Real Estate* (1932) advocating the enforcement of racially segregated neighborhoods, went on to write the FHA's 1938 *Underwriting Manual*, which incorporated similar assumptions of the desirability of neighborhood homogeneity and the pernicious influence of black home ownership on property values.[83] In another instance, the mapping system implemented by HOLC and then by the FHA in the 1930s was already being publicized in 1925 by NAREB as one of its examples of "best practices."[84] In these and other respects, the FHA's institutional racism was a reflection of local attitudes and policies.

Historian Kenneth Jackson writes that the lasting damage done by the national government was that it "put its seal of approval on ethnic and racial discrimination" and that "more seriously, Washington's actions were later picked up by private interests, so that banks and savings and loan institutions institutionalized the practice of denying mortgages 'solely because of the geographical

[78] Federal Housing Administration, *Underwriting Manual*, 1938 Sec 937, quoted in McEntire, *Residence and Race*, 301; see also Long and Johnson, *People vs. Property*, 70–72; Kenneth Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 208.

[79] Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 208.

[80] Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 152.

[81] Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*; McEntire, *Residence and Race*; Abrams, *Forbidden Neighbors*; Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*.

[82] Weaver, *Negro Ghetto*, 72.

[83] Helper, *Racial Policies*, 197, 202.

[84] Ely, *Administration*, 191.

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location of the property'"—that is to say, redlining.[85] The causal flow Jackson and others identify runs from the federal government to local, private actors. While the role of the federal government in reinforcing racially segregated housing in urban areas was certainly crucial in extending the half-life of race restrictive covenants and other local segregatory tools, the historical record shows that influence between local and federal institutions ran both ways. The federal government first adopted its racialized policies from local actors, and in doing so, it reinforced them.[86]

Conclusion

The spread of racial restrictive covenants in the early twentieth century highlights some of the complexities in the study of policy diffusion. The case emphasizes the importance of the mechanisms of diffusion. In particular, the role of the 1917–1921 race riots suggests the part that critical junctures can play in the diffusion process. The racial disturbances of this period left behind an institutional legacy: they accelerated some local organizational and institutional outcomes at the expense of others. However, at any critical juncture there are multiple alternatives; which ones succeed are not always immediately apparent.

The critical juncture/path dependency model does not fully explain the success of racial restrictive covenants where other race-targeted policies failed or their persistence over time. As critics have noted, critical junctures or moments of crisis are simply an opening for institutional change. The opening itself does not guarantee any particular institutional outcome, or that any outcome will persist. Collier and Collier find, for instance, in their study of regime transitions in Latin America that the persistence and stability of institutional legacies is not automatic, but "rather, is perpetuated through ongoing . . . political processes."[87] Institutions are not invulnerable to change, to decay, or to challenge. The changes brought about by critical junctures are not guaranteed to last. Some legacies "self-destruct" by producing political dynamics that militate against the formation of stable institutional patterns.[88] Institutional outcomes are more fragile than conceptualized by strict path dependency theorists.

Which institutional legacies persist is determined, therefore, not only by the self-reinforcing, path-dependent mechanisms described by Pierson, but also by the manner in which different institutional layers interact with one another, allowing some policy outcomes to survive, while others wither. Associational networks linking institutional layers—like the National Association of Real Estate Boards in the case of the racial restrictive covenants—are crucial here.

[85] Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier*, 217.

[86] Hirsch makes a similar argument about public housing: ". . . in a literal sense, it was not a 'federal' renewal at all. National legislation simply provided federal assistance, economic and otherwise, for innumerable local programs . . ." Hirsch, *Making the Second Ghetto*, 269.

[87] Collier and Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena*, 30–31.

[88] Ibid., 34.

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They are particularly important because states are the political laboratories generating policy innovation; and few policies of whatever kind are actually invented by the federal government. Rather, the federal government tends to embellish, improvise, and expand on policies that have already been introduced at the state or local levels.[89] Federal intervention reinforces interstate exchanges by promoting uniform adoption of policy across states and providing additional opportunities for state-level organizations to exchange policy ideas.[90] Associational networks, therefore, help bridge state and federal policy arenas.

Ironically, this finding brings us back full circle to the policy diffusion literature. In his seminal article, Walker notes in an aside that associational networks,"... specialized communications systems ... which cut across traditional regional lines and bring officials from many different regions into contact with each other ..." are critical to the diffusion of ideas and practices among the states.[91] This is particularly true because while the role of the federal government can be critical, it is rarely an innovator of policy. Rather, federal intervention merely reinforces preexisting policy outcomes, favoring one set of alternatives over others.[92] Walker's insight on the role of associations in policy diffusion has never been adequately pursued; this article indicates it is time that it is.

[89] Phillip Monypenny, "Federal Grants in Aid to State Governments: A Political Analysis," *National Tax Journal* 13 (March 1960): 1–6; Welch and Thompson, "Impact of Federal Incentives," 717–718.

[90] Welch and Thompson, "Impact of Federal Incentives," 719, 727.

[91] Walker, "Diffusion of Innovations," 894–895.

[92] Monypenny, "Federal Grants in Aid"; Welch and Thompson, "Impact of Federal Incentives," 717–718.

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Producing and Consuming Trust

ERIC M. USLANER

Trust is the chicken soup of social life. It reputedly brings us all sorts of good things—from a willingness to get involved in our communities to higher rates of economic growth, to satisfaction with government performance, to making daily life more pleasant.[1] In a trusting society, ordinary people take active roles in their communities, join voluntary organizations, give to charity, and volunteer their time.[2] An active and engaged citizenry is motivated by a shared sense of common purpose that ultimately helps people find compromises to difficult issues.[3] A trusting society is a civic society, and a civic society is a civil society.

Trust in other people has fallen dramatically in the United States over the past four decades as Americans have become less engaged in their communities and as compromise in our political life has become more and more elusive. The waning of faith in our fellow citizens is thus cause for great concern. A less trusting society is a less civil society.

Like chicken soup, trust appears to work somewhat mysteriously. Somehow we are supposed to develop confidence in people we don't know based upon data that we can't readily get. Trust, according to a Smith Barney television commercial (and most academic accounts), "must be earned," since people "are not born to trust." We won't trust other people until we decide that they are trustworthy. Trust without evidence makes no sense.[4] Or does it?

[1] Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Francis Fukayama, *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, (New York: Free Press, 1995).

[2] Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), chap. 8, esp. 137; and Eric M. Uslaner "Faith, Hope, and Charity: Social Capital, Trust, and Collective Action" (unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland, College Park, 1998).

[3] Eric M. Uslaner, *The Decline of Comity in Congress* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

[4] Russell Hardin, "The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust," *Analyse & Kritik* 14 (1992): 152–176.

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Robert Putnam believes that trust in people we know can form the bridge to faith in others we don't know: "Joiners become more tolerant, less cynical, and more empathetic to the misfortunes of others. When people lack connections to others, they are unable to test the veracity of their own views, whether in the give-and-take of casual conversation or in more formal deliberation. Without such an opportunity, people are more likely to be swayed by their worst impulses."[5]

Membership in civic organizations leads people to trust each other. They then extrapolate this faith in people we know to folks we don't know. Modern communitarians such as Putnam see membership in voluntary associations as a kind of holy grail to a trusting community. They follow Alexis de Tocqueville, who argued that civic associations are the essential building blocks of collective action.[6] Trust and membership in voluntary associations are part of a "virtuous circle" of engaged and prosperous communities: Trusting people join groups and the camaraderie of group membership builds trust.[7]

There is something compelling about this new Tocquevillian perspective: If trust is important and it is in short supply, it would be wonderful to find a way to restore faith in others. But we should be skeptical of magic elixirs such as trust or civic engagement. Trust doesn't solve all of our problems. It is too important for that. Trust is not a catch-all solution to our problems (neither is chicken soup). It does not affect much of what we call "civic engagement," especially when people congregate with people very much like themselves. In some more expansive forms of civic engagement and in fostering a willingness to treat others with respect, trust matters a lot.

Putting faith in other people helps connect people to folks who are different from themselves. Thus, trusting people feel a common bond with others in the society and believe that discrimination against minorities and women is just not right. They feel moral obligations to help the less fortunate and thus are more likely than mistrusters to give to charity and to volunteer their time. Trusters also realize that it is important for society to be able to reach collective decisions, so they place a high value on compromise and legislative productivity, rather than ideological purity and stalemate.

Most of the time, membership in voluntary organizations and informal socializing has no need to tap faith in people who are different from ourselves. We socialize with people we already know. We join bowling leagues with friends or at least people with similar interests and most likely world views. You don't have to be a truster, or an especially nice person, to join a bowling league. There is little evidence and a shaky theoretical foundation for assuming that either

[5] Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 171, 180; Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 288–289.

[6] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 2, Henry Reeve, trans. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945, originally published in 1840), 108–109, 117.

[7] Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," *Journal of Democracy* 6 (January 1995): 65–78; and John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, "Individual Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (July 1997): 999–1023.

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formal or informal social connections can produce trust in people we don't know, especially when they are likely to be different from ourselves and our friends. Putnam assumes that hanging out with people like yourself will make you more trusting of people who are different from yourself. Yes, there is some reason to believe, as in the children's song, "The more we get together, the happier we'll be." But there is little reason to presume that the chimney sweep's ode in *Mary Poppins*, "Good luck will rub off when I shakes [sic] hands with you," works in real life social situations.

Dietlind Stolle argues that the extension of trust from people we know to people we don't occurs through "mechanisms not yet clearly understood."[8] An even more skeptical Nancy Rosenblum calls the purported link "an airy 'liberal expectancy'" that remains "unexplained."[9] I shall show in this article that these linkages rarely exist in real life. Group membership and informal socializing don't depend upon trust. And they don't create trust either. Giving to charity and volunteering are notable exceptions. Trust doesn't come from our social interactions. We learn it early in life from our parents, who impart to us a sense of optimism and a belief that we are the masters of our own fate. Most of us don't change from mistrusters to trusters (or the other way around) that easily. But trust is not simply a constant. It has dropped significantly over time, as Americans have become less optimistic about the future. And they have good reasons to be pessimistic: the real level of economic inequality has increased sharply over the past four decades.

The Logic of Trust

Part of the confusion about what trust can do stems from the multifaceted nature of trust. There are two distinct types that serve different purposes and have dissimilar foundations. Trust in people we know, which I call "strategic trust," helps us decide which stockbroker we use or which electrician we hire. It separates the people to whom we would lend $50 (those we believe will repay us) from the folks we would decline (either because we suspect they would not pay us back or because we simply don't have any idea whether they would do so). It may help us decide whom to admit to our bowling league and whom to exclude. We usually don't know all potential bowling league members, but we do rely upon friends of friends, which also depends upon knowledge and experience, even if not so directly.

Yet, this sort of trust doesn't take us very far. Placing our confidence in a stockbroker is not a first step toward getting involved in our communities. Lots of good experiences with contractors or businesses don't add up to the sunny disposition that leads people to give to charity or to volunteer their time. Mem-

[8] Dietlind Stolle, "Bowling Together, Bowling Alone: The Development of Generalized Trust in Voluntary Associations," *Political Psychology* 19 (September 1998): 500.

[9] Nancy L. Rosenblum, *Membership and Morals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 45, 48.

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bership in a voluntary organization made up of people very much like yourself similarly doesn't make you more likely to have faith in people whom you don't know.

There is another kind of trust, which I call "moralistic trust." This is trust in people whom we don't know and who are likely to be different from ourselves. Moralistic trust assumes that we don't risk so much when we put faith in people we don't know, because people of different backgrounds still share the same underlying values. We can't base trust in strangers on their trustworthiness, because there is no way for us to know whether they are honorable. Moralistic trust provides the rationale for getting involved with other people and working toward compromises.

Moralistic trust is the foundation of a civil society. It is not simply a summary of our life experiences, but a value that reflects an optimistic view of the world. Moralistic trusters believe that the world is a benign place, that other people are generally well motivated, and that they are part of the same moral community. Such beliefs ease the way toward getting people to work together to make their communities and the larger society a better place. People who believe that they can make the world a better place and are not afraid to work with strangers will become active in their communities. They will work on problems big and small. They may or may not join voluntary organizations. But they will take part in civic activities that are more demanding and yield bigger payoffs, such as giving to charity and volunteering time. Most giving to charity and much volunteering involve commitments to people who are different from yourself, reflecting the moral dimension of trust. In voluntary organizations, we almost always congregate with people just like ourselves—at least with a preexisting common bond. Trusters' values promote consensus and compromise in the society and the polity. My task here is to show how moralistic trust is essential to civil society, to outline what trust leads to (and what it doesn't lead to), to explain the decline in trust, and to show why the decline in trust is worrisome.

Much contemporary discussion links trust and civic engagement. Americans don't trust each other any more because they are joining fewer voluntary organizations. People don't withdraw from voluntary organizations because they don't trust other people. Contrary to much conventional wisdom in the recent literature on trust, I find no linkage between trust and most forms of civic engagement. Most notably, people who trust others are not more likely to join more civic organizations than nontrusters. And they are not more likely to socialize with their friends (what Putnam refers to as "schmoozing").[10] Conversely, people who join voluntary organizations or who socialize with others are not more likely to trust others.

So there is little evidence that trusting people get involved in civic groups. And there is no support for the argument that interacting with people like your-

[10] Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, 93–94 and chap. 6.

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self (the typical pattern in group membership and socializing) makes you more likely to trust people who are different from yourself. Yet there is substantial evidence that more demanding types of civic engagement, activities that involve you with people who may be different from yourself, both depend upon trust and lead to more faith in others in turn. They include giving to charity and volunteering time. And trust in other people also produces a more cooperative spirit in the larger polity; Congress is more productive when the citizenry is more trusting.

The Varieties of Trust

The first distinction I have drawn is between strategic and moralistic trust based upon experience and knowledge of others and trust that transcends personal experience. Additionally, I distinguish between generalized and particularized trust. Generalized trust is the belief that most people can be trusted. Particularized trust is faith only in your own kind. Strangers are suspect and are presumed not to be trustworthy. Religious fundamentalists who see nonbelievers as heathens are a particularly good example. They will get involved in their communities, but only in their own communities. Their civic activity is centered in their own organizations: fundamentalists volunteer almost exclusively in their churches.[11] Particularized trusters do take part in civic life, but not in the bridging associations that Putnam correctly sees as essential to helping society resolve pressing issues. Particularized trust is likely to exacerbate conflicts among different groups, since it is based on the core assumption that most people don't share similar values.

Generalized trust is based on an upbeat world view and the belief that tomorrow will be better than today. Working cooperatively with others is the way to ensure that this optimistic scenario will come to pass. And moralistic trusters are confident that they can make the world better. Consider the prototypical truster Carol Eberhard, who lives in a suburb of Washington. ". . . [O]ne of her favorite movies of all time is 'Oklahoma!'—because [she says] the very first song he comes out singing is 'Oh, What a Beautiful Morning.'. . . She volunteers. She votes. She's a Cub Scout leader. She's a soccer coach. She has a part-time job teaching tumbling to preschoolers . . . She is aware of the evil that people are capable of, and she knows the pettiness . . . But . . . her interpretation tends to put everything in the best possible light." And, of course, she is a member of the Optimist Club.[12]

[11] Eric M. Uslaner, "Volunteering and Social Capital: How Trust and Religion Shape Civic Participation in the United States" in Paul Dekker, ed., *Social Capital and Volunteering* (The Hague, Netherlands: Social and Cultural Planning Bureau, to be translated into Dutch); and Robert Wuthnow, "Mobilizing Civic Engagement: The Changing Impact of Religious Involvement" in Theda Skocpol and Morris Fiorina, eds., *Civic Engagement in American Democracy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999).

[12] David Finkel, "In the Best Possible Light," *Washington Post Magazine*, 12 May 1996, 10–11.

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Generalized trust leads people to get involved in their communities, even if they don't expect reciprocity and even if they have found some people less than trustworthy.[13] Trusters, and optimists more generally, don't let unfortunate experiences get them down. When they encounter bad news, they tend to dismiss or at least discount it.[14] Trust in people doesn't ebb and flow with the tides of people's sentiments about political figures or the state of the economy, as confidence in government does. It is a core value that people hold and is quite stable over time. Two surveys asked the same people identical questions about a wide range of policy views at different points in time. In the 1972–1976 American National Election Study (ANES) panel and in the Niemi-Jennings panel of high school students from 1965 to 1982, trust in other people was more consistent over time than virtually all other attitudes: Over 70 percent of respondents gave consistent answers to the trust question from one wave to the next (two years for the ANES and eight to nine years for the student panels). The correlations (gammas) ranged from .71 to .83 over time.[15] Trust as a value sets in early in life. Trusting adults with nurturing parenting styles have trusting children. And trusting young people in turn become trusting adults.

Generalized trust creates the "bridging" bonds that link people to folk unlike themselves.[16] Generalized trusters have an expansive view of the size of what we may call their "moral community," the people with whom they have common interests (if not common values). Particularized trusters are wary of dealing with people who are different from themselves and have a narrow view of their moral community. But most group memberships build particularized trust, if they have any impact on faith in others at all.[17] Interaction with group members makes you more likely to have faith in them—not in people generally.

If generalized trust is important for civic engagement, it should only matter for the sorts of civic engagement that lead people to reach out beyond their own kind. It should have little impact on joining groups with like-minded members. And generalized trust is more likely to be a cause rather than an effect of even the more encompassing forms of civic engagement such as giving to char-

[13] In the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey of the INDEPENDENT SECTOR, the correlation between trust and having been helped as a young person is zero. So are the correlations between trust and seeing someone in your family help others or someone you admire help others. There is virtually no correlation in the 1981 World Values Study between trust in others and a composite measure of whether you believe that other people obey the secular items in the Ten Commandments. See Eric M. Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust* (unpublished manuscript, University of Maryland, College Park, 1999).

[14] J. David Lewis and Andrew Weigert, "Trust as Social Reality," *Social Forces* 63 (June 1985): 970.

[15] Trust ranked fourth in stability of 17 measures asked at least twice in the 1972–74–76 American National Election Study—behind support for marijuana legalization but ahead of when abortion should be allowed. Across an even longer time period, from 1965 to 1982, trust ranked behind only party identification, religious values, and letting a communist hold political office in the Niemi-Jennings socialization survey of high school students.

[16] Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 93.

[17] Stolle, "Bowling Together, Bowling Alone," 497–526.

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ity or volunteering time. We learn trust from our parents. And trusting people get involved in good works. Yes, they gain something in return—what economists call the "warm glow" from doing good deeds.[18] But people might not reach out to others if they did not trust strangers in the first place.

TRUST'S CONSEQUENCES

I have examined the consequences of trust across a wide variety of surveys, most notably the General Social Survey from 1972–1998, various years of the ANES, the 1981 World Values Study, the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey of the *INDEPENDENT SECTOR*, and the 1996 survey of Trust and Civic Engagement in Metropolitan Philadelphia by the Pew Research Center for the People and The Press.[19]

The trust measure is the standard question: "Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted, or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?" The standard question is not a measure of strategic trust. It does not ask people to look back at their experiences. The 1996 Metropolitan Philadelphia survey asked more than a dozen questions about whom (or what) people trust. I factor analyzed these variables and there were three clear dimensions—one for strangers (people you meet on the street, people who work where you shop), another for friends and family (people at your place of worship, at your club, at your job, your boss, and your family), and a third for government (schools and city, state, and federal governments). The standard question loaded highly on the stranger factor, indicating that this question really does measure generalized trust.

Across a wide variety of surveys, the message is the same: in almost all cases, trust is not important for most forms of civic engagement. And you can't just go around manufacturing trust by getting people to join groups or to socialize with each other. A Scrooge won't become a Bob Cratchitt if we could just get him enrolled in a voluntary organization. If we become trusters (or distrusters) early in life, our world view may already be set before we get involved in civic life. Most adults don't spend enough time in civic associations to develop trust.[20] And there is little reason to expect that many types of organizations

[18] James Andreoni, "Giving With Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Ambivalence," *Journal of Political Economy* 97 (December 1989): 1447–1458.

[19] For individual level analyses, I identify the survey that I use in the text. For the aggregate analyses, I used data from the General Social Survey (GSS) whenever possible: 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, and 1998. Other data come from the Civic Culture survey (1960; see Almond and Verba, 1963); American National Election Surveys (1964, 1966, 1968, 1974, and 1992); the *Washington Post* trust in government survey (1995); the Quality of American Life Survey (1971); the World Values Survey (1981); and the Temple University Institute for Survey Research (1979, reported in the Roper Poll data base on Lexis-Nexis).

[20] Kenneth Newton, "Social Capital and Democracy," *American Behavioral Scientist* 40 (March 1997): 575–586.

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could generate trust.[21] Tocqueville, who originally framed the connection between cooperation and civic engagement, recognized that trust (what Tocqueville called "self-interest rightly understood") is the precursor to civic engagement rather than its consequence.[22] And my work shows that the "virtuous circle" is really a "virtuous arrow" going only in one direction: trusting people get involved in their communities.

What does moralistic trust bring us, and what does particularized trust cost us?[23] There is considerable support for the claim that trust in other people leads to more engaged communities.[24] My work confirms this rather dramatically: trust in other people is the strongest predictor of total membership in fifteen secular voluntary associations in the 1972–1996 General Social Survey. But it predicts membership in only some of the specific organizations (and not informal socializing) in a variety of surveys. I present the results from a regression analysis of group "involvement," giving to charity, volunteering time, and speaking to neighbors from the 1996 ANES in Table 1.[25] Of the twenty-one organizations included in the survey, the impacts of trust are strongest for membership in educational, cultural, and business organizations—where you are more likely to meet people who are not like yourself. Trusting people avoid membership in ethnic groups, where they would congregate with people like themselves.

Giving to charity and volunteering time represent bigger commitments to your community than simply joining voluntary associations. People who trust others are far more likely to give of themselves than misanthropes, who say that you can't be too careful in dealing with people. Generalized trusters are more likely to give to charity and especially to donate their time. But particularized trusters are very unlikely either to give to charity or to volunteer their time. People who don't like out-groups won't give money or time to help people different from themselves.[26]

[21] Margaret Levi, "Social and Unsocial Capital," *Politics and Society* 24 (March 1996): 45–55.

[22] Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 121.

[23] I operationalize generalized trust by the standard question: "Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?" I have developed measures of particularized trust using ANES data on attitudes toward in-groups and out-groups. A particularized truster favors her own in-group and is less favorable to out-groups. See Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, chap. 3 for the methodology.

[24] See Putnam, "Bowling Alone," 65–78; and Brehm and Rahn, "Individual Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital," 999–1023.

[25] The other variables are race, trust in out-groups, whether one ought to get involved in helping people, education, expectation that the standard of living will be better in twenty years, interpretation of the Bible as the literal word of God, a dummy variable for having a job, family income, belief that this year's economy is better than last year's, trust in in-groups, interest in politics, marital status, number of children, and age. The 1996 ANES also has measures of level of activity in organizations, but few people admitted more than a passing role in any of the types of groups. The dependent variable is not a simple dummy measure of membership, but rather the number of groups the respondent is "involved in" (the ANES question wording). For business, hobby, and educational groups, there were a sufficient number of respondents participating in more than one group to calculate effects between zero and two.

[26] The initial results come from the 1992 ANES. See Uslaner, "Faith, Hope, and Charity." The 1996 ANES and Giving and Volunteering surveys show even stronger effects for generalized trust on both

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TABLE 1

Summary of Consuming Trust from 1996 ANES#

Independent Variable	*Coefficient*
Ethnic group involvement	−.293**
Cultural group involvement	.252**
Contributed to charity	.184*
Business group involvement	.158***
Ever attend religious services	.152*
Children's group involvement	.094*
Arts' group involvement	.022
Elderly group involvement	.020
Labor union involvement	−.024
Veterans' group involvement	.127
Church group involvement	−.019
Nonchurch religious involvement	.008
Hobby group involvement	.039
Fraternal group involvement	.147
Service to needy group involvement	.014
Education group involvement	.061
Self-help group involvement	.127
Political issue group involvement	.023
Party/candidate group involvement	−.216
Civic group involvement	−.103
Women's group involvement	.136
Other group involvement	.064
Volunteered time	−.010
How many neighbors R talks to	.026

*** $p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .10$

Effects calculated between zero and two for business, hobby, and educational groups, between zero and one otherwise. See n. 26 for other independent variables in the model.

Only a handful of civic activities in Table 1 consume trust: involvement in business, cultural, and children's groups; giving to charity ethnic group involvement; and attending religious services. Do any activities produce (or generate) trust? To test for reciprocal causality, I estimated statistical models. (See Table 2.) Estimating more than twenty models from the list in Table 1 would be unwieldy at best, so I trimmed the model down to five groups (business, children's, ethnic, cultural, and church) and the two bridging activities of giving to charity and volunteering time—as well as an equation for trust.[27] Does trust cause civic engagement or does civic engagement cause trust?

charitable giving and donating time. In the latter survey, trust was the strongest predictor of both charitable donations and volunteering time. In both the Pew Philadelphia study and the 1996 INDEPENDENT SECTOR survey, trust was most important for types of giving and volunteering that reached out to diverse clienteles.

[27] The statistical technique is three-stage least squares. For cultural involvement, the other variables in the model are: a dummy variable for being Jewish, family income, being a liberal, age, gender, and living in an urban area. For church involvement, the other variables are frequency of prayer, how often one reads the Bible, a dummy variable for being Catholic, age, family income, being a liberal (negative coefficient), how long one has lived in the community, and a dummy variable for being Jewish. The variables in the equation for business involvement are being self-employed, family income, a dummy

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TABLE 2

Summary of Reciprocal Effects of Trust and Civic Engagement: 1996 ANES: Three-Stage Least Squares Estimates

	Coefficient
Effects on Trust from:	
Charitable contributions	.669****
Volunteering	.505***
Church group involvement	−.435****
Business group involvement	.076
Children's group involvement	−.155
Ethnic group involvement	−.088
Cultural group involvement	−.049
Effects of Trust on:	
Business group involvement	.554****
Volunteering	.410****
Cultural group involvement	.287****
Charitable contributions	.278****
Church group involvement	.109
Children's group involvement	.056
Ethnic group involvement	.064*

**** $p < .0001$, *** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .10$

When I look at specific types of organization, no group membership in the 1996 ANES produces trust. Religious organizations seem to consume trust, but produce mistrust. (See Table 2.) Trusting people are much more likely to volunteer, but volunteers are only slightly more prone to trust other people. There is one effect that stands out: charitable contributions both depend upon trust and produce it, sometimes substantially. It may seem strange that volunteering is less effective in producing trust than charitable contributions. After all, giving

variable for being Jewish, the number of hours worked each week, saying that others' beliefs are similar to your own, and knowing and speaking to neighbors. The equation for children's groups includes age, number of children aged six to nine, being married, being an early baby boomer (born 1946–1955), church involvement, family income, whether it is important to be involved in helping others, and saying that others' beliefs are similar to your own. For ethnic group membership, other variables include race, knowing and talking to neighbors, gender, family income, trust in in-groups, and education. For charity, the predictors are church group involvement, family income, frequency of newspaper readership, knowing and talking to neighbors, saying that others' beliefs are similar to your own, and business group involvement (negative coefficient that meets conventional two-tailed tests for significance at $p > .05$). For volunteering, the predictors are knowing and talking to neighbors, saying that we should care about the well-being of others, a dummy variable for being Jewish, family income, business group involvement, and age. For trust, the equation also includes trust in demographic out-groups, people like me have no say in politics (negative coefficient), there would be fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family values, trust in demographic in-groups (negative coefficient), and a dummy variable for late baby boomers. I also estimated a similar model from the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey and the results were largely the same. More restricted models from the General Social Survey are also generally supportive. See Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, chap. 5. A perceptive reviewer noted that education does not appear in any of the models. It failed to reach significance anywhere, so I deleted it.

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time is more demanding than writing a check. But perhaps people are more likely to give their money to people who are different from themselves, while they will spend time more with their own kind.[28] A few membership organizations depend upon trust. But no group appears to produce faith in others, as Putnam and others following in Tocqueville's path suggest that they should.

Most voluntary organizations don't have a diverse enough membership to build trust in strangers. Putnam points to choral societies in Italy as signs of vibrant communities. In the United States they are composed of young singles linked together by their love of classical music, according to my analysis of people who perform music, dance, or drama in the 1993 General Social Survey. They don't consume or produce trust. Many groups wind up in the dilemma of bridge clubs. Social clubs have a lot of conversation about all manner of things, including politics. But they are composed of people who already know each other and who largely think alike. "Serious" clubs have more diverse memberships, but their members are so single-minded about their passion that all they do at meetings is play bridge and go home.[29] For almost all types of both formal and informal social contacts, trust is neither a cause nor an effect. People can form social bonds without drawing on moral resources. The main reason why people join organizations is to meet with people with similar interests.

Even beyond giving to charities and volunteering, generalized trusters also have greater senses of moral obligation to their fellow citizens. Trusting people are also more likely to work with others on community problems. People who trust others are more committed to fulfilling their civic obligations such as jury service (according to my analysis of the 1992 ANES and the 1996 Pew Philadelphia survey). They are less likely to say that it is acceptable to buy stolen goods, to claim government benefits that you are not entitled to, to keep money that you have found, and to hit someone's car without making a report. Generalized trusters' moral codes are not simple reflections of their expectations of how others are likely to behave.[30] They are committed to others in the society beyond anticipation of reciprocity.

[28] This anomaly was not confined to the 1996 ANES. It also appeared in a simultaneous equation model I estimated for the 1996 Giving and Volunteering survey. In Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, chap. 5, I report these estimates and present some support for this argument. John and Sylvia Ronsvalle report trends in church-based charitable donations broken down by "congregational" (internal) contributions and "benevolences" (contributions to others) over time available at http://www.emptytomb.org/Table2.html) [Accessed 10 October 1999]. Two-stage least squares regressions with trust endogenous show that trust has a more powerful effect on benevolences than on congregational contributions.

[29] Bonnie H. Erikson and T.A. Nosanchuk, "How an Apolitical Association Politicizes," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology* 27 (May 1990): 206–19; and David Scott and Geoffrey C. Godbey, "An Analysis of Adult Play Groups: Social Versus Serious Participation in Contract Bridge," *Leisure Sciences* 14 (January-March 1992): 47–67.

[30] These results come from the 1981 World Values Study in the United States. The estimation includes a control for expectations of others' behavior.

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Generalized trusters see American society as one culture united by a set of common values. My analysis of the 1996 ANES and the 1993-94-96 waves of the General Social Survey shows that trusters oppose efforts to split the society into groups that might foster particularized trust, so they don't like attempts to do away with classical education or to let ethnic politicians make appeals primarily to their own communities or even to bring prayer back into the schools. Yet, while people who put their faith in others see a common culture, they are not so naive to ignore injustices. They favor strong civil rights provisions for African Americans, women, and gays; and they reject the argument that affirmative action takes away jobs from whites. They also scoff at the idea that the government doesn't pay enough attention to whites. Cocooning ourselves within our own kind can only serve to abjure the ideal of a common culture. When ethnic politicians represent only their own group, they are rejecting the idea of the common ground necessary for cooperation. When whites say that government needs to pay particular attention to them, they are also promoting isolation and rejecting compromise.

These values represent the belief that your moral community encompasses most people in society, regardless of their status, beliefs, religion, ethnicity, or race. They form the basis of a commitment to searching for compromises on divisive issues, because failure to do so would threaten the idea of a wide-ranging moral community. Trust matters, because it is trusting people who believe that you can disagree respectfully. Having different opinions doesn't mean that you are heathen. When you accept the legitimacy of others' attitudes, you set the grounds for compromise and better policy formation. Even more critically, you avoid the recriminations that mark particularized trusters.

You can't build trust when some groups feel left out of the society and believe that others control the resources. But the line between empowering the powerless and institutionalizing minorities' power bases may be very fine. Groups at the bottom of the economic ladder have less reason to trust "most people"—and they don't. From 1972 to 1996, 46 percent of whites, but just 17 percent of African Americans, were generalized trusters. Blacks are much more likely to trust other African Americans than whites, the General Social Survey (1972–1998) and the 1990 World Values Study show.[31] So building trust among people who have long had reasons to distrust will be difficult. Minorities may well believe that they share others' values, but may be less convinced that others hold the same things dear as they do. Building a common culture where people can readily believe that they share underlying values is not easy in a society with a substantial degree of inequality.

As both Putnam and I have argued, more trusting societies reach compromises on major issues of public policy more readily.[32] In Robert Lane's words

[31] The first result comes from the General Social Survey, the second from the 1990 World Values Study.

[32] Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 88, 111, 170; and Uslaner, *The Decline of Comity in Congress*, chap. 4.

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FIGURE 1
The Decline of Trust, 1960–1998



Trust = 10.638 − 0.005 Year
r-sq = 0.744 RMSE = 0.032 n = 28

of three decades ago, the trusting person "works for political ends not in a spirit of antagonism but in a spirit of cooperation."[33] People who are engaged in their communities, who give of themselves in time or money, who recognize their obligations to serve on juries and to work with others to improve civic life, and who strongly endorse moral commandments have a community spirit.

Onward and Downward

Trust brings good things, and thus we should care about it. We should care even more because trust is becoming scarcer, and so are some of the good things it brings. Even though generalized trust has a moral foundation, it does depend upon social and economic contexts. Even though generalized trust is stable over time for most people, it is not unmoveable. And it has moved downward. Over the past four decades the share of Americans who believe that "most people can be trusted" has plummeted from 58 percent in 1960 to 36 percent. I present this trend graphically in Figure 1. In this and other figures, the data points are labeled by year. The picture we get is one of a simple linear decline: each year,

[33] Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (New York: Free Press, 1959), 166.

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trust seems to drop a bit more until it bottoms out in the 1990s (though there is a slight uptick in 1998). But while trust has fallen rather sharply and consistently, some years see sharper declines than others. The biggest declines came as the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s each came to a close.

Many of the good things that trust brings have fallen in tandem with trust. We are far less engaged in our communities than we used to be. In many ways, we participate less—from organized activities such as group membership to informal socializing.[34] Our social fabric has weakened and so has our sense of national purpose and identity. Americans give less to charity now than they did in the past. Exactly how much they give varies from one source to another: United Way contributions have dropped from 8.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1960 to 4.5 percent in 1996. Figures from the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel's *Giving USA* show a less steep decline from 3.1 percent of GDP at the beginning of its time series in 1967 to 2.58 percent in 1996.[35] But the two trends track each other closely.[36] And they both are strongly correlated with trust: as we trust each other less, we give less to charity—even when I take into account other factors.[37] I present a graph tracking the United Way time series (which is longer than *Giving USA*) and trust in Figure 2. The two trends track each other very closely.

At least by one set of estimates, Americans may be volunteering less as well. Time series data on volunteering are hard to come by. However, Red Cross officials have kindly put together trends from their annual reports for me. Red Cross volunteering figures never exceed 2 million, while a reasonable estimate of the total volunteering population in the United States might approach 100 million.[38] The Red Cross data show the same pattern as the charitable contribution percentages: as trust has gone down, so has the share of Red Cross volunteers in the total population ($r^2 = .796$). This holds in multivariate analyses allowing for simultaneous causation between trust and volunteering. Trust is the major determinant of trends in Red Cross volunteering. There is also mixed evidence about whether volunteering increases trust.[39]

[34] Putnam, *Bowling Alone*, chap. 3.

[35] AAFRC Trust for Philanthropy, *Giving USA 1998* (New York: American Association of Fund Raising Counsel, 1998).

[36] I am grateful to Robert O'Connor of the United Way for both sets of figures. The correlation between the two series is .912 (N = 27).

[37] The other factors are the simple linear time trend and the economic climate (people give more when the economy is robust) as measured by GDP change and the inflation and unemployment rates.

[38] This figure comes from estimates in various national surveys, including the 1996 Giving and Volunteering Survey and the 1992 ANES, where about 40 percent of Americans say that they have volunteered.

[39] Both trust and volunteering as a percentage of the United States population are strongly correlated with time ($r = -.872$ and $-.845$, respectively). However, the results are robust to including time as a predictor and also to single-equation models estimated with a first-order autoregressive lag through ARIMA modeling. The coefficient for trust is .020, with a standard error of .004 ($t = 5.661$). The other variable in the model is the divorce rate: as the divorce rate increased, fewer people had time to volunteer. For United Way charitable contributions, aside from trust, other variables included are the rate of change in the consumer price index, the rate of change of the gross domestic product,

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FIGURE 2
United Way Charitable Contributions as Percent of GDP and Trust Over Time



uwaygdp = 0.016 + 0.171 trust
r-sq = 0.820 RMSE = 0.005 n = 26

It should hardly be surprising that United Way charitable contributions and Red Cross volunteering should be so strongly related to interpersonal trust.[40] While the United Way is only one part of the larger enterprise of charitable giving and the Red Cross is a very small element in volunteering, both organizations tap moral resources. The United Way is a large umbrella organization where contributions are more likely to go to people you don't know. And Red Cross volunteering is mostly aimed at helping strangers through such activities as blood donations, humanitarian services (especially in natural disasters), and international assistance.

Less readily measurable is civic cooperation. But there is more than impressionistic evidence that our national rhetoric has become nastier over the past several generations. Candidates for office increasingly use negative campaigns,

the Gini index of inequality, and a dummy variable dividing the sample into pre- and post-1981 years, reflecting a change in the tax deductibility of charitable contributions (which was insignificant).

[40] Red Cross volunteering as a share of the United States population and United Way contributions as a percentage of gross domestic product are strongly correlated ($r = .907$, $N = 30$). Regressing each against the other yields significant coefficients ($p < .05$) even when controlling for population size, gross domestic product, and time. The partial correlation between the two measures controlling for population, GDP, and time is .334.

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FIGURE 3
Red Cross Volunteers as Percent of U.S. Population and Trust Over Time



Voluntr = 0.006 + 0.028 Trust
r-sq = 0.796 RMSE = 0.001 n = 27

groups of all stripes demonize their opponents, and the level of debate in our legislative bodies has fallen precipitously. Even more ominous, the shrillness of the public debate increasingly leads to stalemate over issues large and small.[41] In the 1950s and even the 1970s, divided government was an invitation to bargain and compromise. In the 1980s and 1990s it became a battleground. As we trust each other less, we no longer believe that our opponents speak with legitimacy; and our politics and social relations become wrestling matches.

Congress gets less done when the public is less trusting—whether the measure employed is David R. Mayhew's list of "major legislation" enacted, Sarah Binder's index of Congressional gridlock, or Richard Beth's compilation of the number of cloture votes in the Senate. A less trusting public is a polarized citizenry—and elite. Cohesion in roll call voting for all four congressional parties (Democrats and Republicans in the House and the Senate) tracks the decline of interpersonal trust rather starkly.[42]

[41] Uslaner, *The Decline of Comity in Congress.*

[42] David R. Mayhew, *Divided We Govern* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Sarah A. Binder, "The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96," *American Political Science Review* 93 (September 1999): 519–534; data provided by Richard S. Beth of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress; and Uslaner, "Is the Senate More Civil Than the House?" in Burdett Loomis, ed.,

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A major reason why our debate has become so shrill and why trust has fallen is that American society has become more polarized along many lines. As our interest group universe has become more open, more and more groups face opponents in the political arena. Interest groups are increasingly likely to use litigation as a strategy when they cannot prevail in the legislative or executive arenas.[43] Political conflicts aren't resolved because the losing side won't accept the legitimacy of the victors.

Why We Trust Each Other Less

Why have Americans become less trusting over time? There are several contending explanations in the literature that I believe miss the mark. First, some people argue that lack of trust in people is just another example of declining trust throughout the society.[44] Americans are now more and more skeptical of their government. A reasonable person might conclude that such skepticism makes sense, since governmental performance has left much to be desired over the past three decades. Aggregate trends in trust in government and interpersonal trust track each other very strongly over time ($r = .795$). Yet, across a wide variety of surveys, the correlation between the two types of trust is rather weak, except during the highly contentious years between 1972 and 1976, when the country was wracked by Watergate and civil rights protests. The relationship between trust in government and faith in other people is not so strong across countries.[45]

Second, much of the decline of trust, Putnam argues, is actuarial.[46] Trust was higher among the "civic generation" born before 1940. The baby boom generation, which began in the mid-1940s, heralded a new age of mistrust. "It is as though the post-war generations were exposed to some mysterious X-ray that permanently and increasingly rendered them less likely to connect with the community," Putnam argues.[47] Younger people simply don't have the faith or

Civility and Deliberation in the Senate (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000). The latter article employs the standard deviations of Keith Poole's D-NOMINATE scores from the House and Senate as measures of intraparty cohesion.

[43] Jack L. Walker, *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989).

[44] Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, 109–113; and Brehm and Rahn, "Individual Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital."

[45] The individual-level correlation (tau-c) across seventeen surveys that use the ANES question about how often people trust the government to do the right thing is .119 (with 1972–76 omitted, it is .082). Across sixteen GSS surveys, the correlation with confidence in the executive branch is .097 (.088 with 1972–76 excluded). The aggregate cross-national correlation from the World Values Studies across forty-two countries is just .276. Ironically, the correlation is considerably greater (.607) for countries with legacies of communism than for those without such legacies.

[46] Putnam "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," 65–78; and Brehm and Rahn, "Individual Level Evidence for the Causes and Consequences of Social Capital."

[47] Robert D. Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America." *PS: Political Science and Politics* (December 1995): 676.

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the civic involvement that their elders did. There is much truth to this, but not as much as we might expect.

We are not on a slippery slope downward with each passing generation. Yes, the late baby boomers (1956–1965) are less trusting than their parents' cohort. Succeeding generations have even less confidence in others than the late boomers. The early baby boomers, who protested for civil rights and against the Vietnam War, chanting "Don't trust anybody over 30," set the pattern for the decline in trust in the 1970s and early 1980s, as Putnam argues. But by 1988, the early boomers reversed the trend and became the most trusting cohort and have stayed that way to the present.[48] Age alone won't solve the problem of why Americans have become less trusting.

But Putnam never claimed that it did. Age is a surrogate for something else—and that key factor is television use. Television presents viewers with a "mean world" where violent dramas and even worse news programs can make us think that the real world may be just like what we see on TV. People who watch a lot of television thus become less trusting.[49] Yet the evidence that heavy television viewing leads people to become less trusting (or less civically engaged more generally) is meager. Television viewing has leveled off in recent years, but trust has not rebounded. Individual level models using the 1972–1994 GSS that include measures of optimism as determinants of trust reveal no effects of TV viewing on trust. People can distinguish between the mean television world and the real world, according to my analysis of the Pew Metropolitan Philadelphia survey in 1996. If we confused the two worlds, we would believe that the violence we see on television represents daily life. Yet people are not more likely to say that their neighborhoods are unsafe if they watch a lot of TV (or even TV news). The only thing that predicts perceptions of safety is the actual level of crime in the neighborhood.[50] So television cannot be the cause of the decline of trust in the United States.

Why, then, have Americans become less trusting and, particularly, why have younger people become less trusting and early baby boomers more trusting? One reason for the drop in trust has been the rise of Christian fundamentalism. Religion has increasingly polarized Americans as more people identify as fundamentalists (who are more likely to put faith only in their own kind) and the simultaneous growth of the "unchurched."[51] Religion has been the source of much of American civic life. Half of charitable contributions in the United

[48] Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, chap. 6; and Social Capital, Television, and the 'Mean World': Trust, Optimism, and Civic Participation," *Political Psychology* 19 (September 1998): 441–467.

[49] George Gerbner, Larry Gross, Michael Morgan, and Nancy Signorielli, "The 'Mainstreaming' of America: Violence Profile No. 11," *Journal of Communication* 30 (Summer 1980): 10–29; and Putnam, "Tuning In, Tuning Out."

[50] Uslaner, "Social Capital, Television, and the 'Mean World,'" 441–467.

[51] Putnam, *Bowling Alone*; and William G. Mayer, *The Changing American Mind* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 34–35. Warren E. Miller and Merrill J. Shanks track the trends quite nicely in *The New American Voter* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 223–225.

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States and almost 40 percent of volunteering are based in religious organizations.[52] These trends have important consequences for American civic life: fundamentalists are twice as likely as other believers to join only religious organizations. People with no religion are almost 20 percent more prone to join no groups at all.

The growing numbers of fundamentalists do take part in civic life, but only within their own kind. The nonbelievers simply stay at home. Nonbelievers are about as trusting (or mistrusting) as other Americans, but fundamentalists are substantially less likely to say that they trust other people than other believers. Fifty percent of believers who identify as religious liberals in the 1972–1998 General Social Survey trust others, compared to just 31 percent of fundamentalists. (See the results in Table 2.)

The religious polarization is only a part of the story of why Americans have become less trusting. A more compelling explanation lies in the disruption of the roots of trust. Americans have become less optimistic about the future, and this growing pessimism translates into mistrust. The growing pessimism is rooted in reality: economic inequality has been rising in the United States; for many people, especially the young, the American dream that things are going to get better no longer holds. As optimism wanes, so does trust.

A central claim of the American Dream is the expectation that life for your children will be better than it has been for you. Americans are now far less optimistic about the future than they have been in the past. In the 1940s through the 1960s, overwhelming shares (60 percent or more) of Americans believed that their children would have better lives than they had. But the see-saw economy of the 1970s led Americans to become far more pessimistic about their kids' future, with barely more than a quarter saying that their children's lives would be better than their own, according to Roper surveys.[53] And by the 1990s, barely more than 15 percent felt so optimistic about the future. Roper also regularly asks Americans to rate prospects for the future on a ladder ranging from zero to 10. In 1960 Americans were quite optimistic, rating their future at 7.4. By 1996, this rating had fallen to 5.6. Americans' expectations for the future track their level of trust ($r = .555$ for children's lives and .615 for the "ladder" measure).

Americans have also become less trusting because they worry about the future. Expectations for the future and the belief that you can control it are the most important factors shaping trust. If you are upbeat, then trusting strangers isn't so bad a risk. When your resources are abundant, you can absorb occasional losses by people who exploit you. When things look bleak, you look at people you don't know as rivals for what little you have.

We have become more pessimistic about the future because economic inequality has grown. Americans' gloom has a real foundation: The rich are get-

[52] Carl Bakal, *Charity U.S.A.* (New York: Times Books, 1979) 10; and Howard V. Hayge, "Volunteers in the U.S.: Who Donates the Time?" *Monthly Labor Review* 114 (February 1991): 21.

[53] Uslaner, *The Decline of Comity in Congress* and *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, chap. 6.

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FIGURE 4
Trust and Economic Inequality in the United States, 1960–1996



Trust = 1.185 − 1.947 Gini
r-sq = 0.604 RMSE = 0.041 n = 26

ting richer and the poor are getting poorer, even as the overall economy has been growing. In 1960, the top 5 percent of Americans earned 15.9 percent of all income. By 1996, the share of the highest earners jumped to 20.3 percent. The increase for the top 20 percent was less impressive, but still quite strong: from 41.3 percent to 46.8 percent. The composite Gini index of inequality, ranging from zero (complete equality) to one (complete inequality), rose from .364 to .425. And the Gini index tracks trust very well, as Figure 4 indicates. The relationship between trust and economic inequality is both powerful and robust: it is the strongest predictor of trust in a multiple regression model of trust.[54] Greater economic inequality has led to less trust. And this result holds

[54] The regression coefficient of −2.128 for the Gini index leads to an expected drop in trust of .132, or 60 percent of the total drop in trust from 1960 to 1996. The t-ratio is −9.204. The other predictors in the model are a dummy for presidential election years (t ratio = 4.257 and an average jump in trust of 5 percent in those years) and James A. Stimson's measure of the liberalism of public opinion, the public mood (t = 4.227). For a statement on the effect of presidential election years, see Wendy M. Rahn, John Brehm, and Neil Carlson, "National Elections as Institutions for Generating Social Capital" (presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August-September, Washington, DC) For the public mood variable, see James A. Stimson, *Public Opinion in America*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998).

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up across nations as well: more egalitarian countries—such as the Scandinavian nations—are more trusting.[55]

Rising economic inequality and growing pessimism account for generational changes in trust in the United States. The early baby boomers became more trusting because they became more optimistic about the future–even as other cohorts (especially those that followed them) became less hopeful. And early boomers became more optimistic because they made it financially. Their incomes rose above their parents' cohort; even more critically, more of them made it. I calculated the standard deviations of income distributions for pre-boomers, early baby boomers, and post-boomers from the GSS. As might be expected, the standard deviations dropped over time, owing largely to rising nominal incomes even as the GSS categories stayed the same. But the drops between 1972–1987 and 1988–1996 for pre- and post-boomers were fairly modest: about 15 percent. The decrease for early boomers was 30 percent.[56] And as the boomers became more optimistic, their hopeful world view had a much stronger impact on trust than it previously did. Succeeding cohorts did not fare so well economically as their parents' generation (even recognizing that they earn less earlier in their lives), and there was much greater inequality in income distribution among the younger generations than among the early boomers. No wonder that they became both less optimistic and less trusting.

Trust has important consequences, so we should be concerned about its decline. It will not be easy to restore. We can't build trust in strangers simply by gathering together people of different backgrounds. Group membership doesn't create trust. Instead, you need faith in other people to get people involved in their communities in the first place. Even those activities that do produce trust—volunteering and giving to charity—require trust at the outset. We can't simply round people up in groups and expect them to become public-spirited citizens. Nor can we herd young people into "required" volunteering and pronounce them future Mother Teresas. Trust is a form of social capital, one of the building blocks of a civil society. But like any other form of capital, you have to make an initial investment to create new resources. And the various

[55] The cross-national Gini indices come from Klaus Deininger and Lyn Squire, "A New Data Set: Measuring Economic Income Inequality," *World Bank Economic Review* 10 (September 1996): 565–592. The result on the cross-national relationship between trust and economic inequality holds only for countries without a legacy of communism. I estimated the model by two-stage least squares. The other variables in the equation for trust are percent Protestant (positively associated with trust) and percent Muslim (negatively associated with trust) in a nation. The variables in the equation for economic inequality are the log of the black market value of a country's currency (which leads to more inequality), the percent Muslim (producing more equality), and the growth rate of the population (more inequality). The Gini index is a highly significant predictor of trust, but the coefficient from trust to economic inequality is insignificant. For the sources of the other variables, see Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, chap. 7.

[56] I divided the GSS samples into early (1972–1987) and later (1988–1996) periods based upon the year that baby boomers became the most trusting cohort.

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forms of social capital—trust, social networks, and civic engagement—are not interchangeable. Trust comes first.

And when trust is in short supply, so will be commitment to others, cooperation, and compromise. Our tempers are frayed, so we stay at home and withdraw from collective action. Or we withdraw into our own communities and become particularized trusters. Particularized trusters are pessimists who fear strangers. We are unlikely to reverse the decline in generalized trust, the rise of particularized trust, the growing disengagement of Americans, and the sharper conflicts in both daily life and political life in the United States until people feel better about the future. And they are unlikely to feel better about the future until we reverse the trend in economic inequality.*

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Contingency, Catalysts, and International System Change

RICHARD NED LEBOW

Very few things happen at the right time, and others do not happen at all.
—Herodotus (ca. 450 B.C.E.)

Wars, revolutions, and depressions change the world and the way in which we think about it. World War I was a seminal event in both respects. It ushered in a profound transformation of the international system, and is described by many historians as the crucible in which the twentieth century was shaped. It has also been a critical case for the generation and testing of theories about conflict and international relations more generally.

Many historians contend that World War I—or something like it—would have been very hard, if not impossible, to avoid. The distinguished British historian, F. H. Hinsley, insisted, "If the Sarajevo crisis had not precipitated a particular great war, some other crisis would have precipitated a great war at no distant date."[1] Neorealists and power transition theorists make similar claims, albeit for different reasons.[2] I do not doubt that many, perhaps most of the causes of war in 1914 that historians and political scientists have identified created a conflict-prone environment. But underlying causes, no matter how numerous or deep-seated, do not make an event inevitable. Their consequences

[1] F. H. Hinsley, "The Origins of the First World War" in Keith Wilson, ed., *Decisions for War, 1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 4.

[2] Randall L. Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 2; A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), 202–03; A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 200–01.

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may depend on fortuitous coincidences in timing and on the presence of catalysts that are independent of any of the underlying causes.

World War I was overdetermined and highly contingent in both its underlying and immediate causes. Historians have proposed a variety of underlying causes for World War I, including social Darwinism, nationalism, the alliance structure, and shifts in the balance of power. I argue that what made Europe ripe for war was not the multitude of alleged causes, but rather the interactions among them. World War I is best understood as a nonlinear confluence of three largely independent chains of causation, which produced independent but more or less simultaneous *gestalt* shifts in Vienna and Berlin, and a slightly earlier one in Russia. Had the timing of the Austrian and German shifts been off by as little as two years, Austrian leaders would not have felt so intent on destroying Serbia, or German leaders would not have been so willing to encourage them to do so. For this reason alone, World War I was overdetermined and highly contingent.

Theoretical explanations for war take catalysts for granted. If the right underlying conditions are present, some incident will sooner or later set armies on the march in the way the twin assassinations in Sarajevo did in 1914. But Sarajevo was not just any provocation; it met a diverse set of political and psychological requirements that were essential for Austrian and German leaders to risk war. It is possible, but extremely unlikely, that some other provocation would have met these conditions or that some other combination of great powers would have started a war for different reasons. In the absence of a catalyst, several more years of peace could have altered the strategic and domestic contexts of the great powers and made war less likely. There was a two-year window when the leaders of at least two great powers thought their national or dynastic interests were better served by war than peace. Social scientists often assume that major social and political developments are specific instances of strong or even weak regularities in social behavior. But these developments may be the result of accidental conjunctures. Conversely, events that seem highly likely may never happen. The concatenation of particular leaders with particular contexts, and of particular events with other events is always a matter of chance, never of necessity.[3]

My findings have important implications for the study of international system change, by which I mean a change in the polarity of the system or the rules by which it operates. They suggest that system transformations—and many other kinds of international events—are unpredictable because their underlying causes do nothing more than create the possibility of change. Actual change depends upon contingency, catalysts, and actors. Neither contingency nor catalysts have been analyzed systematically by social scientists, and I offer some thoughts about how this might be done. There is a large literature on actors,

[3] Gabriel Almond and Stephen J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics* 29 (July 1977): 496–522.

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most of it based on the premise that they are instrumentally rational. A striking finding of the World War I case and of the two other system transformations of the twentieth century—World War II and the end of the cold war—is the extent to which the behavior that brought about these transformations was based on extreme miscalculations. Such behavior may not be the norm in everyday foreign policy decision making, but it may be characteristic of the decisions that unwittingly usher in system transformations.

The first two stages of my inquiry make use of counterfactual thought experiments.[4] Counterfactuals are past conditionals or, more colloquially, "what if" statements about the past. They alter some aspect of the past (doing away with a person or event, changing a critical decision or outcome, inserting an event or development that never happened, or making it take place sooner or later than it did) to set the stage for a "what might have been" argument. I use only "minimal rewrite" counterfactuals. They entail small, plausible changes in reality that do not violate our understanding of what was technologically, culturally, temporally, or otherwise possible.[5] A world in which Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife returned alive from their 1914 visit to Sarajevo is an example. Gavrilo Princip's accomplice missed killing the royals in their procession to city hall. Princip was lamenting his failure when the touring car carrying Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie came to a stop to allow the cars at the head of the procession to back up because they had made a wrong turn. With only a minimal rewrite of history, the procession stays on the planned route, and the assassination is averted. Such a rewrite does not strain our understanding of the world, because most twentieth-century royal processions follow their intended routes. The archduke's was an exception.

Case Selection

Case studies are often described as ill-suited for testing propositions and theories. Unless the case can be shown to be representative of the phenomenon under study, there is always the possibility that it is an outlier. But the laws of statistics are not the sole criterion or justification for case selection. Interesting cases, especially anomalous ones, are a primary source of theory generation. Careful analysis of an infirming case can suggest reasons why the outcome was contrary to predictions and reveal more general problems with a theory. Infirming cases can also improve a theory. By demonstrating why it fails in a single

[4] On the conduct of counterfactual experiments in history and international relations, see Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, "Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives" in Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 15–16; and Richard Ned Lebow, "What's So Different About a Counterfactual," *World Politics* 52 (July 2000): 550–85.

[5] Max Weber, "Objective Possibility and Adequate Causation in Historical Explanation" in *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press of Glencoe, 1949 [1905]), 164–88.

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case, a researcher may identity the scope conditions of the theory and the variables or processes it must take into account to expand the domain in which it is applicable.[6]

I do not use the 1914 case to evaluate a proposition or theory, but to critique a more general approach to understanding social phenomena based on the determining role of so-called structures—system polarity, balance of power, alliances, regime types. I argue that structural theories cannot adequately account for World War I and identify the reasons for this failure and the additional processes these theories must take into account to offer a better account of international politics. I do not claim that the 1914 case falsifies structural approaches; approaches, like paradigms, cannot be falsified. Rather, I contend that structural approaches, while valuable, provide only part of the analytical purchase needed to understand key foreign policy decisions, especially those responsible for system transformations.

There are two ways to generalize from a single case. The first strategy is to add additional cases in the hope of making the finding statistically significant. In this connection, I discuss two additional cases of system transformations—World War II and the end of the cold war. I review the relevant literature on these cases that suggests the presence of the same phenomena that confound structural explanations in 1914. Three cases do not represent a large "n," but they do constitute the universe of twentieth-century system transformations and thereby lend a certain weight to my findings. The second strategy is conceptual. A researcher can argue that a problem, process, or phenomenon that confounds a theory in a single case is *prima facie* universal, or so widespread that it renders the theory inadequate or invalid. I make two such claims: social systems are open and can be transformed through their internal operation as well as through external stimuli; and all wars and system transformations require independent catalysts.

Statistical logic is not the only criterion of case selection. Not all cases are equal. Some have greater visibility and impact because of their real-world or theoretical consequences. World War I is nonpareil in both respects. Its origins and consequences are also the basis for many of our major theories in domains as diverse as political psychology, war and peace, democratization, and state structure. If World War I can be shown to be highly contingent, with the corollary that a very different twentieth century was possible, imagine the gradual evolution of Wilhelminian Germany toward a constitutional monarchy, no Russian revolution, or at least a noncommunist Russia, no World II, and no

[6] Patricia L. Kendall and Katherine M. Wolf, "The Analysis of Deviant Cases in Communications Research" in Paul Lazarsfeld and Frank Stanton, eds., *Communications Research: 1948–49* (New York: Harper, 1949), 152–57; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65 (September 1971): 682–93; Harry Eckstein, "Case Study Theory in Political Science" in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Strategies of Inquiry* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

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Holocaust. We must be wary of structural theories that not only attempt to explain social realities but make them appear foreordained.

Underlying Causes of War

To use counterfactual experiments to explore alternative worlds, it helps to have as a starting point a generally accepted interpretation of why the world we live in has come about. Historians rarely agree about causes, but the degree of controversy surrounding the origins of World War I is extreme. Scholars disagree about the causes of war and the appropriate level of analysis at which to search for them. They also differ in their judgments of which state or states were most responsible for the war and the reasons why their leaders acted as they did. If the nature of the explanations and limitations of evidence makes it difficult to discriminate among competing interpretations, limitations of space make it impossible to address all or even most of these interpretations.

Fortunately, something of a dominant interpretation has emerged in recent years. Historians associated with this interpretation disagree on specific points—German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg's motives for risking war, the relative responsibility of Austria and Germany. But they agree that both powers set in motion the chain of events that led to war; Austria-Hungary exploited the assassination of Franz Ferdinand as the pretext for war with Serbia, and Germany encouraged—even pushed—Austria toward decisive action.[7] Students of Austria-Hungary argue that its leaders acted for a com-

[7] Fritz Stern, "Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Responsibility" in Fritz Stern and Leonard Krieger, eds., *The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), 252–85; Konrad J. Jarausch, "The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's Calculated Risk, July 1914," *Central European History* 2 (March 1969): 48–76; Jarausch, *The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "War Guilt 1914 Reconsidered: A Balance of New Research" in H. W. Koch, ed., *The Origins of the First World War*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 343–70; Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus* (Frankfurt: Fischer Bucherei, 1969); Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy Before 1914," *Central European History* 6 (March 1972): 3–43; Andreas Hilgruber, "Riezlers Theorie des kalkulieren Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzeption in der Julikrise 1914," *Historische Zeitschrift* 202 (April 1966): 333–51; Egmont Zechlin, *Krieg und Kriegrisiko: Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1979); David Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," *Journal of Modern History* 55 (September 1983): 442–74; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, "Germany and the Coming of War" in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, *The Coming of the First World War*, 87–124; Holger H. Herwig, *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary, 1914-1918* (London: Arnold, 1998), chap. 1; John C. G. Röhl, "Germany" in Keith Wilson, ed., *Decisions for War, 1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 27–54. On Austria, see Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand," *The Historical Journal* 17 (June 1974): 417–34; Williamson, "The Origins of World War I," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18 (Spring 1988): 795–818, and *Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1990); R. J. Evans, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Coming of War," in Evans and Pogge von Strandmann, eds., *The Coming of the First World War*, 33–56.

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bination of closely related foreign and domestic concerns. Since the publication of Kurt Riezler's diaries, a near consensus has emerged among German historians that von Bethmann-Hollweg did not seek to provoke a European war but recognized that an Austrian conflict with Serbia would be difficult to contain. He was willing to run the risk of a continental war in the belief that such a war was sooner or later inevitable and that Germany's chance of winning it declined with every year that passed.[8] Given the primary responsibility of Austria and Germany for initiating the chain of events that led to war, I will focus on their decisions and secondarily on Russia's, but in full recognition that it is only part of the story.

Counterfactual experiments are wonderful means of exploring relationships among hypothesized explanations. Even a superficial counterfactual examination of the underlying causes of World War I reveals that many theorized causes are tightly coupled. Counterfactual experiments also help us probe contingency. The most straightforward way to do this would be to use "minimal rewrite" counterfactuals to remove putative causes of an outcome. To apply minimal rewrites at levels of analysis other than leaders, it would be necessary to go back to a time and place where the structures, ideas, or institutions in question were more malleable or still in the process of taking shape. The fewer counterfactuals necessary to remove the causes, the more counterfactuals that can accomplish this end; the more proximate they are to the outcome, the more contingent the outcome is. Limitations of space preclude such an exercise, and I employ a different strategy to address the problem of contingency. I look at the extent to which the underlying causes of war can be understood as a confluence and use minimal rewrite counterfactuals to examine the implications of this causal metaphor for contingency.

A confluence envisages a multiple stream of independent causes that come together to produce an outcome. A house goes up in smoke. Investigation reveals that the fire spread from a lighted candle that was left unattended on a window sill. The window was not completely sealed, and a draft blew one of the curtains close enough to the flame for it to catch fire. The smoke alarm, connected to the house security system, did not function because its battery was dead, and the fire department failed to receive the timely warning that might have permitted it to save the dwelling. What caused the house to burn down? The insurance investigator pointed to the candle, but it would not have been lit or placed on the window sill if it had not been the holiday season and had its owners not been following a neighborhood custom. If the window had not been warped, or the insulation around it had provided a better seal, the candle would not have started a fire. If the owners had been home, or if the smoke alarm had a charged battery, the house would not have burned down. No single

[8] Kurt Riezler, *Tagebücher, Aufsatze, Dokumente. Eingeleidet und hrs. Von Karl Dietrich Erdmann* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972); Koch, ed., *The Origins of the First World War*, introduction.

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factor was responsible for this disaster; it took a combination of them interacting in a particular way.[9]

An outcome that requires the confluence of many independent causes, but could be prevented by removing any one of them with a minimal rewrite—like the fire in the house—is highly contingent. An equifinal outcome to which multiple pathways lead requires multiple interventions to prevent. Its contingency would depend on how many minimal rewrites were necessary to halt or deflect each possible pathway. Some outcomes might be so highly redundant as to make them all but inevitable. Sooner or later, we will all die no matter how careful our diet, how much we exercise, or how many diseases modern medicine is able to prevent or cure.

World War I is probably best understood as a nonlinear confluence in which multiple, interrelated causes had unanticipated interactions and unpredictable consequences. Three causal chains were critically important. First and foremost was Germany's security dilemma, caused by the prospect of a two-front war against France and Russia in which the general staff believed it would soon no longer be possible to defeat one adversary at a time. The second causal chain consisted of all the Balkan developments that threatened the external security and internal stability of Austria-Hungary, and encouraged influential opinion in Vienna to consider war with Serbia a possible solution to these threats. The third chain centered on St. Petersburg and was itself a confluence of external setbacks (defeat in Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, humiliation in the Bosnian Annexation crisis of 1909) and internal weaknesses (the revolution of 1905, growing alienation of the middle classes, rise of a powerful revolutionary movement). The setbacks made Russian leaders fearful of the foreign and domestic costs of another foreign policy defeat.

Each of these three chains of causation was contingent; they were the result of decisions, bad and generally avoidable ones, that had the unintended consequence of dividing Europe into two armed and hostile camps. If German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had been able to dissuade Wilhelm I from annexing Alsace-Lorraine, there might have been no enduring Franco-German rivalry. If Bismarck's successors had managed relations with Russia better, St. Petersburg would have had no incentive to ally with France. The Anglo-French entente might have been prevented by a kaiser who knew how to keep his mouth shut and recognized the unnecessary expense and counterproductive nature of a naval race with England.

The point of no return in Austro-Serb relations was the Empire's annexation of Bosnia and Herzogovina in 1908. Austrian Chief-of-staff Conrad von

[9] J. L. Mackie, "Causes and Conditions" in Myles Brand, ed., *The Nature of Causation* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 308–44; Roy Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Science* (Brighton, UK: Harvester Press, 1979); Rom Harré and Peter Secord, *The Explanation of Social Behaviour* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1973); Heikki Patomäki, "How to Tell Better Stories about World Politics," *European Journal of International Relations* 2 (March 1996): 105–34.

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Hötzendorff had been pushing for annexation for some time and convinced Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, who became foreign minister in 1906, to do this as part of a new, assertive policy in the Balkans. Aehrenthal's poorly conceived initiative provoked a war-threatening crisis, humiliated Russia, and deeply embittered the Serbs. The annexation crisis destroyed a decade of Austro-Russian cooperation and put the two empires on a collision course. With more farsighted foreign ministers in Vienna and St. Petersburg, this clash could have been avoided and Austro-Russian rivalry managed more effectively. In this environment, Russia would have been more restrained, and probably would not have violated the tacit agreement between the empires that neither would support dissident groups within the other's empire. If St. Petersburg had not encouraged anti-Habsburg factions in Belgrade or stoked the fires of Romanian nationalism in Transylvania, the Austrian foreign office would have been much less threatened by the likely defection of Romania from its secret alliance with Austria. In the long run, Slavic nationalism would almost certainly have asserted itself, but that threat could have been managed for some time; as late as 1914 there were relatively few voices for independence within the Habsburg empire. The division of Europe into two militarily powerful but insecure alliance systems contributed to the outbreak of war, but did not make it inevitable.

Even more important than these chains of causation was the synergistic interaction among them. Two features of nonlinear systems came into play here. The first is that the effect of one variable (or cause) often depends on the state of another variable (or cause). In such cases, the consequences of either cannot be predicted or understood independently.[10] This phenomenon is well illustrated by the relationship between Russian armaments and railway construction and the Schlieffen Plan. German generals planned to solve the problem of a two-front war by committing most of their forces to an invasion of France in the expectation that they could occupy Paris before Russian forces penetrated too deeply into eastern Prussia. The general staff worried that Russian mobilization and railway reforms would render the Schlieffen plan obsolete, and this fear shaped the response of Germany's political leaders to Austria's request for support in its confrontation with Serbia. They reasoned that it was better to fight a war while there was still a chance to win. France had underwritten the expense of the Russian railways in the hope of restraining Germany; French leaders reasoned that Berlin would become more cautious in proportion to its fear of the consequences of a two-front war. The French strategy of deterrence actually encouraged the German invasion it had been intended to prevent. Something similar occurred during the July 1914 crisis when Russia mobilized in the hope that it might restrain Germany, not provide a *casus belli.* In each instance, the intensity and effect of particular actions or policies were determined by other actions and policies. In their absence, the leaders in question

[10] Robert Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

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might have made very different choices, or the same choices might have had different consequences.

Game theorists who model strategic interactions have long recognized the need for actors to share a common framework, or at the very least to agree on the kind of game they are playing. They assume that actors use a Bayesian process to update estimates of one another's preferences and that such learning will allow them to establish a common framework.[11] In practice, new information is commonly assimilated to existing frameworks, and actors can continue to communicate for prolonged periods of time without realizing that they are playing different "games." "Signals" may be missed, or their intended import only grasped after it is too late to respond appropriately. Frameworks also change in the course of interactions, and these changes can have profound consequences for behavior. The ability of actors to transform themselves and their understandings of their strategic interactions in the course of those interactions is a second fundamental characteristic of nonlinear, open systems and central to understanding the events of July and August 1914.

Key Austrian and German leaders underwent independent *gestalt* shifts in 1913–1914 that prompted dramatic reversals in their foreign policy preferences. In Berlin, General Helmuth von Moltke and Bethmann-Hollweg had been troubled by Russia's seemingly growing military and mobilization capability for some time. But only in 1914—and probably as a result of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand—did the chancellor's concern reach the level where he was willing to do something he had consistently rejected in the past: risk war in the hope of achieving a diplomatic triumph that might break up the Franco-Russian alliance. Austrian leaders worried about a Balkan League directed against them that would constitute an external threat and fan the centrifugal tendencies within their empire. Conrad von Hötzendorff wanted to exploit the assassination of Franz Ferdinand as a pretext to attack Serbia, Berchtold and Franz Josef saw no alternatives, and Berlin was now willing to offer its support. Serbs and Russians knew nothing about these *gestalt* shifts and behaved in ways that exacerbated Austro-German insecurities and provoked a war that neither country wanted. Wilhelm, Bethmann-Hollweg, and Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow were in turn victims of a Russian *gestalt* shift. They deluded themselves into thinking that they might repeat the success of 1909 and compel Russia to remain on the sidelines of an Austro-Serb war. But that humiliation had led to a commitment not to back down again, something the Russians believed would undermine their status as a great power. This commitment was strengthened

[11] Barry Nalebuff, "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 9 (September 1985): 19–30; Robert Powell, "Crisis Bargaining, Escalation, and MAD," *American Political Science Review* 81 (September 1987): 717–27; Powell, "Nuclear Brinkmanship with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," *American Political Science Review* 82 (March 1988): 155–78; Steven J. Brams, *Superpower Games* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 48–85.

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by cabinet shifts in 1914. These several *gestalt* shifts entirely changed the nature and outcome of great power interactions.

One of the most remarkable features of 1914 was the coincidental timing of Germany and Austria's security problems and *gestalt* shifts. Although Russia was a common threat, each ally's security problems had largely independent causes, and there was no particular reason why they should have become acute at the same time. Germany's security dilemma was the result of its geographic position and prior policies that had encouraged its two most powerful neighbors to ally against it. Russia's improved military and mobilization capability, the development that drove Germany to brinkmanship in 1914, was the result of Russian industrialization and access to French capital markets. German willingness to risk war was also the result of the perceived decline in capability and will of Austria-Hungary, Germany's principal military ally. German political and military authorities worried that failure to support Austria in 1914 would accelerate its decline and leave Germany at the mercy of Russia and France.

Austria-Hungary's insecurity was the consequence of a precipitous decline in Ottoman power. That decline had many internal causes, but it was dramatically hastened by the Italian occupation of Tripoli in September 1911 and the war this unexpectedly triggered with the Ottoman Empire. The war provided the opportunity for Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece to take up arms; to almost everyone's surprise, they succeeded in all but expelling Turkey from Europe. Serbia doubled its population and territory; backed by Russia, it sought to organize an anti-Austrian alliance in the Balkans and to incite national unrest within the Dual Monarchy.

German leaders did not feel so threatened before 1914; German chancellors rejected military demands for war in 1905 and 1912 and supported diplomatic resolutions to the 1912 and 1913 crises that threatened war between Austria and Serbia and Austria and Montenegro. If Italy had not occupied Tripoli—and there had been considerable opposition to this ill-conceived venture—no Balkan wars would have started in its wake, and Serbia would not have constituted a threat, if it did at all, until some later date. Alternatively, if the Balkan events that Austria-Hungary found so threatening had occurred a few years earlier, the German kaiser and chancellor would probably not have encouraged Austria to draw its sword. Timing was everything in 1914, and that timing was fortuitous, if that is the right word. For this reason alone, World War I was highly contingent.

Immediate Causes of War

Wars, like fires, need catalysts. Most structural theories assume an unproblematic relationship between underlying and immediate causes. If the underlying causes are present, an appropriate catalyst will come along—or be manufac-

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tured by leaders.[12] In February 1965, in the aftermath of a Vietcong attack on the American advisers' barracks at Pleiku, Vietnam, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy wrote a memorandum to President Lyndon Johnson urging the sustained bombing of North Vietnam in response. Bundy later acknowledged that he conceived of Pleiku as being like "streetcars." He could count on repeated Vietcong attacks against South Vietnamese forces or their American advisers to provide him with the pretext he needed at the opportune moment to sell escalation to the president.[13]

Pretexts do not always resemble streetcars. They may be infrequent, inappropriate, or may fail to materialize; and without a catalyst, the predicted or intended behavior may not occur. In a matter of months or years, the underlying conditions may evolve to make war less likely, even if an otherwise appropriate catalyst ultimately comes along. The window of opportunity for war may be temporally narrow or broad, depending on the nature and rate of change of the underlying conditions. The outbreak of war, like many other events, requires a conjunction of underlying pressures and appropriate catalysts.

One of the most common metaphors used to describe Europe in 1914 is that of dry kindling waiting for a spark to set it alight. As sparks are frequent in acute international conflicts, this metaphor is well chosen by structuralists, because it emphasizes the underlying causes of war. Metaphors are no substitute for careful analysis, and historians and political scientists need to develop more precise conceptions of catalysts. We can begin by asking what about Sarajevo made it a successful catalyst, and what other provocations or events might have served the same end. Answers to these questions will provide a second perspective from which to estimate the contingency of war in 1914.

Joachim Remak insists that "Sarajevo was more than an excuse for war, it was one of its major causes."[14] Although he does not elaborate on his claim, many reasons can be adduced in support. Arguably the most important was the assassination itself and the political challenge it constituted for Austria-Hungary. In June 1914, Berchtold, with Franz Josef's support, began a diplomatic offensive to arrest the decline of the Empire's position in the Balkans and to frustrate entente efforts to build a new Balkan League. There was no talk of war.[15] The assassination transformed the situation. Not only Conrad pushed for war, but other officials in the foreign office and military argued that failure to

[12] Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), chap. 2.

[13] Senator Gravel Edition, *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making in Vietnam*, 4 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), vol. 3, 687–91; Townsend Hoopes, *The Limits of Intervention: An Inside Account of How the Johnson Policy of Escalation Was Reversed* (New York: David McKay, 1969), 30.

[14] Joachim Remak, "1914—The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered," *Journal of Modern History* 43 (September 1971): 353–66.

[15] F. R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866–1914* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), 334–35.

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respond forcibly to this provocation would undermine, if not destroy, the Empire's standing as a great power and embolden its domestic and foreign enemies.[16] For Franz Josef, there was an additional personal dimension to Sarajevo; he was outraged by the assassination of a member of the royal family. Kaiser Wilhelm also grieved over the loss of Franz Ferdinand, whom he considered a friend and had spent time with only two weeks before.[17] He wanted Austria to take action against Serbia to show that actions against legitimate rulers would not be tolerated.[18]

Sarajevo shifted the balance of power in Vienna. Franz Ferdinand's views on defense matters were almost as important as the emperor's. His influence derived from his official status as successor to the throne (*Thronfolger*), from his interest and knowledge about military affairs, and from the extensive network of contacts he had cultivated throughout the armed forces. His decidedly peaceful orientation evolved during the course of the Balkan wars.[19] The *Thronfolger* was intent on extending Austrian influence in the Balkans, but not at the risk of war with Russia. He warned, "A war between Austria and Russia would end either with the overthrow of the Romanovs or with the overthrow of the Habsburgs—or perhaps the overthrow of both."[20] He cherished the unrealistic idea of monarchial unity in the form of some revival of the Holy Alliance, and he had made a point of cultivating good relations with Nicolas II. On a more practical level, he took Russian military capability more seriously than either the war minister or chief-of-staff, and was convinced that war against Serbia would draw in Russia. He did not believe that the Austro-Hungarian army was ready for war, worried that Italy would defect from the Triple Alliance and that Germany would find some reason to stand aside. More fundamentally, Franz Ferdinand opposed war because it would make it impossible for him to impose fundamental changes in the structure of the Empire upon his accession to the throne.[21]

Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. offers an intriguing counterfactual: If Governor General of Bosnia-Herzogovina Oskar Potiorek had been killed at Sarajevo instead of Franz Ferdinand, Vienna would have responded differently.[22] Like

[16] Remak, "1914—The Third Balkan War"; Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo*, 335–37; Herwig, *The First World War*, 8–18.

[17] Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. to the author, 22 January 1999.

[18] Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), ii, 129–30; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, (London: Macmillan, 1990), 85.

[19] Williamson, "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process" and *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War*, 51.

[20] Alexander Spitzmüller-Harmersbach, .. . *und hat auch Ursach, es zu Leben* (Vienna: William Frick, 1955), 103; Georg Franz, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und die Pläne zur Reform der Habsburger Monarchie* (Vienna: G.D.W. Callwey, 1943), 107, quotes a similar statement that Franz Ferdinand made to his wife in 1913.

[21] Williamson, "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process" and "The Origins of World War I."

[22] Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Coming of the First World War*, 434; David Stevenson, *The First World War and International Politics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988), 14, believes

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Conrad, Potiorek was a charter member of the war party, and his death would have removed another supporter of military action from the scene. More importantly, Franz Ferdinand would have been influential in shaping Austria's response. His opposition to war, combined with that of Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza, the senior voice against war in June and early July 1914, would have carried considerable weight, because the two men were otherwise always at odds. Tisza was the great defender of Hungary, and Franz Ferdinand made no secret of his dislike of Tisza and Hungarians more generally.[23] With Franz Ferdinand and Tisza urging moderation, Berchtold, a weak personality, would also have pursued a cautious line, and Franz Josef, cross-pressured in 1914, would probably have sided with them instead of Conrad. If so, there would have been no Hoyos mission to seek German backing; Germany would have been consulted with a diplomatic end in mind. The channel for communication with Germany would not have been the hawks in the foreign office but Franz Ferdinand, who had close personal relations with Kaiser Wilhelm and had been used in the past to sound out Berlin's intentions in the Balkans. Merely changing the victims of the terrorist attack in Sarajevo might have been enough to alter in a fundamental way Austria-Hungary's response.

Sarajevo provided a necessary incentive and opportunity for Germany. Moltke had pushed for war almost from the moment he became chief of staff, because he wanted to fight Russia and France while Germany still had a chance of victory. Although the German general staff had a low regard for the military prowess of their Austrian ally, they were horrified at the prospect of an Austrian decline, because it would leave Russia free to concentrate all of its forces against Germany in East Prussia. In Berlin, the assassination was perceived to threaten Austria's standing as a great power if it exposed Austria's lack of will to act like one. This additional consideration, when weighed in the balance along with the general concern for the deteriorating military balance, made Chancellor Bethmann-Holweg more receptive to Moltke's pleas for action at the height of the crisis. The assassination may well have been the catalyst for Bethmann-Holweg's *gestalt* shift described in the previous section.[24]

Bethmann-Holweg was more prescient than most of his contemporaries in recognizing, as he put it, that a European war was likely to topple more thrones than it would prop up. He accordingly deemed the backing of the Social Democrats, the largest and best organized working class organization in Europe, the sine qua non of military action. Without it, the chancellor would not have taken his "leap into the dark." Moltke knew this, and in February 1913 had discour-

war much less likely in general if Franz Ferdinand had remained alive and continued to exercise restraint in Vienna.

[23] József Galántai, *Hungary in the First World War* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1989), 100–18; Gabor Vermes, *István Tisza: The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of a Magyar Nationalist* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 230–31; Williamson, "Influence, Power, and the Policy Process."

[24] Konrad Jarausch, email to the author, 4 January 1999.

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aged Conrad from attacking Serbia on the grounds that the German people would not support a war that Austria provoked against a seemingly conciliatory adversary.[25]

Sarajevo was a tailor-made provocation for Bethmann-Hollweg. The assassination aroused considerable sympathy for Austria throughout Europe, not the least among the German working class. Although the Austrian ultimatum was widely regarded as heavy-handed by the politically sophisticated, German opinion perceived their country as a bystander to a Balkan conflict and the innocent target of Russian aggression. The chancellor played up this interpretation and benefited from the general fear and dislike of Russia by Social Democrats, who regarded the czarist regime as barbaric because of its treatment of labor, dissident intellectuals, and minorities. The result was the *Burgfrieden* of 4 August in which the Social Democrats voted for war credits.

Sarajevo created the necessary psychological environment for kaiser and chancellor to overcome their inhibitions about war. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz observed that "When the Emperor did not consider the peace to be threatened he liked to give full play to his reminiscences of famous ancestors, [but] in moments which he realized to be critical he proceeded with extraordinary caution."[26] To his contemporaries, the chancellor came across as a fatalist, as a man who had a deep revulsion of war but felt powerless to oppose the prevalent view that it was necessary. Kaiser and chancellor were caught on the horns of a dilemma: Germany's vital interests seemed to require war or a diplomatic triumph that would break up the *Franco-Russe*, and the latter could only be achieved at the risk of war. But they were not prepared to accept responsibility for starting such a confrontation. Until July 1914, they procrastinated. By deferring a decision that was too difficult for them to make, kaiser and chancellor preserved their psychological equilibrium. The July crises offered them a way out of their decisional dilemma.

When Hoyos met Wilhelm and Bethmann-Hollweg on 4 July in Potsdam to secure their support, he did not confront them with a choice between peace and war but only with a request to back Austria *if* Russia threatened intervention in support of Serbia. Kaiser and chancellor both expected Russia to back down as it had in 1909, and this was also the view of their ambassador in St. Petersburg.[27] They doubted that France would come to Russia's assistance, or that Britain would intervene if the Balkan conflict provoked a continental war. Their support for Austria precipitated its ultimatum and declaration of war against Serbia; Russia's subsequent mobilization against Austria; German ulti-

[25] Moltke to Conrad, *Der grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette*, A, Mendelsohn-Bartholdy, I. Lepsius, and F. Thimme, eds., 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922–26), 10 February 1913, 38, i, no. 12,824; Franz Conrad von Hötzendorff, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*, 5 vols. (Vienna: Rikola, 1921–25), 3, 144ff.

[26] Alfred von Tirpitz, *Politisiche Dokumente*, 2 vols. (Berlin: Cotta, 1924–26), i, 242.

[27] Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, 122–29, on the hold of the Bosnian precedent on German leaders in 1914.

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matums to Russia, Belgium, and France; and German mobilization, which was the equivalent of war. When kaiser and chancellor confronted Russian mobilization, or more accurately, premature and exaggerated reports of Russian mobilization that flooded through the channels of German military intelligence, they convinced themselves that they were only reacting to Russian initiatives, and that St. Petersburg, not they, bore the brunt of responsibility for the war they were about to unleash.[28]

To recapitulate, the Sarajevo assassinations changed the political and psychological environment in Vienna and Berlin in six important ways, all of which were probably necessary for the decisions that led to war. First, they constituted a political challenge to which Austrian leaders believed they had to respond forcefully; anything less was expected to encourage further challenges by domestic and foreign enemies. Second, they shocked and offended Franz Josef and Kaiser Wilhelm and made both emperors more receptive to calls for decisive measures. Third, they changed the policy-making context in Vienna by removing the principal spokesman for peace. Fourth, they may have been the catalyst for Bethmann-Hollweg's *gestalt* shift. Fifth, they made it possible for Bethmann-Hollweg to win the support of the socialists, without which he never would have risked war. Sixth, they created a psychological environment in which Wilhelm and Bethmann-Holweg could proceed in incremental steps toward war, convincing themselves at the outset that their actions were unlikely to provoke a European war, and at the end that others were responsible for war.

A striking feature of the July crisis was the tremendous psychological difficulty German leaders had in making a decision for war. Given their unwillingness to accept responsibility for starting a great power war, it is certainly difficult to imagine how kaiser, chancellor, and foreign office could have taken this step if they had been compelled to recognize their share of responsibility for it from the outset. If the archduke had not been assassinated, giving rise to this unusual opportunity, Germany might have reached the fateful year of 1917 still at peace with its neighbors. If so, its leaders might have discovered that their fears of a window of vulnerability were greatly exaggerated; their adversaries were constrained from attacking Germany for many of the same reasons that had prevented Germany from exploiting its military window of opportunity in the decade before 1914.

The double assassination was critical in its nature and timing, but it could easily have been avoided. Reports reached Vienna that Sarajevo was seething with discontent and a dangerous venue for a royal visit. Franz Ferdinand explored the possibility of postponing his trip and seems to have been encouraged by the emperor to do so. The High Command nevertheless decided to proceed

[28] Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, *Decision-Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict: Choice and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977), 59–60, 205; and Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, 135–45.

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with its great maneuvers, and the archduke, who was inspector general of the armed forces, decided that he had no choice but to attend. Duchess Sophie had come to Bosnia with dark misgivings that something dreadful was about to happen to her husband. She was aware that Dr. Josip Sunarić, one of the leaders of the *Sabor*, the Bosnian parliament, had urged General Potiorek to cancel their impending visit because of the hostility of the local population to the regime. The evening before the assassination, Karl von Rumerskirch, the archduke's chamberlain, urged him to cancel the next day's visit to Sarajevo. General Potiorek's aide-de-camp, Lt.-Col. Eric von Merizzi, interceded and convinced Franz Ferdinand to proceed, because cancellation would be a rebuke to his superior. The next morning the archduke and his wife were met at the Sarajevo train station by General Potiorek and the lord mayor, and ushered into an open touring car to go to a nearby military camp for a quick inspection before going on to the city hall. The lead car in the procession was supposed to carry six specially trained security officers, but their chief departed with three local policemen instead. On Appel Quay, a long street with houses on one side and an embankment on the other, a young man in a black coat asked a policeman which car carried the archduke and then stepped out into the street to throw a grenade at it. Franz Ferdinand's Czech driver saw the object coming and accelerated. The bomb fell on the folded roof, rolled off into the pavement and exploded under the rear wheel of the next car in the procession. The would-be assassin jumped over the embankment into the river.[29]

Lt.-Col Merizzi and another officer, both in the car behind the archduke, were hit by bomb fragments and were rushed to a military hospital. Franz Ferdinand dismissed the attack as madness and insisted on proceeding to the city hall. Following the ceremony there, the archduke asked General Potiorek if there were likely to be any more attacks. Potiorek advised taking a different route and skipping the planned visit to the museum. Other members of the archduke's party urged him to leave Sarajevo immediately, but he insisted on visiting Col. von Merizzi in the military hospital and then going on to the museum. The cars drove up Appel Quay, this time at high speed, but the lead car turned by mistake into Franz Josef Street and the second car with the police guard followed. Franz Ferdinand's driver, in the third car, was turning to follow when he was ordered by General Potiorek to stop, back up, and continue down Appel Quay. At that moment, Princip, standing at the intersection, took a revolver out of his coat, and a nearby policeman reached out to grab his hand. An accomplice struck the policeman, and Princip fired twice at point blank range into the car containing Franz Ferdinand and Sophie.[30]

Numerous minimal rewrites could prevent the assassinations: Princip might have obeyed the order to abort the assassination sent to him by the military conspirators in Belgrade; Austrian authorities in Bosnia might have taken secu-

[29] Vladimir Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966), 10–12, 408–09.
[30] Ibid., 13–15.

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rity as seriously as they did the menu and music for the banquets they planned in the archduke's honor; Franz Ferdinand might have canceled his trip in response to multiple warnings and his wife's fears; he might have followed the advice of his advisers and left Sarajevo directly after the ceremony at city hall; or his cavalcade could have adhered to the planned route and raced down Appel Quay past Princip. None of these changes strain our understanding of the world, because most royal processions do not stray from their intended routes and most security details would have rushed the archduke and his wife to safety at the first sign of violence.

Without the assassinations there would have been no war in the summer of 1914. Could some other country or combination of countries have found a reason to start a war? Britain was committed to the status quo and was consumed with its Irish problem. France coveted Alsace-Lorraine, but had been on the defensive in Europe since 1871 and perceived itself increasingly weaker militarily vis-à-vis Germany. The lynchpin of French security was the *Franco-Russe*, and France supported Russia in 1914 to preserve this alliance. France had also drawn closer to Britain and relied on British military assistance in case of a war with Germany, but the French knew this would only be forthcoming if they were attacked by Germany. Italy pursued an aggressive colonial policy that led to war with the Ottoman Empire and aspired to those parts of Austria-Hungary inhabited by Italian speakers. But before 1914, Italy was constrained by its alliance with Austria and Germany. The Ottoman Empire was everywhere on the defensive and not about to challenge any major power or provide it with a pretext to intervene in support of any of its neighbors. Russia was more or less recovered from its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and intent on expanding its influence in the Balkans. But Russian leaders did not want war; they mobilized reluctantly in 1914 in the hope that it would deter Austria from attacking Serbia. Serbia had long-term aspirations to acquire Bosnia-Herzogovina, but its energies were fully consumed with overcoming the resistance of its newly acquired subjects in Macedonia. In 1910, German Foreign Minister Alfred von Kiderlen-Wächter rightly observed that "If we do not conjure up a war into being, no one else certainly will do so."[31].

A failed assassination attempt could have had beneficial consequences for Europe. Serbia's diplomatic humiliation in 1909 encouraged the formation of secret societies aimed at undermining Austrian rule in Bosnia-Herzogovina. Col. D. D. Apis was at the center of many of these conspiracies and supplied arms and other assistance to the archduke's assassins. Nikola Pašić was hostile to the conspirators and knew of their preparations, but felt constrained to provide only veiled warnings to the Austrian ambassador. Ironically, neither Apis nor the other conspirators wanted war with Austria, and Apis did not expect

[31] Herman Kantorowicz, *The Spirit of British Policy and the Myth of the Encirclement of Germany* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932), 360; and Imanuel Geiss, *German Foreign Policy, 1871–1914* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 126.

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the assassination to provoke one. Apis hoped to strengthen his hand vis-à-vis civilian authorities and sought to call off the assassination when he became convinced that it would not buttress his authority. From the perspective of those who mattered in Belgrade, the war was an unintended and largely undesired consequence of an unwanted assassination. An abortive assassination attempt might have allowed Pašić to rein in Apis, which he did in the summer of 1915. Apis was arrested a year later, tried, and executed in 1917.

Historians who contend that a European war was inevitable root their argument in the deeper trends they see pushing the powers toward war. Would these trends have become more or less pronounced in the years after 1914? Structural determinists assume they would have intensified, although they offer no reasons why. We can conjure up scenarios of more acute Austro-Russian competition in the Balkans, British-German naval and economic competition, and the breakup of the Triple Alliance due to Italy's defection. With no more imagination, we can identify developments that would have muted underlying tensions and made war less likely.

The principal difference between the Balkan crises of 1908–1909 and 1914 was Russian willingness to go to war in support of Serbia in 1914. Some historians maintain that Russia was ripe for revolution in 1914 and that World War I postponed the upheaval for three years.[32] If revolution had broken out in the absence of war, Russia might have been consumed by domestic turmoil for several years afterwards and not have been in any position to pursue an aggressive policy in the Balkans. This could also have happened to Austria. Franz Josef died in 1916 and was succeeded by Prince Karl. If Franz Ferdinand had lived, he would have ascended to the throne. Motivated by hatred of Hungarians and the *Ausgleich* of 1867, Franz Ferdinand would have sought to reduce the power of Hungary and had considered several strategies toward this end including a triple rather than dual monarchy and a looser form of federalism. The documents he had prepared for the transition indicate that he probably would have introduced universal suffrage in Hungary at the outset of his reign in the hope of increasing the power of minorities at the expense of the Magyars. This would have provoked a strong reaction from Budapest, and further attempts by Franz Ferdinand to undercut the *Ausgleich* would have raised the prospect of civil war. Vienna would not have been in any position to start a war with Serbia.[33]

One of the principal causes of war in 1914 was the German military's belief that war was inevitable and had to be fought before 1916 or 1917, when improved Russian mobilization and armaments made the Schlieffen Plan unwork-

[32] Hans Rogger, "Russia in 1914" in Walter Laqueur and George L. Mosse, eds., *1914: The Coming of the First World War* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 229–53; Arno J. Mayer, "Domestic Causes of the First World War" in Stern and Krieger, eds., *The Responsibility of Power: Historical Essays in Honor of Hajo Holborn*, 286–93.

[33] Cited in Z. A. B. Zeman, "The Balkans and the Coming of War" in R. J. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, eds., *The Coming of the First World War*, 24; Dedijer, *The Road to Sarajevo*, chap. 7.

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able. The most obvious alternative, a direct onslaught on France across the Meuse and Moselle, had little chance of success because of the mountainous terrain and French fortifications. Schlieffen contemplated such a campaign in 1894, but quickly gave the idea up as unrealistic.[34] Could Germany have conducted an offensive in the East? Russian railway and fortress construction made an Austro-German offensive in Poland difficult, but not impossible. It could not produce the kind of decisive victory Moltke sought. If the Germans broached the Narew River line, the Russians could withdraw with relative ease into their vast hinterland.

If offensives against Russia or France were unrealistic, the most sensible strategy was a defensive posture on both fronts; German generals knew that France and Russia planned to march against Germany at the outbreak of war. With no German invasion of Belgium, Britain would have remained neutral. The French army would have exhausted itself, as it began to do in 1914, in a series of unsuccessful and costly assaults against the strong German defensive position in Alsace. In the east, the Russian offensive into Prussia was blunted by the meager forces Germany had left in the region. Reserve forces could have conducted a limited counter-offensive, after which Germany could have called for a restoration of peace on the basis of the status quo ante bellum. It seems improbable that there would have been much support in France or Russia for continuing the war after a series of disheartening defeats. Nor could these powers have resisted British and, perhaps, American pressures to lay down their arms and accept a reasonable peace. Austria-Hungary would have been preserved, although the Russian empire might have succumbed to revolution. German preeminence on the continent would not only have been maintained but immeasurably strengthened.

Moltke was willing to tinker with details of the Schlieffen plan but reluctant to consider alternatives. Some members of the general staff doubted the likelihood of victory in 1914, but clung to the Schlieffen Plan because of their collective commitment to the offensive.[35] By 1917, according to the calculations of the general staff, Germany would have had no hope of waging successful, sequential offensives against France and Russia. If war had been avoided in 1914, the contradiction between Germany's strategy and military reality would have become more pronounced. Moltke, or more likely his successor, would have been compelled to abandon the Schlieffen Plan. As funds for additional troops were out of the question, and the concept and technology of the *Blitzkrieg* had not yet been developed, there were no viable alternatives to the defensive. The German general staff might have been compelled to adopt such a strategy or variant of it. If so, they would no longer have had the same incentive to launch a preventive war or preempt in crisis, and to the extent that they became fearful

[34] Gerhard Ritter, *The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany*, Heinz Norden, trans. (Coral Gables, FL.: University of Miami Press, 1970), ii, 196.

[35] Stig Förster, "Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871–1914: Metakritik eines Mythos," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen* 54, no. 1 (1995): 61–95.

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of Russian military capabilities, they might even have become a force for preserving the peace.

I have asked if a European war could have been delayed in the absence of an appropriate catalyst. Could it have come sooner? I am inclined to discount the prospect of an earlier war. Austria considered and rejected going to war with Serbia in December 1912, April–May 1913, and October 1913. Between 1905 and 1914, German leaders spurned Moltke's several pleas to exploit great power crises as pretexts for war. Austrian and Germans swords remained sheathed, because political leaders in Berlin and Vienna saw war as politically and militarily risky and did not feel threatened enough to take these risks.

Contingency and Causation

The origins of World War I are best understood as a confluence of three largely independent chains of causation that came together in 1914. Their interaction has the characteristics of a complex, nonlinear system. The value of important variables was not independent but depended on the presence and value of other key variables. And they in turn depended on the changing understandings that the actors had of their strategic interactions.

A linear model that specified the presence of A (the set of variables associated with the German security dilemma), B (the set of variables relevant for Austria's security dilemma), and C (Russian willingness to risk war to support Serbia) would only capture part of the strategic picture. The values of A, B, and C were determined by *gestalt* shifts that took place in 1909 in Russia and in 1914 in Austria-Hungary and Germany. The presence of A + B + C prior to these *gestalt* shifts would not have produced a war. Nor would their coincidence have been likely to do so after 1916 or 1917 if the political alignment in the Balkans had changed, if Russia's domestic situation had become more acute, or if the Schlieffen Plan had been replaced by a more defense-oriented alternative. War required the coincidence of A + B + C after the *gestalt* shifts and before important underlying conditions changed to produce further shifts. The catalyst for the C *gestalt* shift was Russia's perception of its humiliation in the 1908–1909 Bosnian annexation crisis; and for the A and B shifts, the twin assassinations at Sarajevo.

World War I is not unique in its nonlinearity. World War II, which brought about the next transformation of the international system, was also the product of a highly contingent set of conditions. Aggressive as Hitler was, it is more difficult to imagine Germany starting a war in a less fortuitous context. In the 1930s, France was divided internally, and Britain and France were loath to collaborate with the Soviet Union. Because his imperial policy in Africa had run afoul of Britain, Mussolini abandoned his opposition to German expansion and entered into an alliance with Hitler. In the Far East, Japan attacked China and posed a serious security threat to the Soviet Union and the Western powers. Isolationism guaranteed that the United States, whose intervention had deter-

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mined the outcome of World War I, was no longer a player in the European balance of power. Hitler could attack his enemies piecemeal, while counting on the support of Italy and the neutrality of the Soviet Union and the United States. The end of the cold war, which brought about the third system transformation of the century, can also be described as the result of complex, path dependent, nonlinear interactions.[36]

International relations theory needs to consider multiple paths of causation and their possible interaction. Current theories almost invariably focus on one chain of causation. Power transition theory, for example, attempts to explain the outbreak of wars responsible for system transformations in terms of the changing power balance between hegemons and challengers.[37] Some power transition theorists, notably Robert Gilpin, identify responses other than war for declining hegemons.[38] Power transition theories that acknowledge choice are indeterminate, and attempts to use them to account for the end of the cold war elicit the criticism that they are being used to explain ex post facto what they did not and could not possibly have predicted. The indeterminacy problem arises because factors, independent of the power balance, shape actors' responses to an actual or anticipated decline in their power.[39]

In 1914, power was only part of the story; shifts in the political and military balance may have made German and Austrian leaders more willing to consider the use of force but were insufficient cause for them to draw their swords. Power transition theory—or any other monocausal explanation for system transformation—may be a useful analytical starting point, but it is unlikely to offer much analytical purchase in and of itself. Other causal chains inevitably need to be considered as well as their interaction.

This is also true for the end of the cold war. The Gorbachev foreign policy revolution was undeniably a response, at least in part, to widespread sentiment among the Soviet elite that a stagnant economy severely constrained the country's domestic and foreign policy choices. But there is a lot more to the story. Cutting loose from Third World commitments, internal democratization, toleration of the noncommunist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the unification of Germany within NATO were the direct result of Mikhail Gorbachev's advocacy of *glasnost*, *perestroika* at home, and "new thinking" in foreign affairs.

[36] William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," *International Security* 19 (Winter 1994–95): 91–129; Richard Ned Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism" and Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: Morphological and Behavioral Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace?" in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 23–56, 57–84.

[37] Organski and Kugler, *The War Ledger*; Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*; Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power," *The American Political Science Review* 74 (December 1960): 947–65.

[38] Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics,* 191–92, 197.

[39] Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War"; Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism."

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Other possible Soviet leaders (e.g., Viktor Grishin, Gregory Romanov, Yegor Ligachev) would almost certainly have pursued a different set of domestic and foreign strategies.[40] Gorbachev's foreign policies and their consequences were also a response to independent developments in Eastern Europe and the successful personal relationship he established with Western leaders, most notably Ronald Reagan. To understand the end of the cold war, we need to consider international and domestic structures, domestic politics, leaders, and the nonlinear ways in which they interacted.

Gorbachev's consolidation of power, the collapse of communist governments in Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union's accommodation with the West were also facilitated by a series of catalysts—Chernobyl, Mathias Rust's flight to Red Square, the Reagan administration's endorsement of the "double zero" option in the mistaken expectation that Moscow would reject it outright, the demand of East German tourists in Hungary to travel to West Germany via Austria and Budapest's initial willingness to accommodate them. It is quite likely that the end game of the cold war would have unfolded differently in the absence of these events, and it is not too difficult to imagine a series of alternative events that might have pushed it along a very different course. The Berlin Wall might still be standing, and the two superpowers deploying yet another generation of nuclear-tipped missiles.[41]

Contingencies in the form of random events and conjunctures of multiple chains of causation are difficult to deal with theoretically. Random events by definition lie outside our theories, as do conjunctures, which in turn may be caused by random events. In January 1999, Pope John Paul II made a scheduled stop in St. Louis during his tour of the United States and pleaded with Governor Mel Carnahan of Missouri to commute to life imprisonment the sentence of a murderer scheduled for execution the next day. The governor honored the pope's request even though the condemned man's crime had been particularly heinous—a triple murder to which he had confessed—and he had no credible claim to leniency on any ground. The next person scheduled for execution, Roy "Hog" Roberts, had attracted national attention because of the strong possibility that he was innocent. Numerous groups and prominent individuals, including the pope, appealed—without success—to Governor Carnahan to commute his sentence. We can surmise that the governor, who had campaigned in support of the death penalty, was not about to commute the sentence of two murderers in a row, no matter how deserving the second offender might have appeared. Had the pope arrived in town a few weeks later and made his initial plea for the life of Roberts it is likely that the governor might have commuted his sentence. Studies of the death penalty and its application would never have

[40] Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

[41] George Breslauer and Richard Ned Lebow, "Leadership and the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Experiment" in Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow, eds., *Learning from the Cold War*, forthcoming.

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predicted the actual outcome, because they would not have considered the pope's itinerary as a relevant variable.[42]

As in the case of the pope's visit, coincidences that have unpredictable consequences may be critical to the explanation of particular decisions or courses of action. For this reason alone, prediction in individual cases is an unrealistic goal. Conditional forecasting may be a more appropriate strategy for attempting to cope with the manifold uncertainties associated with the complex events responsible for system transformations. Conditional forecasts use existing theories and behavioral regularities as a starting point to develop alternate scenarios of likely future developments or of a system transformation. They consider multiple chains of causation and look at some of the possible interactions that might take place among them, as well as the paths that might lead from one scenario to another. They also stipulate the kind of information or events that will be used to determine the extent to which events track according to the expectations of any of the scenarios. As events unfold, researchers repeatedly revise their scenarios and expectations in light of the new information. Such a process is messy and time consuming, but it is the only reasonable way of taking into account coincidence and random events. At the very least, it can provide early warning of major changes in a system or of the faulty expectations of those who are tracking its performance.[43]

Catalysts. In many physical processes, catalysts are unproblematic. Chain reactions are triggered by the decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei. Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of uranium 235 or plutonium at given pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted that if a critical mass is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. Wars and accommodations, and the system transformations they may bring about, involve relatively few actors. And unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, political catalysts are not inherent properties of the interacting units. For both these reasons, we can never know if or when an appropriate political catalyst will occur.

Political catalysts differ from their physical counterparts in another important respect. They are often causes in their own right, as was Sarajevo. The twin assassinations caused the Austrian leadership to reframe the problem of Serbia.

[42] Jim Salter, Associated Press, 9 March 1999, "Missouri Set to Execute"; Court TV website, "Missouri Death Row Inmate Executed After Pope's Futile Plea for Governor's Mercy," 10 March 1999; Evelyn Nieves, "Being in the Wrong Place, *News York Times*, 9 May 1999, *News of the Week in Review.*

[43] Steven Weber, "Prediction and the Middle East Peace Process," *Security Studies* 6 (Spring 1997): 167–79; Janice Gross Stein et al., "Five Scenarios of the Israeli-Palestinian Relationship in 2002: Works in Progress," *Security Studies* 7 (Spring 1998): 195–212; Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, and Steven Weber, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems," *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (March 2000): 43–76.

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Risks that had been unacceptable in the past now became tolerable, even necessary. The independent role of catalysts creates another problem for theories and attempts to evaluate them. All the relevant underlying causes for an outcome may be present, but absent a catalyst it will not occur. The uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes not only renders point prediction impossible; it renders problematic more general statements about the causes of war and system transformations—and many other international phenomena—because we have no way of knowing which of these events would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. We cannot assume that their presence or absence can be treated as random. It is thus impossible to define the universe of such events or to construct a representative sample of them.

The independent role of catalysts in some classes of events also renders statistical tests meaningless because of the impossibility of coding outcomes. If war is the dependent variable, researchers will distinguish between cases or interactions that ended in war from those that did not and look for association between these outcomes and their independent variables. Their results will be misleading if war would have occurred in the presence of their variables if a suitable catalyst had been present. Meaningful statistical studies would require two stage data sets that accounted for this variation.

Theorizing about catalysts is difficult, because they are so often situation specific. It is nevertheless useful to distinguish between situations in which actors are actively looking for an excuse for war and those in which the catalyst reshapes the way they think about the situation, making them more willing than they were previously to consider high-risk options because of the greater perceived costs of inaction. Classic examples of the former include Hitler in 1939 and Lyndon Johnson in 1964; both leaders invented pretexts to go to war when their adversaries failed to provide them. Sarajevo may be the paradigmatic case of the situation in which catalysts play important, independent roles.

Once again, the best way to address the problem of catalysts in specific contexts is likely to be through some form of scenario generation. Analysts can reason forward and ask themselves what kind of event(s) would be required to prompt behavior likely to bring about war, accommodation, and system change. Or they can reason backwards by identifying the kind of events most likely to occur and ask themselves if any of these would serve as effective triggers.

Actors. Most models of political behavior assume instrumental rationality, and this may be the norm in everyday decision making. The evidence from both world wars and from the end of the cold war suggests that this is not true for the series of decisions responsible for system transformations. In all these cases, the behavior in question led to results diametrically opposed to those intended by key actors, and there was ample information available at the time to suggest that this would occur.

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The pathology of German decision making in the two World Wars has been extensively documented. The Austrian case in 1914 is less well-known and provides another striking example of deviance from instrumental rationality. In a seeming fit of emotion, Austrian leaders went to war to uphold the honor of the royal family, crush Serbia, and remove the domestic and foreign threats to the security of their empire. They had no appropriate mobilization plan for coping simultaneously with Serbia and Russia, and could not fight the short war they deemed essential. In a longer war, they recognized they would become increasingly dependent upon Germany and end up losing the very independence they were fighting to maintain. More enigmatic still was their crisis policy that maximized the likelihood that Russia would intervene and confront them with the two-front war they knew they were unprepared to wage.

Gorbachev aides and Western scholars agree that Gorbachev would never have made many key policy decisions if he had realized their probable consequences. This is particularly true of the cluster of decisions and statements that encouraged political change in Eastern Europe and led to the demise of communist regimes, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, unification of Germany within NATO, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. The last of these consequences might still have been averted if Gorbachev had responded earlier and more appropriately to the threat of a coup against him by right-wing forces. None of these failures can be attributed to lack of information; they were the result of faulty strategic conceptions and overconfidence.[44]

Determinists might counter with the argument that some, if not all, of these miscalculations were the result of the structural dilemmas these leaders faced. The claim is unpersuasive because in each instance there were other members of the policy-making elite who advocated different responses and almost certainly would have pursued them if they had been in power. This counterfactual has been explored most systematically in the case of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1990. A forthcoming study analyzes in detail how different leaders in Moscow and Washington would have interacted and makes the case for a variety of possible outcomes, including a continuation, even intensification, of the cold war.[45] If so, the Soviet Union would not have collapsed—at least in the short-term—and the international system would not have been transformed.

Unintended consequences have been described as emergent properties of systems.[46] As presently used in the international relations literature, the concept of emergent properties elides two significantly different consequences. The first and most common are the unanticipated outcomes we would expect in a stable system. Examples include arms races, runs on banks, or the 1990s

[44] See the chapters by Archie Brown, Jacques Lévesque, Raymond L. Garthoff, and James Davis and William Wohlforth in Herrmann and Lebow, *Learning from the Cold War.*

[45] Breslauer and Lebow, "Leadership and the End of the Cold War."

[46] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Jervis, *System Effects*; Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Properties in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

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Asian financial crisis. These phenomena are the aggregated, unintended, and counterproductive result of individual behavior based on instrumentally rational calculations of self-interest. The second kind of consequence, and the one relevant to my argument, consists of those that are doubly unintended. Here, behavior has unintended consequences for the actors and their strategic interaction, and also for the system as a whole. It sets in motion a chain of events that leads to the system's transformation. None of our theories, as presently constituted, can account for this outcome.

Niklas Luhmann suggests that systems are repertories of codes and that outside influences must be translated by the logic of the system to have an effect upon its operation.[47] Outside influences in economics, for example, are translated into prices. Simple structural theories like those of Kenneth Waltz completely ignore outside effects. Waltz acknowledges that an international system can change, but says nothing about how such change might come about. More evolutionary approaches to system—Robert Jervis makes the case for them in his recent book—acknowledge that the structure and operating principles of systems undergo fundamental shifts in response to outside stimuli.[48] World War I and the end of the cold war indicate that systems can also be transformed through their internal operations. These cases point to the existence of a self-referential loop by which actors change their understanding of themselves, the system, and how it operates.

The possibility of system change through actor learning has important implications for the study of international relations. It suggests that structural change may be the product, not the cause, of behavior—the opposite of what most realist theories contend. It also directs our attention to the understandings actors have of each other and of their environments, and how these understandings evolve and become shared, an underlying premises of constructivism. Finally, it constitutes a possible conceptual bridge between scholars in the neopositivist tradition who privilege structures and those in the constructivist tradition who privilege ideas.

[47] Niklas Luhmann, *Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft*, 2 vols. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998), i, chap. 2.

[48] Jervis, *Systems Effects*.

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Book Reviews

Presidential Greatness *by Marc Landy and Sidney M. Milkis. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2000. 280 pp. $34.95.*

In this thoughtful book, Marc Landy and Sidney Milkis examine presidential greatness. The authors maintain that the nation's great presidents provided meaningful democratic leadership, "mastered" democratic politics, founded or refounded a political party, possessed a gifted "rhetorical capacity," and were revolutionaries of a "distinctly conservative stripe." Such leaders "taught the citizenry about the need for great change but also about how to reconcile change with American constitutional traditions and purposes." Even as these presidents "transformed the country," they remained "rooted in a democratic polity that had the wit and self-possession to hold them accountable" (p. 4).

The book has eight chapters, beginning with one on presidential greatness and democratic leadership. Chapters two through six focus on George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, all of whom Landy and Milkis place in the exclusive "great" category. The last president profiled is FDR, whom the authors believe was the last great president. The final two chapters incorporate sketches of the presidents since FDR. The last two chapters are titled, "The Modern Presidency and the Absence of Greatness" and "Conclusion: Where Have You Gone, FDR?" The last chapter's title almost suggests that the book lionizes FDR, which is not the case. At the same time, however, the work is not critical enough of FDR in places where it could be, and that occasionally puts dents in an overall interesting and strong thesis. In an endorsement for the book, James MacGregor Burns correctly notes that some will challenge the authors' view of FDR as the last great president. Landy and Milkis specifically explain how FDR was "great" on pages 198–99 and also, importantly, address the constitutional crisis he provoked on pages 179–82. Moreover, while few will question that FDR was one of the great presidents, especially by the authors' definition, others may find it more problematic to argue that he was the last great president.

The authors say that the "only plausible contender" for presidential greatness in the post-FDR period was Ronald Reagan (p. 219). Their assessment of Reagan is particularly interesting. The former president continues to benefit from positive reappraisals by leading presidential scholars, including James

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MacGregor Burns. "[Reagan] prosecuted the Cold War to a successful conclusion," write Landy and Milkis. This was his "greatest accomplishment." They credit Reagan's expanded military build up and "tough talk" about the Soviet Union (pp. 225–26). "The enormity of the economic and technological challenge posed by this military buildup sapped the Soviets of their remaining vigor." Significantly, they connect Mikhail Gorbachev's actions to Reagan's challenge: "Gorbachev took a great risk by opening up Soviet society, a risk justifiable only as a desperate attempt to reinvigorate the Soviet economy and polity in the face of Reagan's challenge. Absent Reagan's challenge, Gorbachev might have stuck to less risky policies geared toward preserving internal stability, and the Soviet Union might have limped along indefinitely" (p. 226). They rightly assert that Reagan seized the historical opportunity before him.

Yet, despite that accomplishment, the authors make a critical distinction that keeps Reagan out of their FDR league. Dubbing it the "revolution that wasn't," they note that while Reagan's rhetoric challenged the fundamental principles of the New Deal, "for the most part his efforts did not go beyond the strictly rhetorical" (pp. 220–22). FDR achieved his goal of enlarging government much more successfully than Reagan achieved his goal of reducing it. The authors note that Reagan's failure is largely explained by the size of the administrative state he inherited, rather than by a leadership quality. As Max Weber noted long ago, it is infinitely easier to "create bureacracy than to destroy it." Reagan himself once lamented that "the closest we'll ever get to eternal life on this planet is a government program." For these reasons, compared to FDR, Reagan faced a somewhat "unfair" disadvantage in striving for his goal, as the authors acknowledge.

Such measured insights are a key quality of this work. Landy and Milkis have produced a solid work notable for its readability and fairness.

PAUL KENGOR
Grove City College

Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community *by Robert D. Putnam. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2000. 384 pp. $26.00.*

Should those already familiar with Putnam's articles or road show read this book? Yes, absolutely. Both his funders and readers get their money's worth in a treatise of 24 chapters, 96 figures, and 100 pages of appendixes and detailed endnotes. The book is nicely organized and engagingly written. Putnam responds to the criticisms he sought and received beginning with his 1995 "Bowling Alone" article, including finding some incorrect data.

"Bowling alone" is a metaphor for declining civic and social activity. Putnam acknowledges that solo bowling has not actually increased, though driving alone through suburban sprawl evidently has. This decline has led to a corre-

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sponding decrease in "social capital," which "refers to connections among individuals—social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (p. 19). Putnam now makes the clear distinction between social capital "bonding" people within narrow groups, which can have a "darker side," versus "bridging" social capital that can produce broader societal connectedness, trust, and reciprocity. The first known use of "social capital" was "by a practical reformer of the Progressive Era" (p. 19), and the book's last two chapters (which some readers may find a bit utopian) reflect on how that social capital-producing era provides lessons for today. Putnam argues that the production of social capital leads to good economic, social, psychological, and political outcomes, and that the decline in most group activity since the 1960s has deprived Americans of these benefits.

While the decline in voter turnout and political participation is Putnam's lead-in, the book is sweepingly sociological and broad, so that his political behavior critics will still have more to say. The book's strongest evidence is its wide variety of data consisting of different measures that impressively and persuasively track essentially the same decline in civic and social engagement and its possible causes and consequences. Putnam's survey data sources include the General Social Surveys, conducted since 1972 by the National Opinion Research Center (though p. 419 incorrectly reads: "Roughly every other year since 1974 the National Opinion Research Corporation at the University of Chicago . . . "); the rich but less well known Roper Organization's (now Roper Starch Worldwide) Social and Political Trends data; and virtually unknown to academics, the DDB Needham Life Style surveys. (Putnam effectively shows how these self-selected "mail panels" provide reliable data for his purpose.)

Chapters 2-5 show all of the strikingly similar declines since the 1960s and 1970s in many forms of political, civic, religious, and work-related participation and social engagement. These declines occurred after prior increases, which is also central to Putnam's case. Chapter 8 shows that these trends are indicative of declining social capital; they go together with increases in public cynicism toward interpersonal trust, reciprocity, and honesty. While Putnam rightly emphasizes the decline in comparison to earlier in the twentieth century, religious participation still remains objectively high and Americans still participate in many activities at higher levels than their counterparts in other countries. At worst, this might be a fall-off to a societal norm that is still a comparatively high level of social engagement.

Putnam shows that there is also a fall-off in informal socializing and connectedness (Chapter 5), paralleling that for organized group activity. In contrast, there have been some changes in opposition to this tide: a noticeable rise in altruistic or charitable volunteer activity, particularly among youths (chapter 7); a rise in activity by evangelical conservative groups, self-help support groups, and other new small groups that Putnam had left out earlier (there may still be other groups unaccounted for, but critics will have to find them); and the growth of the internet and other communication technology, the effects of

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which on social capital are still unclear (Chapter 9). Thus far, however, these trends fall short of offsetting the more pervasive decline in social connectedness.

Chapters 10-15 examine the possible explanations for civic disengagement. While TV and the TV generation are still prominent explanations (contributing to an estimated 25 percent of the decline), the most far-reaching and profound ones are the disappearance of the highly mobilized and civic-minded World War II generation (explaining as much as 50 percent of the decline!), pressures on two-career families (10 percent), and increasingly relevant, the increase in commuting time and other changes that come with suburbanization and sprawl (10 percent). Putnam rules out much effect of the growth of all domestic government spending on private activity, but surely the growth of social welfare spending since the 1960s (including especially Social Security and health care) should have lessened the need for charitable activity and giving, which makes the rise in volunteering even more impressive. Clearly, from a pure rational choice perspective, social engagement and group activity have to become increasingly attractive in terms of benefits versus costs to compete with people's other alternatives, time constraints, and generational predispositions; it's not just TV.

Chapters 16-22 examine the many positive effects of social capital: better education and child welfare, safer and better off neighborhoods, economic prosperity, physical and psychological health and happiness, and democratic values and equality. Even though there are lingering questions about what's causing what (the book does not use statistical methods that can disentangle two-way causation), there is little doubt that social capital has many positive effects. While Putnam uses state-level data to show the expected cross-sectional correlations, he does not report declines over time for many of the outcome indicators. Other influences, such as improvements in medical care and the physical quality of life in the case of objective health indicators, can offset any effects of declining social capital. The "so what" question is a complex one, and the trends for outcome measures do not all parallel those of social capital. There is still lots left to answer and argue over at the end of this great book.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
Columbia University

Reelection: William Jefferson Clinton as a Native-Son Presidential Candidate *by Hanes Walton, Jr. New York, Columbia University Press, 2000. 343 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $22.00.*

Southern partisan realignment was regional change with massive national consequences. It made the Democrats seem a liberal party and the Republicans a conservative party, and it gave Republicans an Electoral College edge.

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Building on his 1992 study of Jimmy Carter, Hanes Walton, Jr. argues here that a "native-son" candidate is the Democrat's counter to the Republican South. Southerners—Lyndon Johnson, Jimmy Carter, and Bill Clinton—achieved the four Democratic successes in presidential politics since the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Walton argues that the native-son variable attracts voters in the region, as well as the home state, across party lines.

This book develops a native-son theory and examines its utility, applied to Bill Clinton's electoral performance in Arkansas. Using county-level voting data for all of Clinton's campaigns, 1974 to 1996, Walton analyzes support for Clinton across five types of Arkansas counties. They are urban, town, rural counties; Clinton's two home counties; and predominantly African-American, black belt counties. Within these counties, Walton finds continuities in support for Clinton across elections, but he finds the highest and most stable support for Clinton in the black-belt counties.

Walton argues that Clinton's consistent appeal to black voters in his home state was in turn a key to building crucial support among African Americans outside the South in the 1992 Democratic presidential primary. He writes: "Clinton . . . used local African-American notables to help legitimize him to northern African-American voters. . . " (p. 225).

Influenced by V. O. Key, Walton argues that southern elections, partisanship, and voting must be studied historically and contextually. This useful book's inquiry into Clinton's home state electoral support offers interesting evidence for the way an electorate supports a political career and responds to a rising native-bred politician going national. However, Walton's approach also has limitations. His approach is indirect; the native son is studied by examining the electorate's response to him. Yet without focusing also on the politician, we fail to learn what it is about such candidates that enables them to evoke home state and regional support while achieving national success.

What is it about a native background that makes a candidate effective to a home state electorate? How does the candidate appeal to southern voters while extending his or her identity to national politics? Walton does not attempt a systematic treatment of Clinton in light of his election history. Nor is the author systematic in his treatment of Clinton's policy initiatives in relationship to his electorate.

In a singular exception to his inattention to Clinton's policy commitments, Walton offers a brief account of the evolution of Clinton's centrist position and his relationship to the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). Sometimes referring to Clinton's position as conservative, and sometimes moderate, Walton fails to set Clinton into the larger, national movement through which some Democrats, northerners as well as southerners, repositioned their party.

A reader might want more from Walton, but he achieves his main goal of conceptualizing the native-son variable and illustrating how it affects voters in the Clinton case. Along the way, this book makes a case for the utility to Democrats of the native-child electoral strategy. But native-sons/daughters need not

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be Democrats. Walton mentions the prospect of a Republican native-child only as an afterthought at the book's end. Political life is about to complicate Walton's theoretical perspective, as two southern candidates face off in the 2000 presidential election. We shall soon learn whether a Republican native-son can neutralize the Democrats' benefit from this factor.

PERI E. ARNOLD
University of Notre Dame

The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance *by James H. Mittelman. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000. 286 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $17.95.*

Globalization is not a single unified phenomenon, but a syndrome of processes and activities that are imbedded in a dominant set of ideas largely influenced by liberal, free-market economics. While it is market-induced, James Mittelman argues effectively that it is not market-determined and that the hegemony of neoliberal ideals is not universal. Building on insights garnered from Karl Polanyi's conception of a "double movement," defined by the orchestrated rise of a liberal market on one hand and the recoiling of groups seeking protection from its deleterious effects on the other, Mittelman analyzes the repercussions of globalization on society, the attempts by states, nonstate- and transstate-actors to exploit economic globalization to their advantage, as well as the efforts by a variety of agents in civil society to resist and challenge globalization. He develops the concept of the global division of labor and power (GDLP) to examine the social repercussions of hypercompetition produced by the growth of global commodity chains and the interlinking networks they create between multiple production processes, buyers, and sellers.

Mittelman anchors his argument in the works of Polanyi, Fernand Braudel, and Antonio Gramsci, as well as a wide range of research by scholars representing the competing viewpoints of neoliberalism, neorealism, and Marxism among others. Mittelman's informed references to current and historical theories and debates within political science and economics make this book a refreshing and rewarding change from the plethora of books on globalization written for more popular audiences. His use of data regarding labor and labor migration, poverty and gender, the environment, and crime to analyze globalization is intriguing and adds to the book's unique contributions to the literature on globalization. Case studies from Southern Africa and Eastern Asia are also welcomed, though they are more limited in scope than the book's advertised claim that it builds on findings and viewpoints that reflect mainly those of the non-Western world. A broader analysis of non-Western countries or regions combined with an expanded discussion of the case selection criteria would placate more inquisitive readers.

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One of the most important insights in this book is its focus on power as a critical component of globalization. Power, according to Mittelman, is central to the global division of labor, the efforts of states and other actors to exploit globalization to their advantage, the hegemony of ideas (especially economic liberalism), and resistance efforts. Mittelman rejects structural views of power and focuses instead on the ability of agents to exercise power using a variety of objective physical resources and subjective factors (such as trust, legitimacy, and community). The focus on agency is intriguing because it suggests a definition of power as control over outcomes. Unfortunately, while Mittelman cites a wide range of activities by states, cities, and members of civil society intended to exploit or challenge globalization as examples of power, it is not always clear what outcomes have resulted from agents' actions or what combination of actions and events can explain the changes that did occur. Some examples of resistance, in particular, may be the result of a wide variety of conditions (including but not limited to globalization), and many have a negligible impact on globalization or its effects. A better-specified definition of power would satisfy critical readers.

In sum, by focusing on power relations and by arguing that states and a variety of agents in civil society are active rather than passive participants in the globalization syndrome, Mittelman's book provides important insights into how global market forces may be influenced by, and as a consequence, imbedded in society.

GEORGE E. SHAMBAUGH
Georgetown University

Argument without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy
by Robert S. McNamara. New York, Public Affairs, 2000. 512 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $17.00.

This book is based on the conference format developed by McNamara and his academic associates in the early 1990s, when they reassessed American, Soviet, and Cuban decision making in the missile crisis of 1962. After seven conferences with their North Vietnamese counterparts, McNamara has put the essence of their dramatic and in some cases informative encounters.

In one sense the results are a disappointment. One gets the sense that McNamara still believes that American decisions were rational and that a combination of the fates and North Vietnamese irrationality led to escalation and a military and political quagmire. McNamara refers twice to "the removal of Diem" in the passive voice (p. 165) without indicating the level of U.S. responsibility. He claims that Lyndon B. Johnson's decisions a few days after John F. Kennedy's assassination involved continuation of the Kennedy policy and argues that the new president wanted to stay out of the conflict and resisted mili-

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tary pressure to do so. Thus the historical prefaces that accompany each section of transcript must be treated with caution and taken with tons of salt.

Even so, the transcripts themselves are extraordinarily valuable. I will focus on just one section, dealing with escalation in 1964–1965. The American side believed that the raid on Pleiku, which resulted in the deaths of many American military advisers, was a deliberate signal from Hanoi that it was not prepared to negotiate a solution, but intended to escalate the war. The United States responded with a major bombing campaign against the North. It turned out, according to the Vietnamese interlocutors at the conferences held in June 1997 and February 1998 in Hanoi, that the local North Vietnamese commanders had simply seized the opportunity to inflict maximum damage on the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam (ARVN) forces in the area, and they were unaware of the presence of American advisers with the ARVN, nor of Alexei Kosygyn in Hanoi and of McGeorge Bundy in Saigon at the time.

These revelations reveal, in a way not intended by McNamara, the limits of the American learning curve. Local unit initiative had accounted in 1962 for the shooting down of a U-2 plane at the height of the Cuban missile crisis and for various other incidents at sea; yet it seems that McNamara's men, even after having gone through that experience, brought none of its lessons to bear in analyzing the Pleiku attack. In the late 1990s it came as a complete surprise to them that the attack could have been anything other than a deliberate signal. Similarly, of course, they were caught off-base in the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which McNamara personally briefed the president on the details of a second attack that it turned out later had not even occurred. This incident also involved the initiative of a local North Vietnamese naval commander who was fed up with OPLAN-34 (operational plan) attacks and DESOTO reconnaissance missions (U.S. destroyers listening in on North Vietnamese electronic traffic) in his sector.

And so McNamara and company finally reach a conclusion in the late 1990s that they might have come to three decades before: there was a chance for a negotiated solution in the mid-1960s; the North Vietnamese side was not monolithic at the top or on the battlefield; and the analysis prepared in early 1965 about North Vietnamese intentions was fatally flawed.

These transcripts will help scholars (and practitioners) in the future to decide for themselves if the "signaling" approach to deterrence, compellence, and other game theoretical approaches to conflict makes any sense. McNamara himself is pretty clear at the end of the day that the U.S. side saw signals that weren't there and missed signals that were there. Still perhaps to come (one awaits a final volume in the confessions of McNamara) is the realization on the part of the American side that the North Vietnamese acted quite rationally throughout the conflict; that the American side intervened initially and escalated thereafter in a fundamentally irrational way, that U.S. decision making needs to be reconstructed to develop new methods of rational thinking and act-

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ing; and that in the argument without end, it is their adversaries who come off as the serious men.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College

Hong Kong's Embattled Democracy: A Societal Analysis *by Alvin Y. So. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 309 pp. $45.00.*

The British hand-over of Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China on 1 July 1997 brought worldwide attention to this small territory in South China. Alvin So's detailed account of the political development of Hong Kong puts the 1997 hand-over into perspective. He takes readers back two decades prior to 1997 to put Hong Kong's democracy into the context of negotiations leading to the 1984 Sino-British joint declaration, the struggle over the 1990 Basic Law, and other key benchmarks. The account is lucid and thorough, exceeding anything that has preceded it.

One of So's tasks is to make sense of the restricted democracy that characterizes Hong Kong. He notes that Hong Kong's economic circumstances and level of development predict a more advanced democracy. The construct at the center of So's analysis is the service professional, whom he argues is a force liberalizing Hong Kong's democracy in the face of counterpressures from the business elite and Beijing.

Although the book will appeal to individuals who are interested in Hong Kong, scholars seeking larger lessons or powerful analytic tools applied to the case of Hong Kong's political development may be disappointed. The service professional construct is not a powerful analytic tool. So criticizes the inexactness of Samuel Huntington's concept of the middle class. Yet his definition of service professional is similarly imprecise. His most direct attempt to denote service professionals is "a service segment of college professors and social workers (who work in the state and nonprofit sectors)" (p. 11). Arguing that such a service class is responsible for the rise of the democracy movement in Hong Kong leaves many questions unanswered, such as why Hong Kong democracy is, in the final analysis, so highly constrained. Although the book sheds a great deal of light on questions about Hong Kong's political development, So is frequently compelled to abandon the service professional explanation to account for them.

Another weakness of the class-based explanation is that it does not readily integrate other aspects of the dynamics that have shaped Hong Kong's democracy. So is critical of Siu-Kai Lau's "one-sided" (p. 10) view of democracy as rule by elites, opting instead for a class explanation. The limitation of So's alternative is that it is also one-sided. In addition to the either-or character of the analysis, So fails to weave personalities into his explanation. People such as

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Chris Patten, Hong Kong's last governor, and Martin Lee, head of the United Democrats, were important parts of the mix. The analytic framework that So offers does not readily accommodate these different threads of the rich fabric that is Hong Kong's political development.

So's narrative provides ample room for alternative hypotheses about Hong Kong's political development that are never explicitly confronted. A shifting-alliances thesis surfaces occasionally throughout the text. It is more interesting and more satisfying as an explanation of Hong Kong's political development than the service professional thesis. Furthermore, So spends little effort reconciling anomalies in the service professional explanation, such as the existence of both pro- and antidemocracy service professional groups.

A minor shortcoming of the book, tempered by the recognition of the difficulty of doing direct research in Hong Kong, is So's reliance on secondary sources to tell the story of Hong Kong's political development. Previous histories of the period play a large role in his research. Given So's proximity to many of the players, it is surprising that he did not use interviews and other forms of direct research to delve further into the motivations, strategies, and tactics of participants.

Despite my criticisms, this is an important contribution to the political sociology of Hong Kong. Scholars interested in Hong Kong or political development generally will appreciate the clear and thorough descriptions of the territory's evolution during the last twenty years.

JAMES L. PERRY
Indiana University, Bloomington

Clinton's World: Remaking American Foreign Policy *by William G. Hyland. Westport, CT, Praeger Publishers, 1999. 230 pp. $24.95.*

William Hyland has written a superb book on Bill Clinton's foreign policy. The former editor of *Foreign Affairs* identifies important dimensions of the post-cold war era: the United States as sole superpower, unrest in the Middle East, ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia, uncertain U.S. relations with China and Japan, the apparent transformation of the USSR from empire to nation, reunification of Germany, and U.S. intervention in Somalia and Haiti.

For President Clinton, foreign policy was second to domestic policy, especially in his first term. Yet Clinton, like Hyland, is an internationalist; the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are high on his agenda. For Hyland, the foreign policy debate is no longer between internationalists and isolationists. It is between realists who base foreign policy on the national interest conceived in geographic and resource terms and globalism, largely disinterested in geostrategic calculations. Within the Clinton ad-

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ministration, the weight of globalist thinking tended to overwhelm national interest views. At the outset, the three most influential globalists were Anthony Lake, Strobe Talbott, and Secretary Madeleine Albright, the first two embracing the Vietnam syndrome and Albright the Munich syndrome. Their views were "woefully unrealistic" (p. 31), Hyland asserts.

Globalism found its clearest application in the policy statement delivered by Lake at Johns Hopkins University on 21 September 1993, in which he argued that the purpose of American power was to preserve, promote, and protect democracies. The enlargement of democracy was to replace the containment of communism. Ignored was the fact that democracies are not necessarily a country's most reliable partners. Democratic wars are often avoided through appeal to national interests. Regarding the concept that democracies never fight wars with one another, Hyland calls it a "witches' brew, too vague to be a guide to practical policy" (p. 25). Only a few Clinton officials opposed it, notably Undersecretary Peter Tarnoff. His views were quickly disavowed by Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

Hyland traces the effects of Clinton's witches' brew through a series of crises, but first he shows the effects of Clinton's priorities. By giving priority to economics and domestic politics, the president's foreign policy suffered. When hard choices were required to intervene or not in Bosnia, Clinton more likely was preoccupied with a domestic crisis. When the British and French opposed his "lift and strike plan," Clinton, announced a new plan with a flourish while sending off Secretary Christopher without mandate to meet with allies in Europe. Meantime, the president did little to build a consensus for the secretary's effort and the policy was doomed before it started. Hyland may lean too heavily on Bob Woodward's account. Much as Jimmy Carter failed in building consensus within the bureaucracy for his policies, Clinton failed because he was less at home in international politics and because he found domestic politics more engaging.

At the heart of the book are the case studies in which Hyland builds on his own extensive knowledge and experience in the foreign policy process. He seeks to demonstrate the high cost of applying the witches' brew to intervention in Somalia and Haiti and the lack of clarity in policy making for Bosnia and Kosovo. The chapter on intervention is a centerpiece for his critique. It is followed by "Nation Building," in which he argues that although the Bush policy for Somalia was a hurried response to the public's reactions to media coverage of famine and starvation, the great flaw in Clinton's policy was to attempt to establish Somalia's national government. Clinton's policy also reveals some of Ambassador Albright's illusions. She charged the UN with the task of "lifting Somalia from a failed state to an emerging democracy" (p. 57). Haiti was more successful, perhaps because of the roles President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and General Clayton Powell played. However, Haiti, along with Bosnia and Somalia, became "a three-part indictment" of Clinton's mismanagement of foreign affairs (p. 64).

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Concluding chapters address the problems of Clinton's policies for Russia, European security, Asia, and Japan. In important respects "humanitarian interventionism" remains Clinton's primary illusion in foreign policy. "End Game" and "Between Hope and History" conclude the discussion. For the present, Hyland's book, despite its limitations, is the strongest analytical study we have of Clinton's foreign policy.

KENNETH W. THOMPSON
University of Virginia

Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future *by Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis. Santa Monica, CA, RAND Publishers, 2000. 296 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $20.00.*

This study attempts an exceedingly difficult task: to identify and analyze the major factors determining China's grand strategy in order to understand the motives behind China's strategic behavior and predict how such behavior might evolve in the future, both near- and long-term. The authors, working exclusively from secondary sources, do not question whether there is a grand strategy: they state at the outset that despite the fact that it has never been explicitly articulated by China's rulers, "there is little doubt that China, like any other state, has pursued a grand strategy..." (p. ix). This they summarize as, first, the preservation of domestic order and well-being in the face of different forms of social strife; second, the defense against persistent external threats to national sovereignty and territory; and third, the attainment and maintenance of geopolitical influence as a major and perhaps primary state.

While unassailable, this description is of such a level of generality as to be of limited value in distinguishing China from most other political systems. There is also the unaddressed problem of what constitutes China. The Chinese cultural area, which was not always organized into a single state, expanded from a small part of what is today the near northwest of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The largest entities to include China were the Yuan and Qing dynasties, neither of which was ruled by (Han) Chinese. China's grand strategy might, therefore, alternately be described as annexation of the periphery: whether this is defensive or offensive will be in the eye of the beholder. With regard to the matter of sovereignty, the concept did not exist until militarily stronger Westerners forced it upon a reluctant Qing dynasty in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Given a mindset that only Chinese civilization mattered, all others were barbarians; the concept of sovereign states, each omnipotent within its borders and voting as equals in supranational organizations, was unthinkable.

More helpful in predicting the future is the present day, in which China has explicitly accepted the concept of sovereignty and has borders that are in the main clearly demarcated. The authors hypothesize that, assuming continued

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high economic growth and domestic political and social stability, an assertive China is likely to appear. Because the United States is apt to resist challenges to its position as the established hegemon of the international system, friction between the two may result. Swaine and Tellis caution against both preemptive containment and preemptive appeasement. So long as there is some chance that Chinese assertiveness may not occur for various reasons, American strategy should neither create the preconditions for its occurrence nor retreat in the expectation that its occurrence is inevitable.

This advice is sound but so broadly phrased as to be of little help in formulating specific policies. It should also be noted that economic growth has slowed, while domestic political and social instability is rising. As evidenced by strong statements in international fora and actions against Taiwan and in the South China Sea, an assertive China already exists. The accuracy of the authors' statement that the PRC has thus far been able to increase its strength without greatly unnerving its partners in the interim (p. 141) depends, of course, on one's definition of "greatly." This reviewer believes that, for example, Japan's decision to seek a closer alliance with the United States after the PRC's menacing behavior toward Taiwan in 1995–1996 and India's citing Beijing's growing power as the major reason for its nuclear testing in 1998 indicate that they are more than moderately unnerved. In the end, China's grand strategy, if one believes it has one, remains elusive.

JUNE TEUFEL DREYER
University of Miami, Florida.

A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza *by Rex Brynen. Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000. 296 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

Setting up the Palestinian governing system has involved massive financial assistance from United Nations agencies, international financial institutions, and foreign governments. Donors have supported salaries for civil servants and the police, rehabilitation of the long-neglected infrastructure, and the strengthening of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Rex Brynen, a political scientist at McGill University, examines the complex political processes required to mobilize, coordinate, deliver, and allocate assistance. He analyzes donor-donor turf wars as well as examples of successful coordination and flexibility. His candid analysis is valuable for policy makers and aid officials who work in a wide variety of contexts.

Brynen details the complex relations between donors and the Palestinian Authority (PA), created in mid-1994. The cash-starved PA assumed responsibility for the civil service, police, schools, and hospitals, and initially had to rely on foreign funding to cover those costs. The PA also tried to respond to the

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pent-up demand for improved health care, education, and water supplies, the result of a quarter century of Israeli neglect. Tackling the productive economic sectors was just as difficult, given their sharp decline under Israeli rule, a process analyzed best by Sara Roy in *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-development.* Agriculture continues to be neglected, partly because farmland lies in Area C, outside the PA's jurisdiction.

Brynen criticizes the bloated PA bureaucracy, interministerial competition, corruption, and lack of financial transparency. These result primarily from President Yasir Arafat's personalized control over finances and his deliberate fostering of corruption, characteristics detailed by Yezid Sayigh in *Armed Struggle and the Search for State* and Glenn E. Robinson in *Building a Palestinian State.* Brynen concedes that donors largely failed to curtail Arafat, because of his perceived centrality to the peace process. Nonetheless, he argues, donors have cut back on direct budgetary support and have helped the PA establish financial management systems. Assisting NGOs is seen as a way to promote independent institutions and limit the authoritarian reach of the state.

Brynen sharply criticizes Israeli actions in the mid-1990s: "The single largest reason for poor Palestinian economic performance was Israel's policy of periodic closure of the territories" (p. 64). Closure blocked travel between Gaza and the West Bank, between the territories and Jerusalem, and even within the West Bank. Closure cost millions of dollars in lost employment and exports, delayed infrastructural projects, and undercut investment. Per capita GNP fell by 21 percent between 1992 and 1998 and unemployment soared. The difficulties were compounded by Israel's failure to implement agreements to open a "safe passage" between Gaza and the West Bank, allow a seaport and an airport in Gaza, and create industrial estates to absorb Palestinian labor. As a result, foreign funders felt compelled to underwrite the PA's budget and its make-work job-creation programs even after the PA began to collect taxes. Donors worried that their compensatory assistance eased the pressure on Israel to reopen the borders; they also feared that the Palestinians' desperation would endanger the peace process.

Brynen's skillful analysis will be valuable for practitioners and scholars alike. He is often cautious in his criticism of the donor community, and he could provide more detail on the problems within the PA and NGOs. Nonetheless, he provides behind-the-scenes insights into a high-stakes project in state building toward which the international community has a major commitment.

ANN MOSELY LESCH
Villanova University

Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War *by Frances FitzGerald. New York, Simon & Schuster, 2000. 592 pp. $30.00.*

The story of Ronald Reagan and the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is wildly implausible. The fervent presidential endorsement of an idea that almost all

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experts believed to be impractical; the spending of billions of dollars for no gain; decisions being made without consultation with cabinet officers, let alone others in the government or our NATO allies; people frequently espousing views they privately ridiculed; top officials publicly contradicting the president and each other; and improvised arms control negotiations that were saved from a successful and disastrous conclusion by top leaders maintaining positions that rested on assumptions they were undermining; and, finally, a happy ending in which first the Soviet threat and then the Soviet Union itself dissolves. It would make a good movie and *Way Out There in the Blue* would not be a bad screenplay.

As a book, however, its value depends on how much the reader already knows. Those who are unfamiliar with the standard accounts but are interested enough to read 500 quite lively pages on the subject will find a gold mine of information and stories, most of them frightening and true. But for those in the field, there is little new information and or sustained analysis.

The picture of Reagan is vivid if familiar. No more than anyone else can FitzGerald explain the combination of passionate commitment to certain goals and lack of interest in what his government was doing in the world, which remains even more puzzling than the contradiction between the charm he could project and his inability to form close friendships or treat his subordinates in a way that engendered loyalty. The picture of the feuds within the government, although again not basically different from other accounts, makes it clear that the dysfunctional machinery of policy making mirrored and magnified the bizarre leadership at the top.

FitzGerald does a good job of collecting the alternative accounts of the origins of SDI and showing the falsity of the most popular account that dates Reagan's conversion from his trip to NORAD headquarters in the summer of 1979, when he supposedly learned for the first time that the United States had no defense against missiles. In a few other areas, she makes interesting claims but cannot sustain them. Thus she attributes Reagan's Star Wars speech to the popularity of the nuclear freeze movement and the growth of the SDI program after its initial hostile reception to the improvement in Soviet-American relations, which reduced public fear of enraging the USSR. This may be true, but FitzGerald does not give us any evidence. She is on firmer ground in arguing that for many of its supporters, SDI was attractive because it was an excellent weapon against arms control. Looking only at the American side, FitzGerald does not try to tell us what the effect of SDI was on the Soviet Union.

Although FitzGerald's account of the Reykjavik summit is, contrary to her claims, conventional, it does bring out the basic paradoxes of the program. It never had any real chance of providing population defense and yet it not only played a large role in American domestic politics and foreign policy, but also drove the Soviets into both strong opposition and the willingness to make major concessions. It would have been a great bargaining chip if Reagan had been willing to treat it as such. But if he had been willing to take this stance, he never would have been able to mobilize the support that was necessary to give it any

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credibility. Furthermore, at the end of frantic summit bargaining an agreement to give up at least ballistic missiles foundered on the rock of SDI. Yet if missiles were abolished, the United States would not need such defenses and the Soviets would not have to fear them. But perhaps the ultimate twist is that the agreement that SDI prevented would have driven the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the American defense establishment into open rebellion and torn NATO apart.

A final oddity is that it is never clear whether the president—or the author—understood that in any war it was much more likely that the United States would launch a first nuclear strike (in response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe) than that it would retaliate. In this context, SDI makes a little more sense.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Good Advice: Information and Policy Making in the White House *by Daniel E. Ponder. College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2000. 250 pp. $39.95.*

The expansion of executive branch responsibilities that dates back to the rise of the modern presidency under Franklin D. Roosevelt has spurred an increase in the number of people who staff the branch, most notably with the creation of the White House Office and the Executive Office of the President. How the president manages this large staff, which pursues different and sometimes competing political interests, is an important topic in the study of the presidency. Daniel E. Ponder makes a significant contribution to this field with his creative and well-developed model for analyzing the White House staff's effect on policy making.

Building upon the new institutionalist scholarly literature on the presidency, Ponder presents a theory of "staff shift" to explain how presidents use advice in making policy decisions. He finds that while presidents typically try to centralize policy making within the White House (consistent with the new institutionalism's focus on a president's political interests), the degree of centralization depends upon the type of policy. As he writes, "No one process, or identifiable set of interactions, dominates all advising. Rather, process and roles shift as presidential incentives and staff resources expand or contract" (p. 17). Ponder proposes that a president's staff employs three basic strategies in presenting advice to the president: policy director, policy facilitator, and policy monitor. These strategies range from centralized White House policy coordination (policy director), to delegation of policy making to executive departments or agencies (policy monitor), to a combination of the two (policy facilitator).

To test his theory, Ponder focuses on domestic policy making in the Carter administration. His use of six case studies—one example of each strategy's suc-

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cess and failure—compensates for the difficulties of generalizing from a single presidential administration. Ponder applies his theory to Carter's policy-making efforts on youth employment, energy, civil service reform, education, welfare reform, and national health insurance. He finds that staff advisement in the first three areas proved successful through the strategies of director, facilitator, and monitor, respectively; while advisement for the latter three failed via the same respective strategies. In each successful case, the degree of White House control varied, but policy making was well coordinated between the White House and other executive branch advisers. In the policy failures, the White House staff typically lost control of the policy-making process, and the advisers in charge of the initiative failed to pay attention to both substantive policy debates and political concerns.

Ponder carefully demonstrates how his staff shift theory fits into the scholarly literature on presidential advisement, and his clearly written analysis contains an engaging and thorough evaluation of the contributions of the new institutionalist approach. His case studies raise several theoretically interesting questions for future research: What factors determine which of the three strategies will be used? Which strategy appears most promising for presidents and why? Does success for all three strategies depend fundamentally upon White House coordination, and if so, does that affirm the importance of White House centralization? The comprehensive research in this book invites comparative analysis of the three strategies, and some more explicit attention to such comparisons would be helpful. Still, the ambitious theoretical framework presents ample opportunity for further examining and evaluating the influence of staff advisement.

In developing a theory to explain how presidential advisers shape the policy-making process, Ponder identifies a systematic method for understanding the increasing institutionalization of the presidency and the varying roles that individual presidents and advisers can exercise in that process. His detailed and well-researched analysis provides an impressive theoretical base for future scholarship on the presidency.

MEENA BOSE
United States Military Academy

Working in the World: Jimmy Carter and the Making of American Foreign Policy *by Robert A. Strong. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2000. 294 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $24.95.*

During his presidency, Jimmy Carter helped achieve the Panama Canal treaties, the Camp David Accords, the transition to majority rule in Rhodesia, the formal recognition of China, negotiation of the SALT II agreement, and the emphasis on human rights. Yet to this day many historians have judged him a

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failure. They have viewed his flexibility and willingness as signs of weakness and uncertainty. To them, he was ever the engineer bogged down in details. In this thoughtful and incisive book, Robert Strong sets out to revise that view. Rather than survey the entire Carter presidency, Strong presents nine case studies chosen not because they are the most significant events, but more because of what they reveal about Carter's conduct of foreign policy. They include the early Senate battle over the nomination of Paul Warnke as arms control negotiator, the neutron bomb controversy, and the Soviet brigade in Cuba, as well as more memorable events such as the fall of the shah, Camp David, and "America held hostage" in Iran.

One chapter that represents the strengths of this book is the analysis of Carter's 1978 speech at Annapolis. Carter and his advisers saw this occasion as an opportunity to clarify the administration's approach to Soviet-American relations. But rather than resolve public speculation about a rift between the hardline anticommunism of National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and the more accommodating approach of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the speech contained elements of both. A year later, former White House speechwriter James Fallows offered an explanation for the apparent confusion. According to Fallows, Carter simply stapled together conflicting memos from both Brzezinski and Vance. Numerous historians have since taken that explanation at face value. By carefully examining the drafting process, Strong shows that Carter contributed substantially to the speech. He sought to strike a balance between firmness and accommodation. More important, Carter articulated a central theme of his foreign policy: the principles of human rights and democracy would shape future Soviet-American relations. Despite Carter's efforts, Strong admits that the speech was a failure. It did nothing to deter Soviet aggression in Afghanistan a year later, nor did it assuage those who criticized the president for failing to reconcile the divisions among his advisers.

Strong argues that in this instance and throughout his presidency Carter was "an active, intelligent, sincere individual in command of a complicated foreign policy agenda that often involved the conscious acceptance of substantial political risk" (pp. 274-275). The articulation of a human rights agenda was the kind of overarching principle Fallows and others charged that Carter sacrificed to his passion for detail. Strong concludes that Carter was unable to alter these perceptions, not because he "lacked principles or passions," but because "he often demonstrated an impolitic indifference to matters of public relations" (p. 121). Not until the summer of 1978 did the president have an adviser to deal with spin control.

As a political outsider, Carter did not seem to fully grasp that in Washington, and unfortunately sometimes in the writing of history, perceptions can become realities. Strong recognizes, but does not stress as much as he might, that as a Washington outsider Carter did not fully grasp the symbolic role of the presidency. He saw it more as a job than an adventure. Nor does the case study approach readily lend itself to contextualizing Carter's failings in the larger his-

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tory of the presidency. Strong does not weigh hostility to an imperial presidency or the residue of Vietnam and Watergate as factors that made the Carter White House a target for so much criticism.

This is a book remarkably free of jargon disguised as theory. Through his cogent analysis of Carter, Strong explains much about how the presidency functions. He has corrected many of the misconceptions that dogged Carter as president and after. His case studies are models of historical detection that will engage readers from the college campus to the foreign policy community.

MARK H. LYTLE
Bard College

America's Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt *by Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Lawrence Westbrook. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. 390 pp. $32.50.*

Roughly 10 percent of this nation lived through bankruptcy in the last decade; countless households now hover on the brink. This excellent study of the apparent paradox of surging bankruptcy filings during a period of prosperity explores the contingent relationship between market, policy, cultural, and individual factors—largely through an analysis of 2,400 cases generated by five states. Five causes account for nearly all cases: employment problems, named in two-thirds of all petitions; medical emergencies; divorce; home mortgages; and consumer debt—the crucial factor that bleeds a family's funds during financial crises.

The authors make three broad claims. First, personal accounts and court records indicate that middle-class Americans file most bankruptcy claims. Second, structural factors such as corporate policies explain bankruptcy trends better than does a debtor's irresponsibility or strategic behavior. Third, citizens and policy makers should recognize that in other developed nations a middle-class social safety net—comprised of health care policies and safeguards for workers facing corporate restructuring, for example—serves to lessen a family's reliance on credit in crisis times. Extensive data collection and analysis support the first, and to a lesser extent, the second claims; the third argument follows from them.

Most of the book describes the class profile of petitioners. Their lower earnings are usually a product of a temporary decrease in income, and petitioners do seem to represent a cross section of America. By age, education, and occupation, filers cluster near the means and medians of the national population. But is the median the best conceptualization of middle class? Many social scientists would dispute the claim that the U.S. median annual income of $36,400 is the data point that anchors the middle class, for households may not be distributed among classes in a normal curve. Still, the bankrupt generally fall in the

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middle range of Americans and appear to be more prosperous and educated than previously thought. This conceptualization of class underpins the claim that "something similar could happen to the most stolidly middle class of any of us" (p. 72).

The authors reveal many interesting patterns and anomalies in the data. Debtors are much more likely to be divorced than the general population, and women are more likely to cite divorce as a cause of bankruptcy. African Americans are somewhat over-represented in the casework; all other minority groups are under-represented. The bankruptcy-prosperity paradox is here resolved by describing the nation's uneven brand of prosperity, in which corporate profit-taking produces significant pockets of unprotected, failed entrepreneurs and unemployed, part-time, and contract workers with limited social support.

The culture's sense of prosperity also raises expectations and promotes careless spending patterns. Not coincidentally, credit card debt doubled between 1993 and 1999. Roughly eight or nine out of ten debtors carry some all-purpose credit card debt. While the debt-income ratio of filers has remained largely the same in three studies beginning in 1981, there are now many more of these very troubled debtors. In this account, the embrace of easy but very expensive credit followed from the deregulation of interest rates in the 1970s and 1980s and the subsequent marketing of accounts—with once-usurious interest rates—to many more Americans.

Policy makers and academic specialists must now contend with this meticulously and widely-researched analysis of a vast new data set concerning the social, political, and business origins of bankruptcy. The other claims concerning corporate responsibility and safety-net reform are both more provocative and somewhat more difficult to verify than the first. While the overarching model might have profited from more sustained and better-documented presentations of these points, this is nonetheless a powerful and challenging interpretation of bankruptcy as a simmering, pervasive social problem governed by what is in effect a poorly designed—and widely misunderstood—federal social policy.

DANIEL KRYDER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

From Obstruction to Moderation: The Transformation of Senate Conservatism, 1938-1952 *by John W. Malsberger. Selinsgrove, PA, Susquehanna University Press, 2000. 320 pp. $47.50.*

John Malsberger has written a study of changing ideology among conservative members of the United States Senate from the second session of the 75th Congress in 1938 through the second session of the 82nd Congress in 1952. His thesis is straightforward: between 1938 and 1952 conservatives in the Senate increasingly split into two camps. One contained what he calls "obstructionists." These

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were senators who remained strongly anti-New Deal. In his view they retained an image of America as agrarian instead of industrialized and urban. They resisted "expansions of state power as it affected both domestic affairs and international relations" (p. 264).

The second group he labels "new conservatives." He argues that they "generally made peace with the positive state and with American internationalism" (p. 264). They adjusted intellectually to the necessity of increased state power generated by the Great Depression and World War II.

To provide evidence for his thesis, he makes extensive use of public documents, newspapers and magazines, and manuscript collections of major conservative senators of the period. He also mines books, journal articles, and doctoral dissertations. In addition, he analyzed roll calls for each individual Senate (see pp. 18-21 for the methodology). Overall, the evidence he amasses shows the emergence of two distinct types of conservatives along the lines Malsberger defines.

The roll call results are only moderately helpful. Malsberger reports the results in considerable detail for each individual Congress but leaves the reader the task of comparing them across Congresses. That comparison reveals only one major pattern: a hardening of the split between Democrats and Republicans in the Senate after Harry Truman replaced Franklin Roosevelt as president. Until 1945, the group that gave "low support" to the Democratic administration contained a substantial proportion of Democrats (between 24 percent and 50 percent in the 75th through 78th Congresses); but it quickly became almost exclusively Republican from 1945 through 1952. By contrast, the "medium support" group was quite bipartisan from 1941 through 1952 after being primarily Democratic from 1938 through 1940. The "high support" group was almost exclusively composed of Democrats during the entire period.

Malsberger also analyzes the medium and low support groups in terms of whether they came from coastal or interior states. The data show a modest increase in coastal composition in the medium support group and a corresponding increase in the interior composition of the low support group.

This book cannot explain legislative outcomes, nor does it seek to do so. It does not refer much at all to the House of Representatives and only mentions final policy results sporadically. Rather, it is a study of the ideological reaction of conservative senators to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman and their domestic and international proposals from 1938 through 1952.

In summary, Malsberger presents a great deal of information on the intellectual history of a subset of U.S. senators during the fifteen years under review. This story is a modest part of the overall gradual acceptance in the United States by politicians and the public of the changes wrought by the response of the federal government to the enormous challenges of the Great Depression and World War II. Did the "new conservative" senators help cause gradual public acceptance or were they reflecting changing public opinion? The answer is probably a bit of both, although that question is beyond the scope of this

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study since it does not address the context of public opinion in which these senators worked.

RANDALL B. RIPLEY
Ohio State University

Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started A War *by Julie A. Mertus. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999. 378 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $19.95.*

One of the most contentious analytic and policy debates concerning the Balkans over the past decade has been whether the conflicts in the region stem from ancient hatreds or whether they are the products of top-down, elite-manipulated nationalism. In her rich study of the recent crises in Kosovo, Julie Mertus goes beyond this simplistic debate and presents a sophisticated analysis of the political, economic, and cultural conflicts over the past three decades in the province. While her argument is that Serb nationalist leaders with their highly repressive policies are to blame for much of the turmoil in Kosovo, she persuasively demonstrates that history and myth are central to understanding why both Serb and Kosovar Albanian populations respond to elite actions.

Mertus begins her analysis with a general overview of the macrolevel social, economic, and political cleavages that began to surface in the 1960s and 1970s. She recites the well-known demographic situation in which thousands of Serbs migrated out of the province leaving behind a Kosovo Albanian majority population. She also describes the devastating economic conditions in the province and the constitutional changes in the 1970s that granted Kosovo greater autonomy and fueled rising expectations among Kosovo Albanians while furthering anxiety among Serbs who remained in the province. But unlike most other analyses that leave the reader to infer some causal linkage between these conditions and interethnic violence, Mertus provides a clear linkage of the macroconditions to the specific violence of the 1980s and 1990s.

Mertus's thesis is that Kosovo Albanian and Serb tensions have intensified over the past three decades because the two groups have developed competing and conflicting interpretations and histories (or "Truths" as she calls them) of specific events. She demonstrates the existence and influence of competing interpretations by examining four separate crises that significantly contributed to ethnic tensions in Kosovo in the 1980s and 1990s: the 1981 student demonstrations; the 1985 Martinovic case; the 1987 Paracin Massacre; and the 1990 alleged poisoning of Albanian school children. In each case she demonstrates how each group came to a different interpretation of these events through a complex maze of elite-based propaganda and underlying predispositions emanating from historical, cultural, political, and economic experiences.

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The strongest case in her analysis is the 1981 student demonstrations. According to Mertus, the demonstrations began as small, localized protests over food and housing conditions at the university in Pristina, but they quickly grew throughout the province. The demonstrations lasted for nearly two months before they were forcefully repressed by Serb police forces. While the actual reasons for the spread of the protests may never be known, Kosovo Albanian, and Serb elites put forward competing interpretations of the events that have evolved into competing "Truths" held by Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. Most Serbs believe that the protests were inspired by Albania-backed Islamic fundamentalists seeking to tear Kosovo from Serbia. For many Kosovo Albanians, the first few days of demonstrations were organized by students merely seeking better living conditions, but the second and third wave of demonstrations were orchestrated by Serb secret police or other Serb nationalists who needed a pretext to launch a crackdown against the Kovovar Albanians.

The real strength and original contribution of Mertus's study is that she does not stop here with her analysis. She goes on to demonstrate through the use of personal interviews with Serbs and Kosovo Albanians how these competing Truths—in this case and in the others—directly led to the erosion of previously harmonious relations between Serb and Kosovo Albanian neighbors and friends.

This book was written before the NATO air campaign of 1999, but her analysis and her policy prescriptions on the need for international awareness of the existence of competing Truths are not only still appropriate but even more important today. This book should be required reading by all those who study and work in the Balkans and on ethnic conflict.

JON W. WESTERN
Mount Holyoke College

Kosovo: War and Revenge *by Tim Judah. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. 348 pp. Cloth, $37.50; paper, $17.95.*

Tim Judah brings a journalist's tenacity and a scholar's rigor to his assessment of the ongoing conflict in Kosovo. The author traces the historical roots of the Serb-Albanian conflict in this once-obscure province and provides a fresh perspective to explain NATO's involvement in a 78-day military campaign against Serbia despite intense negotiations at Rambouillet. Anyone who closely followed the humanitarian disaster that befell the Kosovo Albanians in spring 1999 will find much that is familiar here. However, Judah's comprehensive treatment is notable for its clear exposition of the tangled relationships among the principal national and international actors. The author draws upon recently published memoirs, personal interviews with key participants in the Rambouillet conference, and his own insights derived from years of on-site reporting

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from the front lines of this most recent Balkan conflict. Judah believes that, above all else, the conflict in Kosovo was a "war of human error" (p. xviii) and missed opportunities.

The author believes that the air war against the Serbs and the ensuing refugee disaster occurred because of a failure to find creative solutions to a problem that did not lend itself to a traditional fix. The author points out that the Serbian overlords in Kosovo refused to acknowledge the passion of Kosovo Albanian demands for autonomy; moreover, he believes the Serbs overestimated Russian willingness to stand by their Slavic cousins in the face of international pressure to do otherwise. On the other side, Judah explains how and why United Nations diplomats and Western leaders underestimated President Slobodan Milosevic's disdain for UN Resolution 1199, which demanded that "Serbs and Albanians stop fighting and start talking" (p. 178). And finally, he suggests that NATO generals were caught off guard when military plans for Kosovo did not neatly follow the pattern they had established previously in Bosnia. Most importantly, the international community was left scrambling to assess its responsibility—and ability—to avert the humanitarian disaster that would doubtless result from the Serbian government's attempt to control rebellious secessionists within sovereign Serb territory. Unfortunately, we appear to be no closer to an answer to this conundrum while the bloodshed and displacement in Kosovo and elsewhere continue.

Judah's treatment of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its leadership is particularly useful. While most of the Western press portrayed the KLA as home-grown volunteers who came together as an army of dedicated patriots, Judah paints a decidedly more realistic picture of an organization driven by internal rivalries and power plays within its multilayered leadership. Although negotiations between the Serbian government and often self-appointed representatives of the Kosovar Albanians were difficult enough, they were made nearly meaningless because of the in-fighting among the Kosovars themselves. Commanders of the KLA in the field either were left in the dark as to the decisions that were being taken at Rambouillet or refused to adhere to agreements made by KLA rivals. Additionally, Judah draws attention to the ways in which modern technology—cellular telephones—have revolutionized traditional diplomatic negotiating sessions. Secrecy and the sacredness of the negotiating chamber are phenomena of the past.

The weakest aspect of Judah's analysis becomes apparent when he strays from the immediacy of his own experience or the testimony of the principal actors and into the realm of speculation as to Milosevic's motives. Again and again, experienced diplomats have failed to call Milosevic's bluff, underestimating his appetite for brinkmanship and grandstanding. The author offers alternative explanations for the Serbian president's actions, but in the end, the reader is left to sift through the clues for the truth. Nevertheless, Judah's analysis is always compelling and well informed.

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Many questions as to Kosovo's future—and that of the Balkans as a whole—remain unanswered. The conflict continues as Kosovar Albanians and Serbs exact revenge upon one another every day in the aftermath of this latest conflict. As French President Jacques Chirac pointed out at Rambouillet, "The will for peace can outweigh the temptation of war" (p. 202). As Judah makes clear, in Kosovo the appetite for revenge continues to undermine that will for peace.

LAURA SWARTZ
U.S. Military Academy

The World Split Open: How the Modern Women's Movement Changed America *by Ruth Rosen. New York, Viking, 2000. 446 pp. $34.95.*

The book jacket describes Ruth Rosen as an historian and journalist, a split identity that captures both the strengths and weaknesses of this new book. Based on two decades of research and interviews with leaders as well as followers, *The World Split Open* presents a kaleidoscopic portrait of a movement that spanned the country and eventually touched women of every class, religion, race, and ethnicity. Rosen begins her story with a discussion of the constraints on women's lives imposed by cold war politics. She then proceeds to trace the rise of the National Organization for Women out of President John F. Kennedy's Presidential Commission on the Status of Women (1961-1963), the proliferation of younger women's groups, and the creation of a feminist culture that enabled women to see injustice in experiences that had once been accepted. All of this is accomplished with balance and fairness to the bitterly competing factions that the movement produced. Rosen shows how a welter of feminist groups posed basic challenges to thinking about gender but at the same time allowed an obsessive fear of hierarchy and power to undermine their effectiveness. In the book's most interesting section, she reveals how the Federal Bureau of Investigation contributed to this process through its confused efforts to infiltrate and destroy the movement whose subversive force the agency suspected but never began to understand. Throughout, Rosen seeks to explain how the women's movement changed America.

And yet, *The World Split Open* offers little analysis and no central argument. Rosen chronicles successive splits within the women's movement without exploring the ideological disputes that divided liberals from socialists, socialists from radicals, and radicals from cultural feminists. She cites the importance of affirmative action in advancing women's economic status without defining the factors that led to its widespread adoption or examining the limits of its effect. She condemns the press for its negative treatment of feminist efforts without explaining why the institution that did the most to publicize feminists' earliest writings has so regularly heralded the movement's demise. She mentions that

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many of the self-help projects that spun off from early women's groups came to be incorporated into governmental agencies, hospitals, and universities; but she does not examine the process by which they did so or the success that they enjoyed. She condemns what she calls "consumer feminism" and rightly disparages the self-help, human-potential movement for trivializing feminism; but she ignores the extent to which feminism grew out of these traditions and fails to elucidate why, having offered a vital challenge, feminism had so much difficulty transcending them.

Rosen's organizational strategy compounds the book's analytical weakness. About halfway through her narrative, having reached the point at which many younger feminists began leaving the Left in the late 1960s, she abandons her initial, chronological approach. Subsequent chapters shift to topical discussion of the women's health movement, lesbianism, pornography, prostitution, rape, consciousness raising, feminist publications, and "proliferating feminism." This thematic treatment of mostly sexual topics helps obscure the ways in which feminism was first aided and then, with the economic stagnation and rightward political shift of the 1970s and 1980s, subverted by larger historical currents.

Scholars of modern feminism will value this book for its research and for being the first to treat the women's movement as a national phenomenon of broad political sweep, but they will miss a persuasive explanation of why, by Rosen's own account, the challenges she describes so effectively were not more successful in bettering women's lives.

ROSALIND ROSENBERG
Barnard College

Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age *by Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000. 224 pp. $22.50.*

National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War *edited by Craig Eisendrath. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2000. 296 pp. $34.50.*

These two books look at current intelligence requirements from quite different points of view. *National Insecurity* is a collection of articles, most of which criticize covert operations and clandestine human intelligence collection. The book begins with a largely mundane survey of intelligence problems and approaches by Roger Hilsman. The most notable feature of this article is the unlikely statement, "As McGeorge Bundy pointed out, even a very successful terrorist attack with nuclear weapons would be no worse than the Chernobyl accident," (p. 15).

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What Bundy actually said in the passage that Hilsman cites is quite different: "The terrorist's bomb . . . could be enormously more destructive than the power-plant disaster at Chernobyl, but it would still be much more like that isolated event than like a nuclear war engaging the superpowers." (McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, p. viii).

Hilsman also criticizes covert action and human espionage. The essential argument, prevalent in this book, is that such operations were of questionable morality and effectiveness during the cold war. Absent a threat posed to U.S. survival, such operations should be drastically scaled back if not eliminated. Hilsman favors elimination. Another theme briefly raised by Hilsman but developed more substantially in subsequent articles is that diplomatic reporting is a preferred substitute for clandestine human collection by the CIA. Two articles by former diplomats reporting on their own interactions with the CIA, Robert E. White and Robert V. Keeley, have the most interesting developments of this theme. Both argue that resources currently spent on clandestine human collection should be shifted to the underfunded State Department. Of the two, the article by Keeley is of greater interest, because it includes examples of CIA efforts that were helpful as well as those that were harmful, giving readers some basis for making judgments themselves.

An article by Richard Stubbing addresses overall intelligence spending. It recommends cuts in the funding for each intelligence agency averaging about 15-20 percent. Unfortunately, Stubbing does not provide specific rationale for these quantities—what activities in particular would be cut and why. This may have been because Stubbing had no more than general arguments, classification concerns with being more specific, or simply lack of space in an article.

If Stubbing may have suffered from lack of space, *Best Truth* suffers from too much space. The book has an important insight—the happy coincidence of the less stable international situation in the post-cold war era and modern networking technology allowing for an intelligence community that can flexibly realign itself to deal with new issues as they emerge. Otherwise, the book adds little beyond proposing greater use of open source and private sector resources. The book proposes organizing temporary intelligence "virtual teams" in support of specific consumers. It gives short shrift to the objectivity and quality control problems that may arise and never characterizes the identity of these consumers (that is, individual services, individual program managers, etc.). The book also has a mildly interesting chapter on the authors' view of covert operations. The authors admit, however, that this discussion has little to do with the rest of the book.

RICHARD BRODY
Falls Church, VA

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To Lead the World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War *by John Fousek. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 254 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $18.95.*

In this contribution to the continuing debate on the origins of the cold war, John Fousek writes a cultural history arguing that elites, imbued with a belief in American nationalism, dominated public discourse, marginalized dissenters, and "constructed" popular support for U.S. foreign policy in the cold war. Although the author purports to be "concerned more with popular perception" of American foreign policy than the policy itself, clearly his sympathies place responsibility for the start of the cold war on the United States (p. ix).

Fousek's thesis is that "American nationalist ideology provided the principle underpinning for the broad public consensus that supported Cold War foreign policy" (p. 2). The author explores several arguments to buttress his contentions. First, American globalism of the 1940s was nationalistic at its core and was rooted in the universal values of freedom, equality, and justice. Second, the American-led victory in World War II demonstrated national greatness and thus a concomitant responsibility. To American popular opinion, global leadership would not threaten other nations, because American "exceptionalism" meant its global responsibility—its manifest duty—carried with it an aura of benevolence (pp. 45–7). Finally, the rising tension and global competition with communism provided the glue that cemented the pieces together creating, what Fousek terms, "American nationalist globalism."

According to Fousek's argument, FDR's rhetoric of American greatness and responsibility painted a picture of American global leadership through international obligations such as a U.S.-led United Nations. The media elites accepted and promulgated the view that American leadership was required to ensure peace and freedom throughout the world.

FDR's death meant the replacement of a cosmopolitan president with a nationalistic Harry S. Truman. Almost immediately, according to the author, presidential rhetoric began to place added emphasis on American national greatness and less on international organizations. Increasingly, governmental and media elites—thus mass culture—saw U.S. national security interests in global terms. Over time "national self-interest and global altruism were identical," thus forming the core of American nationalist globalism (pp. 7–8).

Once the first two elements of this ideology were firmly ensconced, world events provided the necessary third leg of the stool—national greatness led to a global responsibility requiring American leadership to contain the global threat of communism. This third element, according to Fousek, had the limiting effect on the public discourse surrounding American foreign policy. As the ideology gained broader public support, those who challenged the appropriateness of American global leadership were vilified as isolationists. To be a loyal American or to be taken seriously in public discourse, one needed to support the basic tenets of the Truman administration's foreign policy—the ideology of American national globalism.

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Organizations such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) were put into a difficult position. These groups were often at odds with the foreign policy of the Truman administration, but believed they needed the executive branch as an ally for domestic political reasons. Therefore, according to the author, supporting the Truman administration's foreign policy became an important method of demonstrating national loyalty, securing that alliance, and facilitating their domestic agenda.

As a political necessity, the leadership of the CIO expelled communist-led unions and the NAACP dismissed W.E.B. Du Bois for his vociferous condemnation of Truman's foreign policy. Actions such as these secured the desired alliance with the Truman administration and effectively marginalized most of the dissenting opinions related to American foreign policy. These tactical decisions, in Fousek's words, "helped to cement the Cold War consensus as the new foundation of U.S. public culture, which ultimately limited the range of [foreign policy] debate" (p. 161).

Fousek should be commended for a lucid, well researched, and tightly argued book that is a significant contribution to the debate concerning American popular cultural attitudes and the start of the cold war. Of equal importance is how Fousek's insights of a constructed popular opinion leading to a U.S. globalist foreign policy relate to a very similar debate involving American foreign policy at the end of the cold war. It is déjà vu; America demonstrates its greatness through a cold war victory, requiring global responsibility and leadership, thus necessitating a globalist foreign policy.

CRAIG T. COBANE
Culver-Stockton College

The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution *by Tinsley E. Yarbrough. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 306 pp. $35.00.*

Under full disclosure I should note that I have been a fan of Tinsley Yarbrough's work for years. His study of the United States Supreme Court under Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist is surely no disappointment.

Yarbrough's discussion and analysis of the Rehnquist Court's decisions constitute most of this book. The first two chapters, however, make the work particularly useful for those who are not judicial scholars but seek a scholarly treatment of the Supreme Court. The first chapter reviews the confirmation histories of all but one of the currently sitting associate justices (John Paul Stevens is the exception) and the confirmation of Rehnquist as chief justice in 1986. Chapter Two discusses the internal operations of the current Court, describing, for example, the pace of decision making and the interactions among the justices. In this chapter, Yarbrough brings thoughtful analysis to two recent con-

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troversies involving the Court—the extent to which the justices' law clerks influence the outcome of cases and the Court's long-held tradition of secrecy, especially as that secrecy has been impaired by the opening of justices' court papers to the public, in particular while some of those whose internal memoranda are included remain on the Court. Yarbrough rescues these topics of clerks and secrecy from the realm of finger-pointing and hyperbole; instead he raises measured concerns with which scholars and citizens alike should be familiar. (Yarbrough, as noted below, is among those scholars who have made use of justices' papers.)

Following these introductory materials, Yarbrough takes up in turn the major areas of law the Supreme Court has addressed in the Rehnquist era: governmental authority, federalism, and separation of powers; economic regulation; "unenumerated" rights such as privacy and personal autonomy; religion; freedom of expression and association; criminal justice; and equal protection. Yarbrough's skill in writing about the Supreme Court is clearly evident here. He covers these legal topics in a most judicious manner, such that important decisions are given appropriate attention while the reader is spared having to wade through too much detail about too many cases. Especially noteworthy is Yarbrough's treatment of the Rehnquist Court's federalism and takings clause cases. Yarbrough's task is not mere description; it is his critical analysis that makes this book so enlightening. Nor are published opinions the only source Yarbrough draws upon to tell this story of Court and Constitution. Internal Court materials (opinion drafts, notes from justices, clerk memoranda) from the papers of retired Justice Thurgood Marshall are used—and scrupulously documented—to explain how the justices developed the reasoning eventually seen in the final opinions.

Yarbrough concludes, as have many Court observers, that the Rehnquist Court has been neither what conservative Republicans had hoped nor what liberal Democrats had feared. This Court has established a "generally conservative, yet essentially mixed, civil liberties record" (p. 267). *Roe v. Wade* has not been overturned. The state, it has been held, may aid religious schools in many ways, but public schools are not themselves to sponsor religious activities. The Burger Court's refusal to expand the criminal rights protections of the Warren Court has been maintained; in particular, the Rehnquist Court has shown little sympathy to death penalty challenges. In the realm of equal protection, the Court has subjected affirmative action plans and racially-sensitive redistricting to careful scrutiny.

Given that Yarbrough's conclusions about the direction of the Court's decisions are not unusual, one might wonder why this book rather than some other on the Rehnquist Court. The answer lies not only in Yarbrough's careful research and clear writing but also in his explicit concern for the role of the Supreme Court as an important political institution and the effects of the Court's decisions in the life of the nation.

SUSAN E. GROGAN
St. Mary's College of Maryland

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Politics and Constitutionalism: The Louis Fisher Collection *edited by Robert J. Spitzer. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2000. 292 pp. $57.50.*

Few recent scholars of the American Constitution and government have been as influential as Louis Fisher. His impact traces to his extensive testimony before Congress and to the impressive quality and quantity of his scholarship. Over the years, he has expounded many important ideas. At a time political science emphasized behavior, not institutions, and studied branches in isolation, Fisher insisted institutions were important and should be viewed together. He appreciated the Founders' commitment to checks and balances and developed Richard Neustadt's insight that ours is a system of separate institutions sharing powers, not of separation of powers. Constitutional interpretation, Fisher argued, was not the exclusive province of courts; other institutions join in constitutional dialogue. Just as judicial exclusivity was constitutionally suspect, so too was executive autonomy in warmaking, foreign policy, and spending. Congress's intended role had shrunk, in part because it had abdicated constitutional powers.

Robert J. Spitzer presents in one short volume essays by seven of Fisher's admirers on various themes that resonate in his work. These papers are generally well-reasoned and worthwhile. They may not settle the questions discussed, but that is largely because the constitutional issues addressed do not lend themselves to easy resolution, especially within the confines of an essay. They do provoke thought in areas Fisher has spent his career illuminating.

The first four essays after Spitzer's introduction address to varying degrees the extent to which the judiciary is the exclusive or ultimate voice in constitutional interpretation. The essays generally accept Fisher's argument that constitutional dialogue does and should occur but strike the balance in different ways. For instance, Neal Devins argues that "[n]o single institution has the final word on constitutional questions" (p. 25). Michael J. Glennon discusses coordinate review in the context of foreign affairs. He argues that branches other than the judiciary help shape constitutional meaning but believes judicial decisions merit greater deference than do Fisher or Devins. David Gray Adler summarizes and defends Fisher's criticism of presidential claims to engage in unilateral warmaking. He concludes that "the postwar practice of unilateral presidential warmaking finds no support in either the text of the Constitution or in our constitutional architecture" (p. 100). An interesting contribution by Dean Alfange, Jr. reminds us that the Supreme Court's federalism decisions increasingly have separation of powers overtones; when the Court overturns federal statutes on federalism grounds, it asserts judicial power while narrowing national legislative power.

The book tends to caricature the activity of lawyers and law schools in developing another of Fisher's themes—that constitutional interpretation is not the exclusive province of lawyers. For instance, several articles assume that le-

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gal scholars believe the Court is the sole constitutional interpreter. Yet Fisher has helped persuade many legal academics (though not the Court) of the merits of coordinate construction. Many constitutional law scholars are well versed in other relevant disciplines, enhancing their commentary.

This volume demonstrates the value of multidisciplinary approaches to studying the Constitution and government. Certainly political scientists have an important role in helping place constitutional decisions in context and explicating the ideals behind our institutions and values. The Court's renewed penchant for striking down congressional statutes in federalism cases raises the question of whether political, rather than constitutional, safeguards can protect the states. Political science can help illuminate this important contemporary constitutional issue and others.

Constitutional dialogue between historians, lawyers, and political scientists would no doubt enrich the contributions from all fields and those of our system's various constitutional interpreters. Fisher's work well illustrates what a scholar sensitive to these disciplines can add to these enduring questions.

JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN
Saint Louis University School of Law

Pitiful Plaintiffs: Child Welfare Litigation and the Federal Courts *by Susan Gluck Mezey. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 272 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, 19.95.*

Following a path taken by others who could not obtain their objectives by resort to the political process alone, child welfare advocates have turned to the federal courts to force state child welfare agencies (and indirectly state legislatures) to be more responsive to the needs of neglected and abused children. Political scientists have divided on the legitimacy and efficacy of such court-based reform. Susan Gluck Mezey argues that litigation can be an effective and appropriate way to accomplish social change. She attempts as well to add to our understanding of the nature of judicial policy making in such cases.

Mezey reviews the academic and policy debates over how best to protect neglected and abused children, and then continues with a history of the involvement of federal courts. She focuses primarily on *B.H. v. Johnson*, a class action suit filed on behalf of children under the custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). She traces this case from its inception through the implementation of the consent decree that resulted.

Drawing from this case and from related litigation, Mezey argues that federal court judges play a significant role in public policy formulation, both in the recognition of rights and in their implementation. She cites numerous examples of law developed in the lower federal courts. For example, when Judge John Grady allowed the *B.H. v Johnson* lawsuit to proceed, this itself was an act of

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policy making. Plaintiffs had charged DCFS with failing to provide minimal protection and services to children in its custody, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, relevant federal laws, and various state statutes. Judge Grady agreed with the constitutional argument, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause imposed a constitutional duty on states to protect children in their custody. However, although Grady drew from legal developments elsewhere, his decision was in no sense compelled by either Supreme Court or Seventh Circuit precedent. Grady later helped to orchestrate the final consent decree in this case and then continued to play an active role in the implementation of the policy through the appointment of a monitor.

In the end this litigation served as a resource for social reform advocates. Though it took time, the state legislature ultimately increased DCSF appropriations, which in turn allowed the DCFS to improve its operations and lower its case worker-client ratios.

Mezey presents a convincing case that courts have had an important role in reforming child welfare bureaucracies. It is unclear, however, that one can generalize from litigation aimed at reforming child welfare agencies to social litigation elsewhere. One could easily argue that the child welfare case that Mezey presents is not typical. The plaintiffs here drew much public sympathy. The DCFS as defendant had little to lose and derived a clear benefit from the outcome. Caught between increasing demands and limited resources, DCSF was pleased with the increased budgets they ultimately received from the state. Similarly the legislators, while unhappy with federal mandates in general, did not intrinsically oppose helping neglected children. The outcome of litigation in other types of cases, particularly those in which the plaintiff's cause is unpopular or challenges accepted norms, might be very different. Finally, there is a significant question about whether the present Supreme Court, which has been much more inclined to expand state immunities against federal intervention than previous Supreme Courts, will continue to allow significant state institutional reform by federal judges. Overall, however, Susan Gluck Mezey has provided a thoroughly researched, useful addition to the literature on interest group litigation and judicial decision making.

CAREN G. DUBNOFF
College of the Holy Cross

Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation *by Bruce Conin. New York, Columbia University Press, 1999. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $18.50.*

This book represents an important contribution to the emerging constructivist literature in international relations dealing with questions of collective identities. Bruce Conin, who teaches at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, starts

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from the assumption that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Alexander Wendt) and argues that self-help is only one particular form of security arrangement that can develop out of an anarchic international system. He posits seven different security arrangements—from an international state of nature all the way to amalgamated security communities whereby two or more states essentially merge into a federal system. The distinctive feature of these security systems is the degree of common identity among the members of the system. Conin is particularly interested in community-based security arrangements and distinguishes between concerts to manage security affairs collectively in a given region, common security associations based on shared regime types or political ideologies, and amalgamated security communities with common pan-nationalist identities. He illustrates his argument empirically by investigating various transnational communities in nineteenth-century Europe—namely the Concert of Europe as a great power community; the Holy Alliance of Austria, Russia, and Prussia as a security association to preserve absolutist monarchies; and the pan-Italian and pan-German nationalist movements as examples for the emergence of amalgamated security communities.

Conin's theoretical contribution consists of the attempt to discuss the conditions under which transnational common identities transform an egoistic definition of oneself to one based on membership in a social group. He draws on social psychology, namely social identity theory, as well as social theory, particularly symbolic interactionism, to make his point. He then argues that the emergence of a transnational community identity requires both material and intersubjective conditions. He mentions shared fundamental characteristics (common ethnicity, form of state, level of economic development), a shared exclusive relationship to the other states in the system, and strong interdependence among the states. Sustained interaction then leads to the emergence of transnational collective identification and community-building.

The theory part of the book is very well argued. Conin specifies the conditions under which transnational identities emerge as well as their effects on behavior. He goes beyond the existing literature by developing precise and empirically testable hypotheses. The empirical case studies on security communities in nineteenth-century Europe draw on the existing historical literature and do a good job of illustrating his theoretical argument. Conin should be applauded for selecting historical cases rather than focusing on contemporary security arrangements.

I have two critical observations. First, Conin's theoretical argument is state-centric, even though he—somewhat misleadingly—uses the term "transnational" implying a reference to nonstate actors. While this state-centrism serves the cases of the Concert of Europe and of the Holy Alliance well, the evolution of pan-Italian and pan-German nationalist identities owes a lot to the activities of societal groups and actors. But the theoretical argument essentially ontologizes states. Second, from a methodological standpoint, it is a pity that Conin did not make a more thorough effort to evaluate his well-developed hypotheses

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more systematically by paying more attention to case selection. The four case studies serve to illustrate his categories of security arrangements and the emergence of transnational identities (against mostly realist explanations). But Conin did not use them to submit his propositions to systematic empirical tests.

In sum, the book substantially contributes to the theoretical literature on security communities based on collective identities, while there could have been a tighter link between the theoretical propositions and their empirical evaluation.

THOMAS RISSE
European University Institute, Florence, Italy

On Narrow Ground: Urban Policy and Ethnic Conflict in Jerusalem and Belfast *by Scott A. Bollens. Albany, State University of New York Press, 2000. 416 pp. Cloth, $73.50; paper, $24.95.*

The study of cities presents the political scientist with a methodological dilemma. Cities are both intensely political locations requiring sophisticated application of social science research skills, and at the same time they can only be fully understood from a multidisciplinary perspective. In surrendering some of the rigor of systematic analysis in order to utilize the advantages of a more holistic approach, political scientists run the risk of creating muddle and confusion. In *On Narrow Ground*, Scott Bollens appears to have got the balance just right with a clear analytical framework incorporating insights from other disciplines. The result is an intellectually accessible and highly rewarding book.

The task Bollens sets himself is both very pertinent to social scientists, urban planners, geographers, and social psychologists; but it is also central to our understanding of the roles cities play as mediating institutions between the national, regional, and local political environments. He wishes to examine the extent to which ethnic conflicts on a local and national level affect the planning and development of urban areas. Or, conversely, can urban planning ameliorate or exacerbate ethnic conflict in divided cities? Is it the conflict that creates the city's problems or is it the planning process as well? The choice of Jerusalem and Belfast are clearly highly appropriate for this task. Despite the complexity and emotional accretions that are part and parcel of the study of these two cities, Bollens has been able to conduct both an illuminating debate and to provide valuable insights into the workings of the planning system and the relationship to the political milieu.

The book comprises an introductory section, a section on Jerusalem, another on Belfast—each of three chapters—and a concluding section of one chapter. The first section discusses the relationship between planning policy and ethnic conflict in an urban setting. It also lays out the analytical framework

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Bollens will use and details of his fieldwork. This is a useful overview and excellent introduction to the theoretical and methodological aspects of the subject. Identifying four main strategies of urban policy—neutral, partisan, equity, and resolver—he hypothesizes that urban policy in Jerusalem is partisan and in Belfast is neutral.

Being more familiar with the situation in Jerusalem, this reviewer was impressed with the grasp of the subject shown by Bollens over both the general evolution of planning policy in Jerusalem and also over the more subtle elements that can normally only be discerned following a long period of residence. He shows great knowledge of both the internal debates among Israeli planners and the significance of fast-moving political changes brought about by the Middle East peace negotiations on the future of the city. A similar sure-footedness is evident in the section on Belfast. Much of the success of the work can be attributed to the thoroughness with which Bollens constructed the research project.

The book concludes with the rather undramatic but carefully argued view that urban policy making has an important impact upon ethnic conflict: in Jerusalem it has accentuated and heightened ethnic divide, in Belfast it has bought time but not resolved the underlying problem. While these two case studies can bring a solid body of evidence to confirm this conclusion, they do lead to another question: Jerusalem and Belfast play central roles in relatively small political areas of Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland. Would the planning process of cities in a much larger polity such as Johannesburg or Montreal have a similar impact? Limited to only two case studies, ultimately the book can only be a partial answer. Nevertheless, *On Narrow Ground* is applied political research at its best, good theory, good methodology, and useful to a wide range of students, scholars, and practitioners.

MICHAEL DUMPER
University of Exeter, UK

Women and Politics in Uganda *by Aili Mari Tripp. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2000. 280 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $25.95.*

For decades, if not centuries, the pendulum has swung between state and society as the appropriate focal point of political analysis. While *Women and Politics in Uganda* clearly prioritizes civil society, Aili Tripp goes even farther than those who emphasize the importance of societal autonomy as a means to engage the state more effectively, contending that autonomy offers other benefits, such as an organization's ability to select its own leaders and to challenge discriminatory distribution of resources.

Although these benefits of societal autonomy are also arguably essential to improving society's capacity to negotiate with or resist the state, the book lays

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out a convincing argument that civic associations need autonomy from the state in order to break the "politically dysfunctional state-society relationships" in Africa (p. 5). Furthermore, Aili Tripp argues that African women are particularly well positioned to assert their autonomy from the state, ironically because they have been politically marginalized, thus suggesting that marginalization is a double-edged sword that is potentially empowering as well as exclusionary.

The book provides a detailed history of the manipulation of women's organizations in Uganda, including the current National Resistance Movement (NRM) regime, which assumed power in 1986. The purpose of these four chapters is to demonstrate that "the scope of the agendas and the level of activity by women's organizations were most extensive during periods of greater autonomy from the government" (p. 52).

After a brief interlude in Chapter Six, which discusses Ugandan women's challenge to patronage politics, Aili Tripp presents four case studies that draw on a combination of survey data from over 500 interviews and personal interviews with over 200 individuals. Her seamless use of quantitative and qualitative methods is not common in the study of African politics and is to be applauded. The first three cases about the control of a health clinic, ownership of local market stalls, and beneficiaries of an urban renewal project focus on the challenges of establishing autonomy from states, while the fourth illustrates the problems of accountability attributed to the increasing availability of funds from international donors.

The case studies are detailed and fascinating, although the reader is left wondering whether the observed increase in women's activism is attributable to autonomy, especially given the discussion in Chapter Five of alternative explanations, including the promotion of women by the NRM and their increasing access to economic resources and education. To isolate the role of societal autonomy, a comparative study would be needed with a country where these other factors are present but do not result in an influential women's movement because of the absence of societal autonomy. In her introduction, Aili Tripp briefly mentions Ghana as potential candidate for such a comparison.

This is an ambitious book that engages various literatures in political science: civil society, new institutionalism, decentralization clientelism, and feminist theory. One of the most theoretically insightful contributions of the book is the challenge it poses in Chapter Eight to the dichotomy in feminist theory between the practical and strategic struggles of women that sets up an implicit hierarchy among activists rather than recognizing practical struggles as inherently strategic, as the Ugandan cases demonstrate.

Nevertheless, given that what is often needed in the cases is women's autonomy from men or other elite women who seek to manipulate them, it is not clear that societal autonomy from the state is sufficient. Nor entirely desirable, since "the main problem facing the women's movement is the government's lack of responsiveness and inability and unwillingness to address their key de-

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mands" (p. 102). The double-edged sword of marginalization, after all, cuts both ways.

LINDA J. BECK
Barnard College

From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America *by Alison Brysk. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000. 370 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $24.95.*

Delving deeply into the indigenous rights movement in Latin American, Alison Brysk takes us far beyond the testimonial literature of horrific human rights abuses of the "lost decade" and analyzes the phenomenon of how indigenous peoples utilized the so-called dominators' means of global communication to tell their stories to the world and in doing so crafted new political linkages at an international level. In a well-documented and highly readable text, she demonstrates how marginalized Latin American Indians thought locally and acted globally not only to transform their existing identity, but also to create new ones that frequently gave them more leverage with international forces in their bid for justice within their own borders.

Synthesizing social movement and democratization theories, international relations, and ethnic politics from a critical constructionist approach, Brysk analyzes the compelling process of how indigenous peoples reached out across borders to rewrite power relations, a task that was often impossible to accomplish within their own civil society. She utilizes a most-different-systems case study approach to examine indigenous movements from Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Bolivia. She discusses how representative movements interact with power (state), profit (international market), and principle (cross-national identity).

In Chapter Three, drawing on cases of the Nicaraguan Miskitos' armed rebellion aimed at autonomous rule, international drug eradication efforts on Bolivian highland Indians, and Brazil's treatment of the Amazonian Yanomani, Brysk illustrates how identity and autonomy claims serve as linkages to international organizations, which in turn help reformulate from above the existing civilian-state relations of the indigenous peoples and their home country.

She outlines in "Indian Market": Profit Versus Purpose (Chapter 4) how ethnic identity can sometimes counteract the markets "most ethnocidal effects." From so-called ethnic earthquakes of indigenous mobilization against Ecuadoran structural adjustment policies to the creation of community capitalism in Mexico, to ecocapitalism of Brazil's Kayapo, Brysk demonstrates how indigenous identity fosters cohesion within the community and internationally, and how it serves to protect the group's heritage and identity on a variety of levels.

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Utilizing the cases of how international organizations, ranging from the Catholic Church to nongovernmental organizations, anthropologists, and scientists, interacted with various indigenous groups, Brysk concludes that the impact of both transnational civil society and global conceptualizations of indigenous peoples on the amount of political empowerment depends on the level of their autonomy from power and profit, as well as the strength of indigenous identity and self-determination.

In the Conclusion, she argues that when the ravages of power, profit, and principle coalesced with globalization, the tribal village was nearly erased; but surprisingly, globalization can serve as a tool for those struggling against it. "If poor and isolated Indians can block World Bank projects and evict oil companies, perhaps we're not all condemned to be hapless victims of global forces" (p. 286). Brysk is not so naïve as to call for more globalization, yet she does call for more international attention to the problems of Latin American Indians by offering a clever indigenous impact review process of sorts for all international aid, trade, and development programs, as well as other policy solutions.

This is an important work that not only meticulously documents a fascinating social and political phenomenon, but also analyzes it in a both a scholarly and creative fashion drawing together various theoretical approaches. Thus it makes a much needed contribution to the fields of Latin American politics, indigenous and ethnic politics, as well as social movement theory.

PAMELA STRICKER
California State University, San Marcos

Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions *by Lloyd Gruber. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000. 316 pp. Cloth, $60.00; paper, $19.95.*

Despite its grandiose title, this book is actually devoted to case studies of economic agreements in two special regions—North America and Western Europe. Gruber charts in some detail the series of negotiating maneuvers that produced the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and agreements on a common European monetary system.

These negotiations in the late 1980s and early 1990s are hardly new terrain for scholars of international relations. But Gruber argues strongly for new interpretations. First, and most importantly, he takes issue with the assumption that these negotiations rested simply on mutual recognition of common interests. Instead, Gruber emphasizes the defensive or reactive—or coercive—moves that drove the bargaining behind these agreements.

In Gruber's telling, Mexico felt compelled to seek a free trade pact with the United States after the United States concluded a free trade pact with Canada in 1988. In this new setting, Mexican authorities feared a sizable threat to U.S.

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investment in Mexico unless Mexican exports could be assured access to U.S. markets on terms at least as favorable as those now secured for Canadian exports. But to preserve their own gains, the Canadians felt obliged to join a tripartite pact to head off a separate U.S. agreement with Mexico. Left to themselves, Gruber claims, both Canada and Mexico would have preferred no agreement to the NAFTA arrangements that ultimately emerged. Gruber tells a similar story about European negotiations: the threat by Germany and France to establish their own common currency compelled Italy and other countries to go along when they would really have preferred that every country keep its own currency.

In emphasizing the disparate bargaining power among states and the consequent power of some to frame the agenda for others, Gruber seeks to challenge the assumptions of the "liberal" (or "neo-liberal") literature in IR studies regarding the scope for mutually beneficial cooperation among states. Here he explicitly sides with realist critics who see international relations as fundamentally a competitive struggle for advantage, where cooperation is more an accident than a norm.

But Gruber also wants to correct the realist penchant for viewing states as unified actors. In his telling, a key element in the original Canada–U.S. Free Trade Agreement was the eagerness of Canadian Conservatives (then in power in Ottawa) to lock in a policy that the Liberals had opposed. Similarly, French conservatives sought to lock France into a common monetary policy that Socialists opposed. In both cases, the politicians who sought to consolidate their own preferred policies had to think about the mix of incentives (to remain in the new structure) and disincentives (against withdrawal) that would commit successor governments. To understand the ultimate shape of both agreements, Gruber argues, we must look at the precise motives of the particular political actors involved and not simply at the assumed interests of states.

Others may question Gruber's analyses on particular points, but the general argument seems quite compelling. Gruber is particularly clear and skillful in explaining how his interpretations highlight blind spots in existing theoretical literature. Still, Gruber may be too optimistic in his expressed hope that international theory will make great progress by integrating the insights of rational choice scholars on positioning leverage and agenda setting in domestic disputes. The world is a lot bigger and messier than North America and Western Europe. Many noneconomic issues, which are suppressed or settled in domestic politics in liberal states, may be much harder to suppress in international disputes.

But this remains a useful book and IR theorists will do well to wrestle with it.

JEREMY RABKIN
Cornell University

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Comparing Post-Soviet Legislatures: A Theory of Institutional Design and Conflict *by Joel M. Ostrow. Columbus, The Ohio State University Press, 2000. 464 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $29.95.*

Enough time has elapsed since the fall of communism that one can begin to assess why some postcommunist regimes and institutions have functioned better than others. Several theories—including political culture, modernization, sequencing of reforms, geography and the role of the West, and institutionalism—have been trotted out to account for variance across countries. Joel Ostrow's work on legislatures clearly falls into the last category, as he examines how the design of institutions accounts for differences in their ability to manage conflict. He presents three cases for analysis: the Russian Supreme Soviet (1991–1993), the Russian Duma (1994–present) and the Estonian Riigikogu (1992–present).

Ostrow's central point is that the relative importance of committees and factions or parties, along with the linkages between the two, is a major factor in explaining legislatures' ability to manage both internal conflict and disputes with the executive. His three cases are each designed differently. The Supreme Soviet was committee-dominated, as partisan factions played virtually no role. He describes the Duma as an "unlinked, dual-channel" design; there are both factions and committees, but the two are not tied together in any systemic fashion. The Estonian case links both channels and therefore functions along the lines of what most would call a normal parliament.

Ostrow refines his argument by specifying four types of conflict management capacity, which is his dependent variable. These concern different sets of issues: legislative (the budget) and extralegislative (personnel) issues both internally within the legislature and externally vis-à-vis the executive. He maintains that the nonpartisan Supreme Soviet was a "well-oiled legislative machine" in terms of passing legislation, but otherwise suffered from its lack of partisanship. Specifically, he maintains that this deficit gave free reign to the Speaker to pursue his disastrous line of confrontation with the president. In contrast, the Duma suffers excessive partisanship that undermines the capacity of its committees; but surprisingly, the Duma has managed relations with the executive better than its predecessor. The Riigikogu scores high on all counts, as governing coalitions control the committees, providing strong links and well-defined relations with the executive.

Much of the research—in particular in the case of the Duma—is based on systemic participant observation. Ostrow is thus well-positioned to detail the often opaque legislative process itself. His arguments are cogent, and he engages in theory building by noting where his findings converge or diverge with existent literature on legislative behavior. Of particular interest is the theme that it is the nature of links between parties and committees, not their mere presence or absence, that accounts for conflict management capacity. Ostrow also attempts to transcend much of the institutionalist literature that focuses on

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constitutional issues (parliamentary vs. presidential systems) by claiming that either system can work if it is designed properly with internal legislative linkages and mechanisms to constrain executive-legislative conflict.

There are shortcomings. In places the book tends to be repetitive. Background information detailing the substance of parliamentary-executive conflict in Russia and the positions of the Duma's factions would be helpful, as without it the book is far less accessible to the nonarea specialist. More seriously, perhaps, Ostrow's effort to be theoretically parsimonious gives little room for alternative explanations or factors that account for the differences he observes. For example, the constitutional changes in Russia and the events of October 1993 may have conditioned the Duma to behave differently, as it knew it could not pursue political conflict with the executive. Moreover, the Duma's ambiguous relationship with the government—unlike the clear parliamentary system in Estonia—has been a constant source of trouble for Russia, independent of the linkages between factions and committees. However, Ostrow does makes a persuasive case for how changes in institutional design, as opposed to constitutional overhaul, could produce a more efficient legislature, although he remains agnostic as to whether these changes, as opposed to the current executive dominance, would ultimately further democracy and reform in Russia.

PAUL KUBICEK
Oakland University

Profits and Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China *by Michael A. Santoro. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2000. 242 pp. $25.00.*

This book did more to whet than to satisfy my appetite for an investigation of an increasingly important topic: What should global businesses do to improve human rights conditions in the places where they source products or invest? Although not a China specialist, Santoro takes China as his case study because, he says, it currently absorbs one-quarter of world investment and as an authoritarian state, it poses the relevant dilemmas in the sharpest form. These dilemmas include the pressure on businesses to abuse worker rights in order to save on labor costs ("the race to the bottom") and the risk that the authoritarian government will penalize firms that defend rights.

Santoro nonetheless insists that businesses have a moral and practical obligation to defend rights, albeit within a limited sphere. In working toward this argument, he proposes a number of useful distinctions. One is between businesses engaged in a "cost-minimization strategy," which involves buying cheap labor, and businesses engaged in a "market-building strategy," which involves a long-term presence and employment of more managerial and technical personnel. The former type of business creates more human rights problems

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(sometimes through subcontractors), while the latter type tends to create positive human rights spin-offs through meritocratic personnel practices, training in participation, and the like.

Another useful distinction is between the different human rights goals of policies that use or threaten sanctions and those that rely on "comprehensive engagement." Santoro suggests that each has been successful on its own terms, the former by obtaining specific prisoner releases, the latter by encouraging long-term change. Much of the debate over the choice between the two confuses the goals each can obtain. But choice is necessary: the two policies cannot be used at the same time.

Such arguments are attractive but at some points superficial. The book contains no primary investigation of human rights abuses either in Chinese sweatshops or in Chinese society more generally. The argument that engagement produces human rights benefits seems to assume that any good developments—rising living standards, the growth of civil society, cultural change—improve human rights. This "all good things go together" argument overlooks the specific nature of the obligations that states including China have undertaken by signing human rights covenants and conventions. Santoro never takes note of the fact that human rights are obligations on states under international law. His chapter on cultural debates is thus marred by the conclusion that, "There is no authoritative international consensus about the universality of human rights values" (p. 140). One knows what he means—human rights are debated—yet the most important rights are established by internationally binding treaties, which China and most other countries have signed.

The heart of Santoro's argument is what he calls a "fair share theory of human rights responsibility." It argues that businesses have a moral obligation to work for human rights improvements in those areas where they are able to have an impact, regardless of whether doing so might exact a business cost. This means "yes" to defending the rights of their own workers, but "no" to intervening proactively with the host government on behalf of the rights of others. It also means "yes" to incorporating worker rights standards into the World Trade Organization system.

These conclusions are not everything a human rights advocate might want, but they also set heavier obligations on businesses than most executives are ready to accept. Thus despite their apparent good sense, they still need more rigorous moral reasoning to become persuasive to doubters. Santoro slides over the hardest questions. If a corporation is not obligated to protest when it is not in a position to make an impact, does this justify operating in pervasively abusive settings like Burma or—to take the extreme case which is often useful for sharpening the issue—Nazi Germany? If one of the reasons corporations cannot make an impact is that their executives are not trained to do so, then shouldn't the lack of training be remedied rather than become an excuse for inaction?

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These are questions human rights advocates might ask. Business executives are likely to wonder why the fact that they can make a difference should require them to do so. Santoro's answer is that human rights are moral rights, so everyone should contribute. But this is undermined by his own argument (albeit one that I think is wrong) that there is no authoritative consensus on rights. It would still be questionable even if he accepted that human rights are binding obligations under international law, because the international law of rights obligates states, not corporations.

The book's common-sense, pragmatic tone serves well to open up a complex and important topic for several communities of readers—policy makers, business people, and the nongovernmental organization community. Even if few settle for his conclusions, he will have helped by setting out some terms for future debate.

ANDREW J. NATHAN
Columbia University

Prayers in the Precincts: The Christian Right in the 1998 Elections *edited by John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2000. 416 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $23.95.*

In the 1998 elections, commentators notice a curious thing: despite the media hype in the 1980s and 1990s about the rise of the Christian Right (takeovers of state Republican parties, elections to school boards, presence in the primaries, and influence over the Republican platform), the Christian Right's participation and influence in electoral politics was surprisingly flat. Candidates supported by religiously conservative groups and evangelical voters fared badly in states such as Georgia and Alabama. Republican candidates distanced themselves from the Christian Right in states such as Florida and Texas, and conservative Christian candidates suffered bruising battles in primaries in California.

In *Prayers in the Precincts* John C. Green, Mark J. Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox and their co-authors document the trials and tribulations of the Christian Right in 1998 in a variety of northern and southern states. They review nomination processes, mobilization efforts, internal state party battles, and electoral outcomes; they find waning influence, even in states where the Christian Right holds significant organizational and political power. The case studies show effectively that the Christian Right faces significant constraints on growth for the foreseeable future.

A number of interesting themes emerge from the volume. For instance, many authors note the tension within the Republican party generated by the need to mobilize the Christian base—both votes and money—and the equally important requirement of attracting moderate voters, especially in the non-

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southern states. Kenneth D. Wald and his co-authors, for example, chronicle the transformation of candidate Jeb Bush from a darling of the Christian Right to his shedding of positions favored by the religious conservatives, even eschewing events sponsored by the Christian Coalition and selecting a pro-choice running mate. They argue that this shift in part facilitated his eventual election to the governorship of Florida. Similarly, J. Christopher Soper and Joel Fetzer note the helplessness of conservative Christian groups in California, who supported moderate Republican candidates such as Matt Fong for Senate, as a pragmatic nod to the mainstream in the GOP and the state's prevailing social liberalism.

The review of the states is useful and informative, particularly since it is usually the local efforts of the Christian Right that generate cumulative national political impact. The volume, however, needs to do a better job generating systematic explanations for the strength or weakness of the Christian Right. For example, the authors could have drawn on the literatures concerned with public opinion and American political culture to explore the limitations of Christian Right appeals. As Clyde Wilcox and Mark J. Rozell quite rightly note in their conclusion, the Christian Right has never influenced views of the American public in the same way as other important movements, such as the women's movement, the gay rights movement, and the civil rights movement.

More generally, the authors could have looked at how variation across states in party structures, political cultures, or electoral rules makes the emergence of political movements more or less likely. By drawing on the social movement, interest group, and parties literatures, rather than relying solely on explanations rooted in the peculiarities of each state, the authors might have been able to generate insights applicable to American politics more generally.

ANNA GREENBERG
Harvard University

In The Name of Liberalism: Illiberal Social Policy in the United States and Britain *by Desmond King. New York, Oxford University Press, 2000. 350 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $19.95.*

Defining liberalism as a political philosophy that values individual freedom and equal treatment under the law, Desmond King argues that under certain conditions the liberal democratic state in the twentieth century violated its own core tenets. He introduces three cases of illiberal practices undertaken by the United States and Britain—eugenic policies in the 1920s, work camps for the unemployed in the 1930s, and modern workfare programs. In each case, social policy failed either to defend individual freedom, or promote equal treatment, or both. "Each of these measures entails differential treatment (sometimes involuntarily or quasi-voluntarily) for the citizens concerned," says King, by "mak-

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ing judgements about the mental competence and reasoning powers necessary for citizenship," "using collectivist solutions to social problems," or "requiring activities of recipients of welfare benefits" (p. 10).

The general thesis that liberal democracies have generated illiberal policies seems indisputable, although there may be questions as to whether King has selected the most salient cases or whether violations of liberal norms are in some circumstances acceptable. A fellow of St. John's College and professor of politics at Oxford University, King is careful to acknowledge these concerns by providing ample justification for his case selection as well as a critical reading of the arguments advanced for eugenicist social policies, work camps, and workfare programs by politicians and policy experts. The role of a "problem-oriented knowledge elite" (p. 34) appears especially important from King's perspective, given that "policies are legitimated and rationalized by reference to a claim about their intrinsic validity" (p. 32). "The influence of experts and expertise has grown," he insists, "resting on the implicit (or sometimes explicit) assumption that the quality of such research is sufficient to justify its application in policy choices" (p. 34).

Having highlighted the increasingly critical intervention of think tanks and social science research in the realm of social policy, King turns to the cases themselves, offering a well-researched if narrowly focused overview of Anglo-American policy making in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1980s–1990s. The section on the impact of theories of eugenics on family policies is particularly engaging, if chastening from a moral standpoint. His account of the U.S. Civilian Conservation Corps and the Instructional Centres (work camps) of depression-era Britain is also enlightening. The least satisfying section from a comparative and historical perspective addresses the only current illiberal policy that King's book considers—the emergence of welfare-to-work programs in the United States and Britain. While the author nicely summarizes conservative objections to tax-funded welfare and the so-called dependency culture, he seems reluctant to directly confront the dependency thesis or provide an alternative approach to tackling social inequality. While critics of welfare provision might object to King's characterization of workfare as contrary to basic liberal principles, they will not feel much of a sting from his discussion of their views.

The unanswered question is whether the three cases are merely illustrative of a more general dynamic or whether illiberal policy in countries such as the United States and Britain is exceedingly rare. King does argue, somewhat abstractly, that "illiberal elements appear to be part of liberalism itself. It is a defining but neglected feature of liberal democracy" (p. 27). But he does not try to determine whether these elements are common. At the conclusion of the book, King says the implication of his study is that "liberal democracy is a dynamic not a static set of institutions and values, the content of which should never be assumed but instead periodically scrutinized" (p. 308). I find it striking that a book purporting to unveil the hidden, nonliberal aspects of policy making

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would conclude by calling for "periodic" scrutiny of the modern bureaucratic state.

KENT WORCESTER
Marymount Manhattan College

Models of Capitalism: Growth and Stagnation in the Modern Era *by David Coates. Cambridge, MA, Polity Press, 2000. 310 pp. Cloth, $64.95; paper, $24.95*

Scholars of comparative political economy have increasingly accepted that capitalism in the industrialized democracies is not monolithic, but instead that there are at least two varieties of capitalism, each governed by its own internal logic. The first is the liberal market economy, exemplified by the United States, in which the principal mode of coordination among actors is the free market. By contrast, in organized market economies like Germany's, employers and workers primarily coordinate their interactions through nonmarket mechanisms.

David Coates argues that this theoretical development is fundamentally mistaken: while capitalist diversity may have been possible between 1945 and 1973, he claims that the free movement of financial capital across borders sounds the death knell of multiple models of capitalism. Rather than a clinical review of the relative merits of different models, this book is a political manifesto, exhorting parties of the Left to move away from British Prime Minister Tony Blair's embrace of a kinder, gentler capitalism—the so-called Third Way.

The empirical core of the book comprises four chapters examining the political determinants of growth in the United Kingdom, United States, Sweden, West Germany, and Japan. These variables will be familiar to political economists, but readers unfamiliar with this literature will find the synthesis of past research informative. There is good evidence to show that the organization of labor and systems of education and training do matter for economic performance, and Coates presents it nicely. But these are distractions from the variables the author really wants to consider: the organization of capital and of the state.

Along with much of the current literature on political economy, Coates underlines the primordial impact of the organization of capital in the functioning of modern capitalism. Employers have differing interests, and recent research has shown how the coalitions built by competing groups of employers have profoundly shaped economic and social policy in the capitalist democracies. The varieties of capitalism in the advanced industrial countries are constructions of which employers have been active architects. But so too have states; even the systems of private interest governance associated with corporatism depend on the willingness of states to erect enabling legal frameworks

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within which these actors can govern themselves. Deferring to the evidence he presents on this score, Coates admits that "in the first half of the postwar period, the nature of the global order allowed a significant space for both consensual and developmental alternatives to a purely liberal market order. The question before us now is whether . . . the space for those alternative models is diminishing or has already gone" (p. 229).

Coates argues that the liberalization of finance has eliminated the possibility of multiple models of capitalism, as capital wanders the globe searching for "ever more supine or repressed proletariats abroad" (p. 244). Yet this claim neglects the voluminous literature on globalization, which in fact shows exactly the opposite—the remarkable durability of diversity within the capitalist countries. More tellingly, it runs against the grain of his own claims about the centrality of the organization of capital in the first place. If employers helped build these capitalist systems and designed production processes so as to exploit their comparative institutional advantage, why would they abandon them now?

Although the author stretches his argument farther than the evidence can support, the empirical chapters represent a useful, accessible synthesis of research on economic growth from political scientists, economists, and sociologists. And the book certainly delivers on its promise of being a provocative contribution to the ongoing discourse of thinkers on the Left.

PEPPER D. CULPEPPER
Harvard University

Term Limits in the State Legislatures *by John M. Carey, Richard G. Niemi, and Lynda W. Powell. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2000. 182 pp. Cloth, $49.50; paper, $18.95.*

The adoption of legislative term limits in twenty-one states during the 1990s produced a rare natural experiment. Speculation—call it hypothesizing—abounded in the early part of the decade about the potential effects of legislative term limits. Now, as term limits are actually applied (or their effect approaches), those hypotheses are being tested in serious empirical studies.

John Carey, Richard Niemi, and Lynda Powell are interested in the potential effect of term limits on who gets into legislatures and how these people act when they get there. They also want to know how term limits affect the distribution of power within legislatures and state governments more generally, and about enhanced electoral competitiveness that may result when limits are effected.

The authors surveyed most state legislators serving in 1995 and all whom they could reach who last served in the immediate preceding two years. Additionally, they interviewed twenty-two legislative leaders in Maine, California, Washington, and Massachusetts, and looked systematically at decisions of state

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senators to seek congressional seats in 1994. The behavior of old timer and new comer legislators is separately assessed. Multiple regression analysis includes extensive controls for the effects of political system and legislative district-based differences and includes a newly devised measure of legislative professionalization. (See Appendix C.) Though the work proceeds with great methodological care, the authors don't tell us why they surveyed all senators but just three-quarters of the state Assembly members. Nor do they explain why they chose the four states they did for leadership interviews, or why fully half of these were completed in Maine alone.

Research results are very nicely summarized in end-of-chapter tables. Apart from a slight increase in opportunities for women and some dampening of a national trend toward social conservatism, term limits seem to have had little effect on legislators' demographic characteristics or ideological predispositions. The assurance that every legislative seat will open at a predictable moment encourages potential challengers to wait for vacancies, diminishing competition. But term limits also drive up aggregate campaign costs, because more seats become open and because legislators focus energy, resources, and effort outside their constituencies in anticipation of next career steps. Electoral competition for congressional seats was enhanced by state-level term limits: members facing limits had fewer costs—no safe seats to risk—as they considered next career steps.

Within state government, interviewees reported that power shifted away from legislatures and legislative leaders to governors, bureaucrats, and (sometimes) interest groups. Within legislatures, the shift was to staff and sometimes to committee chairs. Also within legislatures, cooperation, expertise, and legislative craftsmanship became less important with term limits, while the importance of individuals' policy agendas grew. Most interestingly and less anticipated, collaboration between houses suffered as incentives grew for Assembly members facing limits to challenge senators with overlapping districts.

It is my guess—hypothesizing again—that for the longer term, the individual effects found here are underestimated while the institutional ones are overestimated. This is because as American society continues its rapid demographic transformation, forced regular openings in legislative seats will create earlier, more frequent opportunities in states with term limits to mirror these changes in the population in the characteristics of their legislators. Meanwhile, institutional mechanisms will be found, as was the case in the 1970s, to assure that legislative power in the political system is buttressed.

GERALD BENJAMIN
State University of New York, New Paltz

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To Promote the General Welfare: A Communitarian Legal Reader *by David E. Carney. Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 1999. 320 pp. $65.00.*

Asian Security Handbook 2000 *edited by William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000. 349 pp. $89.95.*

Human Rights: A Bibliography *edited by Arthur V. Carrington. Huntington, NY, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2000. 435 pp. $49.00.*

Historical Encyclopedia of U.S. Independent Counsel Investigations *edited by Gerald S. Greenberg. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 2000. 550 pp. $99.50.*

Parties and Elections in America: The Electoral Process, Third Edition *by L. Sandy Maisel. Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999. 583 pp. $35.00.*

One Europe, Many Nations: A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups *by James B. Minahan. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 2000. 781 pp. $99.50.*

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For the Public Record: A Documentary History of the League of Women Voters *by Barbara Stuhler. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 2000. 313 pp. $65.00.*

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

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

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

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

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

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

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